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"Participation" is one of a class of essentially contested concepts.

Review of major contemporary political interpretations of power and

possibility in the United States illuminates the wide-ranging meanings
for this concept.

Particularly, the revision in the liberal-pluralist

conception in its criteria of application and moral point requires
critical examination.

Another purpose of this study is to make a case

for expanding the scope and practice of participation.

The approach is contextual and follows the thesis gaining favor
that implicit and explicit normative commitments both shape and flow

out of any explanatory framework.

recognize the 'hermeneutical

'

It,

therefore, makes sense to

or interpretive character of the sciences

of man.

A vision of the participatory society derives from the ideas of
Rousseau, T. H. Green, and John Dewey and provides a contrast model by

which to appraise the selected interpretations.

The chief feature of

this model is the emphasis placed on the cognitive and affective

development of the Self under participatory social arrangements.
This development is fostered when all members of a community formulate,

discuss, and determine common issues affecting them.

Through this process

the process
the individual is encouraged to act as a moral agent and in

social stability can be promoted.

Tlie

liberal-pluralist (e.g., Robert A. Dahl) views participation

as one of many roles competing for the individual's attention in

democratic society.

Individuals are depicted as free to engage in a

range of political forms, but this range is limited in historically-specific
ways.

The paradigmatic case of participation is voting.

Dahl recommends

/
expanding the settings of participation, but, because of his theory of
abstract individuals, he misunderstands and rejects for the wrong reasons
the fuller classical vision as a possibility.

Furthermore, he fails to

see why the present structure makes it irrational for some members cf

society to participate in the ways he prescribes, thus underscoring the

inadequacy of the consensus-integration framework.
The importance of the constitutional republican interpretation
(e.g., Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi) is that it discloses the

manipulated use of the term in the liberal-pluralist vocabulary.
Participation becomes "cooptive" under present conditions and impedes
socially just policy.

The analysis, however, leads to the unwarranted

dismissal of expanded and- enriched forms of participation by assimilating
the abstract conception of the individual to its theory.

The radical-liberals (e.g., Peter Bachrach and Arnold S. Kaufman)

advance the self-developmental model of participation and recommend expanding
the settings of participation to the workplace, the schools and universities,
the neighborhoods, and elsewhere.

Appraisal of this Interpretation reveals

that how interests are "objectively" formed is an important consideration
to the participatory case.

The critical theory of Herbert Marcuse significantly shows distorted

communication as a form of social control.

Marcuse

's

work has theoretic

«/

limitations, but his philosophy affords a synthesis with the radical-liberals

who appreciate the importance of experiential settings.

Extending

Marcuse's insight, this study constructs a model of "repressive participation'
and considers the extent to which instances of ordinary political activity

approach the limiting case.

"Representative participation" is activity that

serves the requirements of the established apparatus of production, distri-

bution, and consumption at the price of the cognitive and affective growth
of the individual.

Repressive participation closes political discourse.

*

This study concludes that the present forms of participation and

non-participation in American society, and the forms of participation
which are possible, are directly related to the language-structuring of
society.

Class-structuring, the fracturing of people into cultural

units, is to a large extent the function of social language and who

controls it.

Possibilities for self-development are linked to opportunities

for linguistic-conceptual development which expanded settings and enriched

forms of participation help to provide.
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CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION - THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION

EHte theory, including

its pluralist variant, has had a firm hold

on V/estern social thought and practice and, if there were a reason
to

believe

thiat

it has been held at an unnecessarily high price in lives

suffered and lost, we would probably be inclined to reexamine once again
the grounds and implications of that set of ideas and judgments.

Just

such a reexamination has begun to take place, although it is not so clear
that all relevant viewpoints are engaged as parties in the debate.

A central claim pressed against elite theory from its challengers
involves the issue of the scope of participatory institutions and the
place of citizenship within the modern democratic structure.

The claim

has usually been framed in phraseology that recognizes the individual's

capacity and right to share in the decisions which affect his life.

The

call for exj)anded participatory structures, however, cannot be successfully

pressed if the elite theorists are correct about the necessity and in-

evitability of elite structure under the conditions of advanced industrial
society and the limited possibilities for human conduct on the whole.
There is some reason to believe that they are mistaken on several points.
Elite theorists are not correct in suggesting that a high degree of cir-

culation among elites compensates for the imbalance of authority obtained
between elites and masses, nor are they correct about the disinterested

perspective of professionalized elites.

More importantly, they under-

estimate the tendencies for extremes to develop in society from a class

stratified set of arrangements,, and they do not take into account the

1

nature and causes of revolution.

Finally, and most significantly, they

are unconcerned with the human need for self -development and
selfreailj-zation.

On the practical side of life, the subject of participation is not

likely to be of interest to the individuals who have what they want,

when they are enjoying a state of wealth, privilege, and power.

The

person who is materially well off does not need to see the interconnection between institutional structures and the character of hujnan
existence, unless he is pressed to do so.

Interest in participation

generally arises only when one does not enjoy such a position.

The

atte;apb to expand the scope of participation and invigorate the exercise

of participant rights by all is the

atteiiipt

tribution of bu_rdens and benefits.

The underlying premise is the impor-

to redress the existing dis-

tance of the development of "self", through the interactive processes of

a community, for a stable and just democratic society.
This is the way interest in participation exhibited itself during
the early 1960's, a time vjhen American society looked to various groups
as though it were moving more and more in an inegalitarian direction with
2

power concentrated in an identifiable elite.

The civil rights effort,

1

The influential role of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels is being referred
to here, and the developed arguments against versions of the elite interpretation are fo^ond in T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Maryland:
Penguin, 196U).
2

.

(New York: Oxford, 1956) lent
support to such a view. A frequently cited source on inequality has
been Gabriel Kolko's Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social
Political
Praeger, 1962
Cl ass and Income Distribution (New York;
economists such as Robert Lampman, Herbert Oans, and Thomas Weisskopf
have given further attention to charting the dimensions of inequality.
C. Wright iMill's, The Power Elite

3

the struggle for voting rights, even the
reapportionment cases could be

viewed as effectively symbolizing the failure of American
politics to
make the representative process fair and open.

In the course of the

^

decade, private and public obstruction of efforts to reshape
power in a

more fully participatory way became even more visible.

"Participation"

was captured as a hortatory word, taking on an ideological connotation.

An example of this was the controversial phrase, "maximum feasible
participation," in the Economic Opportunity Act of

196)4.

This phrase was never

clearly thought out in the terms of its organi-zational requj.rements or its
political implications in a system of federal arrangements.

The degree to

which it nurtiared a program of social action "loaded with political dyna3

mite"

V7ent

unnoticed by the ratifying congress.

In all its ambiguity,

the phrase contributed to undelivered promises and conflict irrelevant to
tlie

matter of enabling excluded and disadvantaged groups to articulate

their needs and aspirations and develop their capacities for critical
appraisal.

Cynicism set in towards the use of a vocabulary which expressed

aspirations ujifulfilled by a practice that denied and limited them.

3

John C. -Donovan in The Politics of Poverty (New York: Pegasus,
provj.des
an accoimt of the genesis of the controversial section,
1967)
Section 202 (a)(3), of Title II, Economic Opportunity Act of 196ii; see
Ch. 2-3.

The political science profession did not clearly
lend a hand to
support the claims of expanded participation.

k

Conventional political

science offered empirical support to constricted
interpretations of

advanced industrial society.

For instance, some students of voting

behavior reacted to the claim for expanded participation by
arguing

closely the evidence against this possibility.
lor participation

m

Others pressed claims

terms of a very narrow range of application.

In

T
Representative of mainstream political science I would take to be
the consensus perspective that is encouraged in the presidential addresses
of the American Political Science Association and the dominant empirical
approach that is revealed in its annual convention and Review papers.
The position is enunciated in the Association's history, Albert Somit
and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development o f America n Politi cal Science
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 176-180. ParticulariyTnfluential
in the application of this approach is the work of the University of
Mchigan's Survey Research Center (e.g., Campbell et al. The American
Voter, I960). Not until 1969 did acknowledgment of a challenge to~the
behavioral approach manifest itself; see David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," a presidential address reprinted in Amer ican
Polit ical Scie n ce Review, 63 (December 1969) :105l-1060.

Early arguments celebrating a passive citizenry were placed by,
for instance, Heinz Eulau, "The Politics of Happiness," Antioch Review ,
(1956) :259-26Iij and W. H. Morris Jones, "In Defense of Apathy7^^~PoIltical
Studies , 2 (February 195U):25-37. Also, James W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg.
"Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,"
Journal of Politic s, 22 (i960) :276-29U. Fears of a mobilized electorate
were expressed in the findings of Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity ,
and C ivi l Lib erties (Garden City, N. I.: Doubleday and Co.,
and by
Tierbert McCloskey's studies.
The case was succintly restated by Nelson W.
Polsby and Aaron V/ildavsky, "Toward Participatory Democracy?" in Wall
Street Journal, August 3> 1972.
5

Paradigmatic is the approach of Robert Dahl, whose work will be
discussed. It should be noted that his later work seeks a broader sense
of participation than some earlier works. Also representative are V. 0.
Key's studies, including The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966) and Alan A. Altschuler's Community Control The
Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities (New York:
Pegasus, 1970). Also, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in
America - Po l itical Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972).

—

v

failing to identify their ideological assumptions they
could be accused
of propping up a vi.ew of political participation which
justified and
7

gave advantage to particular dominant interests.

These studies, however, overlooked possibilities.

They seldom

questioned the legitimacy of a political system whose electorate turned
out at lower rates than most other European democratic systems, nor did

they indicate any suspicion that within the non-participant population
social discontents may be lurking.

That they failed to ask how the

quality of life for all might be fostered— especially for those for whom
the question is rarely posed

—meant

that the relationship between social

structure and hiwian development could never be investigated.

The ques-

tion of the relationshi.p between our concepts and the limits of our act on
J-

derives from a different perspective than the static, a hi.storical consensus perspective conventional political science works fromj that is

why the studies in political paxticipation as voting failed to bring to
life any of these considerations.

It

v/as

the critics

\rho

returned to

the classical democratic theory, especially the ideas of Rousseau, who
refonrnolated the lost and vague ideal of a participant citizenship and

7

Such methodological limitations are considered in, for instance,
Herbert J. Storing, ed., Lssays on the Sci e ntific Study of Politics
(New York:
1962); W. C. Runciman, Social Scie nce and Political Theory
(Cambridge: University Press, 1963T7"Chap. V; and Charles A. McCoy and
John Playford, eds., Ap olitical Po li tics: A C ri tique of Behavioralism
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, .1$^67"). An empirical critique of the
"Apathy" thesis is provided by Lester M. Salamon and Stephen Van Evera,
of
in "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations
(December
Review
Science
67
Political
American
Political Participation,"
15'73):12d8-1326.

A

6

pressed it as a just claim for all members of society.

8

The proponents

of this position suggested that much of the evidence for a
case for

participation had been lost in the narrowly confining social and economic
and bureaucratic arrangements of our societyj modern social conditions
are such that they stultify the individual's intellectual capacities and

sensibilities.

Conditions were not promotive of the kind of participation

that the classical democratic model required.

That maiiy sides have deliberated on the meaning and possible role of

participation makes opportune a critical analysis of the concept and reformu].ation of that concept in terms of its fullest practical range of appli-

cation.

That is, on one level, the task of this study

and clarification cf the concept of participation.

- t)ie

elucidation

As has already been

implied so far, "participation" is far from having limited and specific
usage and can be usefully considered to be one of a set of important,
9

general and abstract, and internally complex concepts subject to dispute.
The key for elucidating the concept is to see it in contextual

8

The critics' paradigm is represented by, for instance Christian
The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1968, ^19587); H.
Mark Koelofs, The Tension of Citi zenship (New York: Holt, Rineharb and
Winston, 1968 )j Th e Port Huron S tatement (Students for a Democratic
Society, 1962); Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism
Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 196?); and Robert J. Pranger, The
E.clips G of Citizenship-Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965).
(New York:
"

—

9

The significance of this characterization of certain concepts is
made apparent by Stuart Hampshire, T hought and Action (New York: Viking,
1959), PP» 230-231; and William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested
Concepts in Politics" (Paper presented at American Political Association
Convention, September ii-8, 1973), pp. 1-19.

7

terms— that is, within the interpretation of which

it is an integral part.

An analysis in terms of major interpretations of the United States

(as a

paradigmatic case of advanced industrial society) presumes the difficulty,
if rot the impossibility, of achieving a single broad-ranging, objective
theoi-y of human organization; and, therefore, the necessity of some de-

limiting perspective.

Human purposes, in other words, are closely built

into any viev; of society, and it makes sense, as Charles Taylor contends,
to recognize "the unavoidably 'hermeneutical' component in the sciences
10
of man."

In this view of political inquiry two arguments are taken as persuasive:

(1)

Important examined and unexamined assumptions, including

assessments as to ultimate value, necessitated by conditions of uncertainty
11

and limited empirical control, shape the perspective that guides inquiry.
(2) These sometimes unexamined and often obtuse assumptions which make up

an explanatory theory have bearing on the recommendations that flow out
of an interpretation.

The concept xial approach sets the range within which
12

things can vary and also sets normative conclusions.

While it may not

always be possible to resolve conceptual differences, and differences
that involve paradigm disputes, it is possible to expose these differences

and this process makes likely a more explicit awareness of the commitments

10

Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review
of Metaphysics (Fall 1971), pp. 3-5l.

William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York:
Atherton, 1968), pp. U8-5U.
12

Peter Laslett
Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in
ser. (New
3rd
and Socie ty,
and W. G. Runciman, eds., Ptolo sophy, Politic s
Barnes and Nobel, 1967), pp. 2b-i?Y.
York:

8

a theorist affirms or denies.

At the least, it makes more difficult the

distorted or manipulated use of a concept.
At one level, the purpose of this study is to show the contextual

reasons for the many meanings of participation in contemporary usaf,e and
to provide an explanation in terms of theoretical and ideological differ-

ences.

At another level, it seeks to

rtiake

a case for expanding the scope

and practice of a participatory style of politics.

The value of partici-

pation is found in its two functions recognized by the classical theorists,
most notably Rousseau:

First, to achieve self -development, the development

of the human personality in terms of its intellectual capacities and

sensibilities j and secondly, to redress the imbalance of forces in society
by so doing.

The manifest function of social institutions, and mod cm

politJ.cal ones in particular, is to mediate the extremes for bringing

social forces into balance; it is true that this function is not always
realized.

The effect of participating in the formulation of a collective

pub].ic decision is to influence the individual's self-identity and thereby

broaden his range of considerations in terms of the vrider values of the
communn.ty.

The process of making the law helps one to see the reasons

for feeling bound to the law; and this process should bind both those

for and against the particular item of legislation.

The case to be persuasive must show that the

tv/o

classical ends

claimed on behalf of participatory structures are theoretically possible,
if not actually achieved under conditions of advanced industrial society.
It must indicate the extent to which participation becomes possible
under various settings and with what consequences.
that in the prevailing interpretations choices

My effort is to show

ar.- iriAde

which exclude

9

this important theoretical possibility and to indicate how other inter-

pretations enable such a possibility to unfold.

Certain premises are essential for this effort.

Those which

I

have

identified as particularly important to this enterprise are indicated in

summary form to guide the reader in the line of argument taken.
(1)

Political inquiry must be guided by normative considerations.

Here I take my lead from classical democratic theorists who aspire to
establish the conditions of self-development for all members of society.
The empirical-normative dichotomy of conventional social science is

rejected as unfruitful.
(2) The view of a human "science" must be broadly conceived.

The

behavioralists, in patterning their approach of that of the natural

sciences model, have drawn their methodology too narrowly for the study

of the human phenomena.

Political inq^liry must be closely connected to

questions of political and moral philosophy,
(3)

A theory of institutions and self -development is important for

bringing out the interconnections betvreen social conditions and human
character.

Failure to see the interdependence of individual and environ-

ment can be linked to the British empirico-utilitarian tradition which
atomized subject and object.

The strong connections between what happens

to hiiman personality under variable social conditions best appears in

the work of Rousseau, Marx, G. H. Mead, and in the focus on understanding
analytic
"action" in the more contemporary developments of pragmatic and
13
philosophy,

13

PhiloRichard J. Bernstein in Praxis and Action - Contemporary
University of Pennsylvania,
sophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia:
development and its
this
of
1971) gives an excellent exposition
significance.

10
(U) Examination of socio-political processes in the conventional

terms of "consensus" and "conflict" may have to be reevaluated in
the
light of the view of man that is adopted here.

Particularly, what becomes

important is the identification of issues shut out of public debate and
the social, political, and economic structures related to this process.

In Schatt Schneider's sense, understanding the "mobilization of bias" in
a commujiity or polity becomes significant.
(5) The influential role of distorted communication in sustaining

and extending, if not establishj.ng, a class-divided society must be considered.

Language as a social product, can shape consciousness for en-

couraging the development of a rational and moral being or it can be

used to limit and crush that possibility.

Individuals carmot be autono-

mous when the conditions for that state are not available; that is

particularly so with highly centralized control of inforniation.
(6) Conditions of uncertainty in our knowledge about human organi-

zation cannot be used as an excuse for political scientists failing to
make recommendations for public policy.

The purpose of social science,

of human knowledge in general, is to guide conduct.

To put this off

means that decisions that must be made will be made by those less pre-

pared or ill-prepared to consider the problem in its fullest dimensions.
Analogously, non-participation is a process of decision-making by default.
I

will undertake an examination of the concept "participation" in

the following way:
First, I will review the classical formulation found primarily in

Rousseau.

Rousseau was concerned with the two aspects of participation—

required
the settings in which it can occur and the moral features they

11

on the part of the participants.

Participation developed the moral

virtues which were necessary for a modern social order.

What is im-

portant to remember about Rousseau's standpoint, which is very
unfamiliar
to traditional social science, is that he was concerned with the
oppor-

tunities that would allow for the development of the individual, all

individuals, to their fullest capacities.

In contrast, the contemporary

polj.tical behavioralist begins with the assumption of the necessity of

social stability and asks how it can best be achieved.

Often enough, it

appears as if it is achieved at the expense of at least some groups in
society.

Conditions of economic and social equality, solitude, and

respect for persons were part of the conditions required for Rousseau's

system of citizenship to work.

T. H. Green made an important contribution

to one side of the classical case for participation in his theory of

political obligation; this theory required that the citizen put into
practice a moral theory of the common good.

Citizenship was not the

highest state of morality for him but enabled the individual to become

self-realized, a rational and moral human being.

John Dewey made a con-

siderable contribution to the institutional side of the case for participation, strongly promoting the cause of broad scale participatory insti-

tutions extending to all levels of government and society.

For him they

were particularly important at the community level and in educational as

well as other social settings.

A second chapter will indicate the conventional position in political
science toward "participation."

Within this interpretation several

Vfiiriants

are apparent, depending upon assessments made about human capa-

cities.

I

take Robert Dahl's work as representative of the predominant

12

pluralist interpretation of the American political system.

Participation

in intermediary institutions is seen as important for maintaining
a

socially cohesive society, but participation refers to a more limited
range of activities than would be encouraged by a radical position.
Chiefly, Dahl is unable to deal vdth the problemmatic in advanced in-

dustrial society as many see it; the forms of participation that he
suggests are insufficient for resolving the prevalent social conflicts,
for they have not basically transformed the limiting and oppressive

conditions so that the individual can freely develop and critically

appraise his situation.

Other social scientists deny effective parti-

cipation for the mass of individuals altogether.

Minimal turnout for

presidential elections is regarded as a sign of a "happy" electorate, or
"expanded" participation is shown to be inefficient or impractical given
the scope of decisions required by the international and national scene.

This position is reflected in the interpretations of Irving Kristol,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Edward Banfield, for example.

But my concern

shall be primarily with the "strong" wing of the pluralists, the liberal-

pluralist case for expanding opportunities to participate.
There are a set of critics of the pluralist position who correctly
appraise, from the standpoint of this study, the political features of
the American system but draw mistaken conclusions as to what will

effectively remedy the problem.

Specifically,

I

will examine the work

of Grant McConnell and Theodore Lowi, the republican interpretation.
This interpretation neglects the lead of classical theorists and suggests

potential
that participation is a purely rhetorical device with little

consequences for realizing the public interest.

Decentralization, as a

13

broadly open system of making as many of the political decisions as
possible at local levels, is regarded as a ruse by special interests.
Centralization becomes a more viable alternative.

V/hat happens to the

individual personality in the way of becoming more impoverished in his
capacities for critical reflection and action, under the political system

McConnell and

Lovri recommence is

never regarded as a topic of concern.

Another set of critics, a position which we will identify as radicalliberal, however, offers a sensible alternative to the recommendations of

McConnell and Lowi.

Taking their lead from Schatt Schneider

'

s

important

effort to reveal the "mobilization of bias" in the American party and

pressure group system, Bactirach and Kaufman are among the first to return
to classical theory for elucidating the shortcomings of contemporary

democratic theory.

Bachrach makes the case for promoting the conditions

for self-development and attempts to show how increased opportunities for

participation in Baltimore restructure the balance of povrer in a more

democratically favorable way.

Kaufman, who is cautious about the benefits

to be expected from a broadened scope of participation, nevertheless,
feels that participation has a self-fulfilling effect and that it can

work if it is believed that it will work.

His work more clearly shows,

than Bachrach' s, what is required of the citizen as a moral agent.
The radical interpretation of advanced industrial society is framed

in the work of Herbert Marcuse.

Central to his critique is the view

that social and political conditions are such that not only is the develop
*

ment of the personality not encouraged, it is outrightly disallowed.

Marcuse 's pessimism about existing society leads him to recommend a

position of refusal or resistance, of non-participation.

Participation

Hi

within the established framework of po31tics is "repressive," subject
to the consequences of all delusory behavior.

I

will draw a model of

"repressive participation," suggesting the features that make his
critique of the liberal-pluralist conception such a controversial, yet,

important one.
V/hat

this project attempts then, in brief, is a contextual analysis

of the contemporary liberal-pluralist conception of participation in
order to see to what extent it is challenged or defeated by alternative
perspectives.

I

begin with a preliminary commitment to the ideal of a

participatory society as envisioned by the classicists, but

I

am also

alert to the historically- unique conditions of advanced industrialcapitalist society and the important functioning of elites under the

social arrangements associated with industrialization, bureaucratization,
Initially,

and urbanization.

I

want to suggest the analyses of Bachrach

and Kaufman and Marcuse make possible an enriched conception of participation that satisfies both the ideals of the classicists and overrides
some of the limiting conditions of present social and political arrange-

ments usually offered as significant objections to it.
I believe that the qualitatively different society that Marcuse

imagines as possible would be a truly participatory society, but he has,

with his version of critical theory, no leverage for developing constructive strategies for change, nor does he have an explicit moral theory.

These matters are correctly identified as the weakest part of Marcuse 's
philosophy, but,

I

believe, that a convergence can be worked out between

other
the perspectives of the radical-liberals and Marcuse through
in analytic
radicals and with the important work currently being done

.
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philosophy in terms of the concepts of "action" and "intention."

The

radicals, while identified with Marcuse's critique in essential ways,

provide some more developed indications of structures of change.

I

in mind, particularly, the work of Andre Gorz, Milton Kotler, and

E. F.

Schumacher and others.

have

They have been involved, both in theory and

practice, in developing participatory structures at the grassroots level,

viewing these as ancillary to developing the Qualitatively different
society.

Broad-scale participation in the communities, in the schools

and universities, and in other public and private institutions are seen
as important experiences for awakening the perception of another way of

life
But, most significantly, it is necessary for developing the social

language that is required for guiding human conduct.
portant point, and so in the concluding chapter,

I

This is the im-

want to propose a

scheme by which forms of participation and non-participation can be

understood in terms of being language-constituted.

This view recognizes

that individiials can only participate to the limit of their linguistic

ability.

I

find Habermas's distinction between the "purposive-rational

activity" model and the "communicative interaction" model as particularly

suggestive in this discussion.

Attention to the role of language in

social life, of communicative interaction, suggests new ways for in-

vestigating forms of participation in advanced industrial society and

Tu

See Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor - A Radical Proposal (Boston:
Beacon Press, 196?) and Socialism and Revolution, Norman Denny tr.
Govern(Garden City, N. I.: Anchor, 1913)] Milton Kotler, Neighborhood
York:
New
and
ment: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis
Beautiful-Economics as if
Bobbs -Merrill, 1969); E. F. Schumacher, Small is
see Hunnius,
People Mattered (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973;. Also,
Social
and
Labor
on
Reader
A
Control
Garson, and Case, eds.. Workers'
Change (New York: Vintage, 1973).
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may even, as well, go some way toward reconstituting the prevalent
forms
of participation now practiced.
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CHAPTER

II

THE CLASSICAL VISION OF ROUSSEAU, GREEN,
AND DEWEY:
PARTICIPATION AND THE CONCEPT OF SELF

Introduction

The classical vision of the participatory society
has its roots in

the French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
for it vas he
who, in an age of social discontent and discontinuity,
recognized the

plight of modern man in a most prescient, meaningful, and enduring way.
He identified the problem of alienation by framing the problem of human

society in terms of the dynamic relationship between social structure
and personality.

Later in his life, Rousseau captured

ttiis

insight in

his Confessions , stating it as the one underlying principle from

all his work flowed.

"I

whj.ch

had attained the insight," he wrote, "that

everything is at bottom dependent on political arrangements, and that no

matter what position one takes,

people will never be otherwise than what

a

1

its form of government makes it."

Framed in this way, Rousseau's work

becomes a critical tool for examining and appraising the social and
2

political arrangements of advanced industrial society.

But this view-

point has not always been favored,

Rousseau always considered himself an "historian of human nature j"
his concerns were precursors to those of philosophical anthropology.

1

Quoted by Ernest Cassirer in Rousseau, Kant and Goethe--Two
Essays (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970 /19U£/), p. 27.
2

We would be expecting too much if we seek in his writings constructive strategies as well. The emphasis is provided by Peter Gay in
his introduction to Cassirer 's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Indiana Uni.versity Press, 1963 /19!?i£/), p. 27.
(Indiana:

.

:
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Yet, many whose viewpoints have not been empathetic to
Rousseau on this

have misunderstood and misappropriated what he wrote.

Interpretations

have miscast Rousseau as a totalitarian, an irrationalist , a
pessimist,
a Utopian.

Having surveyed them, we are no further along in our under-

standing of the pervasive ills that we sense in our civilization.

tradition is much more resourceful and acknowledges its deb»

Anoth

k
.

3

The literature is abundant and all too familiar: For instance,
John W. Chapman, Rousse au
Total it arian or Liberal ? (New York:
Columbia
Um.versity Press, 1956); George Lichtheim, "Rousseau and DeMaistre" in
The Conce pt of Ideolo gy and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 196?),
pp. 123-1257 and Judith N. Shklar, Men" and Citizens - A S tud y of Rousseau's
Social Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
;

J-

One must first recognize the debt of Marx to Rousseau and of all the
subsequent important sociology and social psychology, including G. H.
Mead's. Besides that of Cassirer, constructive interpretations to which
i am indebted have been provided by G. D, H, Cole, Robert DeRathe in translation in "Rousseau, Jean- Jacques," I nte r national Encyclopedia of Social
Science, 13:563-571; and by Marshall Herman's The P o litics of Authenticity
R adica l I ndividualism and the Emergence of Modern Society (New York
Atheneum, 1970) . Implicit in this tradition is a fascination with concepts of a similar sort: Alienation, exploitation, and repression.
Specific efforts to make Rousseau's concepts more analytically
meaningful to the contemporary period have been carried out by the
following:
I. Fetcher has made Rousseau's notion of freedom more meaningful by
distinguishing the independence of the natural man, the relationships of
domination in civil society, and the real freedom available to all when
regulated by law in which they have had a hand in making; see, "Rousseau's
Concepts of Freedom in the Light of His Philosophy of History," in Carl J.
Friedrich, ed., Nomos IV: Liberty (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 19-53
Brian Barry, in the context of a discussion of the public interest,
guggests the fruitfulness of Rousseau's notion of the General Will once
his usage is clarified; see, "The Public Interest" in William E. Connolly,
Atherton, 1969), pp. 168-172.
"ed,. The Bias of Pluralism (New York:
Rousseau's idea of the General
put
to
attempted
has
Kateb
George
that distributive "justice," along
showing
by
light
Will in more favorable
concept of fair play are at
the
and
Vith the concept of moral autonomy
Political Thought,"
Rousseau's
of
"Asp?cts
the center of his concerns, in
:520-521.
Political Science Quarterly , 76 (1961)
Rousseau's
I^Iaure L. Goldschmidt persuasively challenges the claim of
as a
"Neither
that,
contends
hostility to intermediary associations and
interall
reject
he
matter of theory or of practical recommendation does
in
Associations"
See, "Rousseau on Intermediary
jnediary associations."
iAssoc
Voluntary
John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XI
fj, Roland Pennock and
ations (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 119-137.
:

•
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Ernst Cassirer, who comes. to Rousseau through Kant, tells us
that

Kant was one of the few contemporaries of Rousseau who appreciated his
true ethical significance j^indeed, Kant was to describe Rousseau as the

Newton of the moral world.

Rousseau challenged his own time, and ours

equally as well, with the problem of discovering those conditions that

would develop morally autonomous human beings, human beings who would act
in regard to each other on the basis of moral principle rather than
egotistic self-interest.

Trusting his deeper self, Rousseau always

doubted the virtues of institutions which fanned illusions and vanities
and encouraged people to give the appearance of having lived rather than

really living.

He had brought into focus the problem of authenticity.

According to Berman:

"It was only in the second generation of the En-

lightenment, through Rousseau, that the search for authenticity came

into its own.

Rousseau gave it a personal immediacy and urgency that

his age could not ignore; he forced his contemporaries to acknowledge

that the self was a problem as pressing for them as it was for him.

In

forcing this problem to the surface of consciousness, moreover, he

showed how repressive, how profoundly alien to the self the modern world
6

really was."

One passage is indicative; Cassirer in his essay, "Rousseau and
"What is truly permanent about hujTuin nature is not any
Kant," writes:
condition in wiiich it once existed and from which it has fallen; rather,
Kant looks for
it is the goal for which and tov;ard which it moves.
And Kant credits
be
should
he
.
what
in
but
constancy not in what man is
'real man' be^
the
discerned
having
with
Rousseau the ethical philosopher
masks that
the
beneath
all
neath all the distortions and concealments,
history...",
his
of
course
man has created for himself and worn in the
p. 20.
6

Berman, p. 75
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The alleged ambiguities, paradoxes, and inconsistencies
fall into

place in Rousseau interpretation when the philosopher is
perceived as

on a journey of growth himself, tracing out the range of answers
to this
problem of authenticity.

This is the thrust of both Cassirer's and

Barman's interpretations of Rousseau's radical individuaUsm.

Rousseau's

work, I believe, must be appreciated as a comprehensive unityj it is
as

a single piece of cloth when viewed in terms of the guiding problem which

demands solution.

Cassirer brings out the significance of the crystallizing and formative experience which helped to set Rousseau on this path.

on the summer day in

17ii9

It occurred

when Rousseau read about the Academy of Dijon's

essay competition for which he was to submit his First Discourse.

essay question posed was:

The

"Has the restoration of the sciences and the

arts helped to purify morals?"

Rousseau later recorded to a friend the

moment of insight generated in him by the question he read:
,.,0h, (Sir), if I could ever have written one fourth of
what I had seen and felt under that tree, with what
clarity, I should have revealed all the contradictions of
the social system: With what force I should have exposed
all the abuses of our institutions: With what ease I
should have shown that man is naturally good, and that it
is through these institutions alone that man became bad.'

It was a revolt, perhaps the first moment when one person's self8

consciousness became political consciousness.

In the contemporary

vocabulary of psychology, this was a conversion experience.
observes:

Cassirer

"Indeed it was that moment which decided his fate as a

7

The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau , p. u7.
6

This is the theme Berman investigates in The Politics of Authenticity ,
p. XXIV.
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thinker.

The question that suddenly confronted him focused
all doubts

which had previously assailed him on one point....
feeling became clear and clairvoyant.

Rousseau now saw where he stood;

he not only felt but he judged and he condemned

require such an experience as well.

At a stroke, his

9
"

Others would

Rousseau's more concrete answers

as to how individuals might be freed of oppressive institutions were
to

work themselves out in The Second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality
(1755), in Julie, or the New Heloise (I761), in Emile (1762), in the

Social Contract, or The Principles of Political Right (1762), and, finally,

in the Project of a Constitution for Corsica (1765) and in Considerations
on the Goverment of PolaM (1770-1771).

What Rousseau offered his age was an answer that involved a new view

of man in his relation to society and God; a new view of the roles for
intellect and feeling; a new view of the functions of the family, religion,

and the state; and a reasoned critique of inequalities.

He asks us, as

well, to consider a new definition of "happiness and freedom," what Kant
10
views as a rationalized conception of freedom.
Rousseau, ultimately,

9

The Question of Jean-Jacaues Rousseau, pp. U7-U8.
10
"It
Here, Leon Emery suggests Rousseau's meaning of happiness:
to
and
his
inner
tranquility,
of
requires a man to be fully conscious
know that he is exempt from distress or fear, from barren or violent
passions. Happiness is the enjoyment of oneself, is an intense and
harmonious emotional life; it amounts to 'pulling one's feelings close
."
around the heart,' and enjoying to the full their ardent upswelling. . .
Studies
,
"Rousseau and the Foundations of Human Regeneration," Yale French
"To be free
28 (1960-1961) :6. '•'•his form of happiness required freedom:
and happy, a man must bear only the chains he knows to be natural, and so
does not dream of shaking off." Emery, p. 7. We will see later how
closely this conception resembles the Marcusean notions of existentially
necessary "sublimation" and historically unnecessary "surplus repression."
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asks us to consider whether for this new Being, the price
would be too

high in giving up the pursuit of pleasure through power; in the
loss of
some areas of privacy; in the sacrifice of material benefits; in the dis-

position of certain belief systems; in the loss of a system of social
status enjoyed and not enjoyed, and so forth,

^'his

question lies behind

assessments of interpretations to be examined in this study.
The purpose of this chapter is to project a model of a participatory

society that has been assaulted and deformed by the dominant positivist
intellectual traditions of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
centuries.

Rousseau, and after him, T. H. Green and John Dewey, renew

our attention in the importance of a society established upon the basis
of an intersubjectively-created sense of the common good.

Rousseau in

the first pages of the Social Contract has, therefore, defined a problem
that still merits our consideration:

"I

mean to inquire if in the civil

order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men
11
being talcen as they are and laws as they might be."

First, a brief examination of Rousseau's crit:.que of society in its

alienation of the self will be set out to reveal the sources of modern
man's troubles.

I

will then attempt to characterize his chief solution

to the problem, the participation of all in the creation of the General

Will and what this must require on the part of mortal men and women.
Some major objections to this model of society will also be considered.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and Discourses Tr.
and Intro. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 3.

•/
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Rousseau's Critique of Modern Political Society

In the preceding section we suggested that, personally
and philosophically, Rousseau was concerned with defining freedom
in terms of self-

realization.

y

This was the postulate which separated Rousseau from
the

theorists who grounded their theories of the state in necessity
or
utility.

For, Rousseau's contribution to a theory of participatory

democracy lies in the intuition of the alienating aspects of a
growingly
complex, stratified, and achievement-oriented society.

Once making the

^

link between the rise of artifice in man's behavior and the structure of

inequality in property, power, and status, Rousseau had to go on to
pose the possibility of a more rational and, therefore, valid social

arrangement— one that involved a form of participation and a commitment
to it

tiiat

can only seem curious to many from the present-day nihilistic

perspective.
The unraveling of the conception provided by the Social Contract lay
in the description of the problem:
is in chains."

"Man is born free and everywhere he

A metaphor more historically provocative would be difficult

to conceive.

The openirig paragraphs of the Contract focus on one of the chief

paradoxes of social life, and one of the great social lies

— the

incessant

claim in social discourse and behavior that man is "free," perhaps even
that he has free will, and the recognition (for some at least) that such
a claim only provides a comfortable illusion to his real, class-bound

existence.

More formally stated, Rousseau's remarks are a direct attack

on the basic presuppositions of classical liberal democratic theory, which
has a fairly coherent view of man in the universe as shown by C, B. Macpherson

2h
arid

Steven Lukes.

This is a static, mechanistic, Newtonian, first cause

view of the universe in which figures the "abstract individual;" these

individuals are deemed to possess, according to Lukes, "'independent
centres of consciousness,' and have given, non-context-dependent interests,
12

wants, motives, purposes, needs, etc."

Lukes*. Individualism helpfully

probes, in this context, the conflation of these several unit-ideas in

classical liberal theory to make much clearer the dubious commitments
the distinct ideals entail.

Much of Rousseau's work, and perhaps the

measure of his rhetorical capacity as well, is his ability to accomplish
Just that and to show the falling of the atomic view of man

— to

draw the

tensions between appearances and realities, the disjunctions between

Seeming and Being.

Such disjunctions are embedded in his use of irony,

the double perspective, and the apparent contradictions, and it is the
13

source of his cynicism and hope.
The arts and the sciences are the target of all that has gone wrong

with man and society in the First Discourse .

They have created masks

behind which modern man can hidej perhaps the point may

be

drawn from

the following passages:
So long as government and law provide for the security
and well-being of men in their common life, the arts, literature, and the sciences, less despotic though perhaps
more povjerful, fling garlands of flowers over the chains
which weigh them down. They stifle in men's breasts that
sense of original liberty, for which they seem to have
been born; cause them to love their own slavery, and so make
of them what is called a civilized people.

*

*

*

12

Steven Lukes, Individualis m (New York:
pp. 138-139 and passim.
13

Harper Torchbooks, 1973),

(New
Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau
213.
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19thY, Pp. 210, 211,

)
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Human natiire was not at bottom better than now; but men found
their security in the ease with which they could see through
one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel
the value, prevented their having many vices.
(And in a
footnote in reference to the American Indian he asks: "¥nat
yoke, indeed, can be imposed on men who stand in need of
nothing?"
*

*

»

Politeness requires this thing j decorum thatj ceremony has
its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always
follow, never the promptings of our own nature.
*

*

*

We no longer dare what we really are, but lie under a perpetual
restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call
society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike,
unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them. ...-^^
The arts and sciences have had the effect of corrupting man, of nurturing

vices rather than virtues; there is the "appearance of all the virtues,
15

without being in the possession of one of them."
an historical examination of civilizations.

Rousseau follows with

When culture (useless

knowledge) flourished the great empires, like Egypt, Greece, Rome, and
the Eastern Empire, began to crumble.

Under these conditions the true

virtues, which will make for an enduring and self-satisfying society, go
unhonored:

"A wise man does not go in chase of fortune; but he is by no

means insensible to glory, and when he sees it so ill-distributed, his
virtue, which might have been animated by a little emulation, and turned

to the advantage of society, droops and dies away in obscurity and in16
Surely this statement appears rhetorical, but the
digence...."

The First Discourse (Cole Edition), pp. Iii7-lu9.
Ibid., p. Ili7.
16
Ibid., pp. 168-169.

j
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rudiments of a critical theory of culture and personality, which
will
later be unfolded by Marcuse's synthesis of Marx and Freud, are here.
The failur-e of citizenship to materialize can be found in these
conditions

Rousseau's passage continues:
It is for this reason that the agreeable arts must in time
everywhere be preferred to the useful; and this truth has
been but too much confirmed since the revival of the arts
and sciences. We have physicists, geometricians, chemists,
astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters in plenty; but
we have no longer a citizen among us; or if there be found
a few scattered over our abandoned countryside, they are
left to perish there unnoticed and neglected.
'

Aspects of the socialization process have had the effect of making men
mean, corrupt, and miserable, rather than simple, courageous, and virtuous.

Worse than this they have become specialists and are no longer comprehensivists.

Man's natural being, and his natural needs, and his natural

potentialities, have been usurped by artifice and artificial wants.

Man is chained, in a psychic sense, by all sorts of cultural
techniques and other symbolisms, including language

— but

he is also

chained, in a more physically real sense, by certain conditions associated

vith civil society.

By the Second Discourse Rousseau's thought has taken

on more positive

radical content, and there is the recognition of the

eind

inevitability and the necessity of society.

The ornaments of culture are

useful for veiling and deflecting truths and, in general, for reproducing
18

the society itself.

alienating society.

But these are still only the manifestations of an

The root cause of its instability and of unfreedom

17

Ibid., p. 169.

18

Rousseau writes: "We should see the magistrates fomenting everything that might weaken men united in society, by promoting dissension
division.
among them; everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual

27

is inequality, which has its origin in
property and the first act of

possession.

Accompanying the structure of inequality of
property come

the differentials in prestige and power.
The Second Discourse is, in essence, a
hypothetical account of how

natural man progressed to the point where he was
able to make the claim,
"This is mine," and have others accept this
declamation.

According to

Rousseau's conjectures, from this moment on the tendency
towards greater

and greater extremes of inequality moved inexorably
onwards.

Social dis19
tinctions cultivated the vices of vanity and contempt, shame
and envy.

The distribution of property, which came with its cultivation
and the

division of labor, necessitated a system of justice, but there were
no
forces to sustain the side of equality:

In this state of affairs, equality might have been sustained,
had the talents of individuals been equal, and had, for
example, the use of iron and the consuiaption of commodities
always exactly balanced each others but, as there was nothing
to preserve this balance, it was soon disturbed; the strongest
did most workj the most skillful turned h.s labour to best
account; the most ingenuous devised methods of diminishing
his labour; the husbandman wanted more iron, or the smith more
corn, and, while both laboured equally, the one gained a great
deal by his work, while the other could hardly support himself.

Education only served to increase diversity and the distances between
21

individuals.

The process generates extremes of sufficient force to

demand some ameliorative solution, and thus, government is born:

"All

ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty; for

they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political

while it gave society the air of harmony everything that might inspire the
different ranks of people with mutual hatred and distrust by setting the
rights and interests of one against those of another, and so strengthen
the power which comprehends them all." Second Discourse (Cole edition),
pp. 267-268.
19

Ibid., p. 2iil.
20
Ibid., pp. 2i;6-2ii7.
21
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institutions, without experience
enough to enable them to
foresee the
dangers.
"The most capable of foreseeing
the dangers," acconiing to
Rousseau, "were the very persons
who expected to benefit by
them; and
even the most prudent Judged it
not expedient to sacrifice
one part of
their freedom to ensure the rest;
as a wounded man has his arm
cut off
to save the rest of his body."'
It was only a few short steps
to wars
between nations and ultimate tyranny.
The problem of the origin of society
and state which Rousseau is

trying to explain, perhaps, fails to be
satisfying today.

Marx's histor-

ical dialectical explanation, for instance,
stands out as more empirically
accurate.

But it is important to remember that
Rousseau is also constrained

by responding in the format of a problem set
before him by Hobbes and
Locke.

The view of human nature, of reason and
sentiment, and of possi-

bility, however, were respectively distinct.
hujnan nature assumed

Unlike the static view of

by his predecessors, Rousseau had, through intro-

spection, given attention to the malleability of the
instincts and

impulses under varying conditions.

Or as, Stuart Hampshire now phrases

this, "A reflective man is aware that he would have recognized,
and acted
from, other motives in himself if he had been born and formed
in other

circumstances

He could see that the human creature was innately

susceptible to socialization by his environment and that language (syrabolism, broadly) played a most important role.

The worst problem of

corrupting society was that of its unhealthy competitiveness as the

22

Ibid.
23

Ibid.
2h
Stuart Hainpshire, Thought and Action (New York:
p. 2iUi.

25

Second Discourse , pp. 216-217.

Viking, 1963),
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feeling of "amour-propre," egoism
ard pride, replaced the natural
feeling
of "amour de soi," self-love or
self-respect.'' Under institutionalized
arrangements, man became "the infinite
appropriator," "the infinite
consumer," to use C. B. Macpherson's
opprobriative terms, as needs and
wants became externalized.
An artificial, ascribed-status or a
contrived, achievement-status system must
bear the onus for stunting the
grov^bh of the complete person who
can trust his own instincts and im-

pulses to satisfy his life processes.

In the long run, what Rousseau fore

saw for civil society was a state of affairs
very much like that of

Hobbes' state of nature unless some insight
could be obtained to transcend
the pettiness, and the tyrannies, of the
presmr^ably urbane and cosmo-

politan existence.

In attaching meaning to the socialization processes of
culture and
the degenerative aspects of inequality, Rousseau was
able to place great

significance on the impact of social arrangements in fostering the
emergence of individually- and socially-harmful behavioral
characteristics

Freud was to capture this same process in his distinction of the conscious

and the unconscious and the role of the mechanism of repression.

Culture

could then be viewed in its manipulative aspects, and inequality in status

26
Self-respect, for Rousseau, "is a natural feeling which leads every
animal to look to its own preservation, and which guided in man by reason
and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue." Egoism, which
Rousseau claims has no need of existence in primitive society, "is a
purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of
society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other,
causes all the mutual damage men inflict on one another, and is the real
source of the 'sense of honor.'" p. 223.
27
C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory;
Essays in Retrieval (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973), Sssay ^I, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and
Technology," pp. 2ii-38o
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wealth, and power could be seen for
its more pernicious effects in

exciting rancorous conflict.

These insights could not have been achieved
had not Rousseau held
two important conceptions.

The first is an evolutionary and
morphological

conception of social institutions, which Herman's
reading discovers as
much as my own.
2o

historicity."

Herman says, Rousseau's was "the celebration of
man's

Man was a structuring force in the universe, not
merely

a God-given object in it.

The second was a genetic or developmental

concept of man, such as can be followed through in the
compelling work

on moral development of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg,
and it is to
be found as well in the writings of psychoanalysts such
as Karen Horney,
29
Erich Fromm, and Carl Rogers.

These assumptions are what constituted the unique perspective of
Rousseau.

How did he come by them?— Perhaps, through accident in the

selection of "natural" as opposed to mechanistic models.
be the apparent bias of his metaphors and analogies.

Such seems to

As some of his

commentators have pointed out, Rousseau had cut through centuries of
thought and returned to the models of Plato and Aristotle.

Rousseau, as

De Jouvenal has significantly pointed out, was "the first great exponent
30

of social evolution."

2B

—
Berman, pp. 1U6-1U9.
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For instance, the closeness is suggested by a consideration
Rogers proposes: "Do we dare to generalize from this type of experience that if we cut through deeply enough to our organismic nature,
that we find that man is a positive snd social animal? This is the
suggestion from our clinical experience." In On Becoming A Person
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 196.1), p. 103. It must be kept clear,
however, that Rousseau has both a psychology and a moral theory^ this
distinction seems to be confused in Rogers.
30
Bertrand De Jouvenal, "Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist,"
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Rousseau's Solution:

The Idea of the Social Contract

The Social Contract framed one
answer to Rousseau's problem:

"The

problem is to find a form of association
which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the person
and goods of each association,

and in which each, while uniting himself
with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."

31

What would seem to be

enigmatic on the face, can be better understood
by considering what is

required of individuals and, therefore, what is
gained and lost in the
process.

If another sort of happiness and freedom was to be
desired, a more
simple and natural life of virtue, what was the course
open to the indi-

vidual?

As many have recognized, there are two apparent solutions
in

the v/ritings of Rousseau.

He never seemed to consider as realistic or
32

desirable a return to nature.

Perhaps a retreat to some commune might

have made sense to him, but of this one cannot be certain.

There is, first, the choice of the life of "natural man" in the
classical sense, the life personified by Emile who is reared in a care-

fully determined environment in isolation from society.
forever the "amiable foreigner."

Emile becomes

The significance of his isolation was

to show the corrupting strength of existing institutions, which was

Ya le French Studies , 28 (1961-1962) 83
And Masters, p. 223, for his
interpretation of the important role of history in Rousseau's thought.
Cf. Shklar's interpretation which takes Rousseau to be a- historical and
sees him as engaging in the construction of a timeless utopia. Men and
Citizens , chap. 1.
31
The Social Contract (Cole edition), pp. 13-lli.
:

.
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Appendix to the Second Discourse (Cole edition), pp. 281-282.
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abundantly evident in the very inauthentic
and mutilated self Julie became
in LaJWelle Heloise. That this could
be a seriously considered alter•

native does not seem probable to me, and
this is Beman's account as well:

"Authentic action would have to be interaction.
others could the uniqueness of the self emerge."

Only through unity with
33

But, there was "a

profound contradiction between the hiunan need for
mutuality and the
social tendency to convert all human relations
into mutual exploitation...,"
and so Rousseau's partial hope was that the romantic
relationsliip would

provide a kind of paradigm, in the sharing of meanings
and a trust of
motives, for the kind of interaction that was more broadly
required for
a larger commun.ity.

According to the account, then, political con-

sciousness accrued in steps.

vdth anxiety.

First was the internal awareness that came

Next came the attempt to capture and realize one's identity

with and through another j this was the experience of "the authentic
person."
One's self -identity had to be confirmed by others: "¥hat they would not
35
recognize, he could not assert."
Finally came the broader kind of

authenticity derived as a participating member of a community.

This was

the experience of "^the authentic citizen."

This last stage was the second model that Rousseau pursued in his

political, as opposed to fictionalized, writings.

It figures as strongly

in his practical pieces intended as guides to action, his writings for

Poland and Corsica, as it does in the Contract.

This is the model of a

society of an active, participating, moral citizenry.

33

Herman, p. 188.

Ibid., p. 188.

35
Ibid., p. 103.
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In contrast to the worst fonos of internal
and external tyranny
that could be generated in modern
states by a practxce of everyone
pursuing his own self-interest ("amour propre")
and an ideology that

encouraged it, stood Rousseau's answer.

Rousseau's critical powers had

allowed him to postulate a synergistic
possibility-that several ingredients could be more enhanced in combination
than any singly.

This

was the original nature of the conception
projected by Rousseau's new
36
use of the social contract.
The notion of the social contract had utility in
suggesting some
means by which society first occurred and made social
ties between

members possible.

This was the familiar approach for political
phil-

osophers of the time.

Once Rousseau could explain human association,

it was possible to distinguish between particular wills,
the will of all,

and the General Will.

Moreover, he could particularly show the inade-

quacy of the social theory of classical liberalism which predicated
itself on a concept of a public interest as the mere sum of the particular interests.

Essential to the hypothesis of the General Will, as the basis for
a good political order, was the notion that a rational order, in contrast

to the order achieved in the natural state and the disorder of chaotic

claims that characterized civil society, could be achieved by replacing

physical force (coercion, which was necessary to maintain the multitude

of warring fantasies) with moral force.

—w~

And this is what makes Rousseau's

The conditions Rousseau presumed under which the contract would
take effect must be pointed out. In order to restrict the privileged and
powerful minority, a proper economic and educational environment had to
be established. Rousseau, while requiring a relatively equal economic
structure, did not reject the private property system and, instead,
called for a progressive tax policy.

3k
consensus a "moral" one; it is a connnunity
consensus in which each person
votes for a policy that he is willing
to live with if everybody else
will
abide by it. The moral force is
obtained when everyone recognizes
that
in giving himself up to the common good,
he gives up nothing. That on
this basis each obtains equality, not under
domination as a subjugated
being, but equality before the law that
they have all participated in

making and know the true reasons for obeyi.ng.
Only in the legitimate state, the state based
on right, in which a

policy represented the interests of everyone in
common could it be said
that a General Will existed.

Its elements can be seen from Rousseau's

own statement:
The undertakings v;hich bind us to the social body are
obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature
is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for
otners
without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general
will is always in the right, and that all continually will
the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is
not a man vho does not think of "each" as meaning him, and
consider himself in voting for all? This proves that
equality of rights and the idea of justice which such
equality creates originate in the preference each man gives
to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. It
proves that the' general will, to be really such, must be
general in its object as well as its essence; that it must
both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its
natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular
and determinate object, because in such a case we are judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle
of equity to guide us.-^'''
This was the ethical premise at the basis of the social contract; the

emphatic position of everyone to every other made possible the establishment of universally-applicable rules for governing behavior.

required of

tlie

What is

individual is made clear in Brian Barry's essay which

37

Social Contract (Cole edition), Book II, chap. iV, p. 29.
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develops the contrasting meanings
of the public interest:
citizen's deliberations to comprise
llfTJ^^'i:
two elements:
(a) The decision to forego
(either as ,1^++^.! ki
or as i^oral) policies which would
be fn one's own
interest alone, or in the co^non
interest of a
than the whole, and (b) the attempt
to calculate whichfoflhe
various lines of policy that would
affect oneself eqSaily wUh
'
others are like LI
for

p™/"'"'

group^™^

lllZl:^^

Attention was now drawn to the "reflexive
mood," to use Mead's terms.

Empathy and true communication were the keys
to any success this deUberative process might enjoy.

Attentiveness would have to be given to

encouraging the art of dialogue, the art of
conversation, and full access
to pertinent information would be necessitated as
well.

Finally, Rousseau

had a place for solitude as a necessary condition
for independent reflec-

tion to occur.

Who should participate?

According to the formula of the Port Huron
1/

Statement, "Everyone should participate in the decisions
that affect
one's life."

Rousseau's view was apparently more inclusive; he would,

for instance, have excluded women from an active role in the
political
circles or from participating in other ways in the life of the community.
But this discriminatory policy is not required by his theory and hardly

seems justifiable in terms of his own recognition of the nat\ire of the

General Will,
a

"

For, as Barry brings out, the General Will would represent

single policy which is equally in the interests of all members of the

group," and "only where all are equally affected by the policy adopted can
39
an equitable solution be expected."
3B

Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," in Bias of Pluralism , pp. 159177.

39
Ibid., pp. 169-170.
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Also, the General Will cannot be
expressed when all who are
affected
and allowed to participate do not do
so.
To insure equality, that is
that
everyone have the same chance as
everyone else to determine the
General
Will, Rousseau^adamantly required
one-hundred percent participation by
the citizenry.
And to encourage the participation
of all he proposed

an incentive system based on the public
awarding of civic prizes and
honors.

This was the only opportunity for
inequalities to express them-

selves in Rousseau's society.

There is one other important aspect of
Rousseau's citizen that must
be noted, for it is also a view that tends
to be discounted and criticized

quite frequently, especially by political scientists.

That is the strong

emphasis placed on the citizen to be "omnicompetent."

The omnicompetent

citizen was necessary to overcome particularist forces
in society.

The

following is an excerpt from the Considerations on the
Government of

Poland :
Our distinction between the legal and military castles was
unknown to the anciects. Gitizeria were tieitheu lawyers nor
priests by profession; they performed all these functions as
a matter of duty.
That is the real secret of making everything proceed toward the common goal, and of preventing the
spirit of faction from taking root at the expense of patriotism, so that the hydr of chicanery will not devour a nation.

Rousseau saw sufficient evidence to fear several forces in society:

The

bureaucracy, the military, the legal profession, and the church, as well

Unanimity of vote was not required; the majority rule principle
seemed to be acceptable to him; but it mattered that every vote was
counted. Social Contract (Cole edition). Book II, chap, iii,
ia
Quoted by Goldschmidt, p. 133.
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as economic monopolies.

"His hope," according to Goldschnddt
"was that
,

the ordinary citizen could overcome
the specialization of labor to
the
extent that^he could perform

functions."

i^ejxhan^eab^

a wide range of government-

But this is also very much a part
of Rousseau's notion

of a complete and self-sufficient person
as well.

In his sense of a good

citizen, the individual could not be allowed
to beg off, to claim that he
is ignorant, indifferent, or unconsidered
on this or that issue.

It was

his responsibiUty in order to enjoy the
benefits of a well-run society,

which contributed to his own well-being to participate
in a meaningful and
involved way, to become a deliberative human being.
The requirement of omni competence has been mistakenly,
I believe,

viewed as requiring repression of one's private life of such
a drastic
sort so as not to seem viable.

It has also been argued that there are

other activities as well, besides the political, which many or most
hh
individuals like to spend their time.
What Rousseau was arguing was

Ii2

Emphasis added.

Goldschmidt, p. 133,

h3

According to Shklar, for instance, the citizen "loses himself in"
or is "absorbed by" the polity in a total and complete sense:
"...the
individual loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive
social unit. Here alone the group absorbs all his resources, emotional
as well as physical." Men and Citizens , p. 15. The problem of tnis
interpretation lies in continuing to view the individual as a dependent
and passive creature, which he cannot be under Rousseau's regime.
According to Michael Walzer, many have found other ways to cope
short of being militant activists:
"They stay away not because they are
beaten, afraid, uneducated, lacking confidence and skills (though these
are often important reasons), but because they have made other commitments...." "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen," Dissent , l5 (MayJune 1968) :2U6. Here Walzer hopes to argue that these nonparties pants
(by choice) have rights too.
In stressing their rights, he neglects
their obligations. In general, the point that some limits have to be
found is acceptable, but I believe it was one that Rousseau was aware of.
Rousseau is unconcerned with dogmas and ideas except insofar as "they
have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes
them is bound to do to others," Social Contract , Book IV, chap, viii,
p. 139.

—
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that the political life was
important and necessary to the
entire structuring of one's life circumstances.
In Dewey's terms his concern
was
the nature of one's "conduct"-the
underlying tendency of one-s acts.^^
Once the proper direction had been
set, perhaps, it would become more

likely that the individual would have
greater time for his personal
enterprises.

Rousseau was so heavy-handed in his
denial of private

activities, because he was most .conscious
and fearful of the degenerative
forces that always lurked within society.

If one was not constantly

concerned with this aspect, then one could only
blame himself for the
fragmented, limited, and probably unhappy
existence he would have.
But even this view, as Rousseau would point
out, cannot be tolerated

very long for its inherent selfishness.

Aside from this argument,

Rousseau's Contrac t allowed the person the freedom to
leave, a freedom
not allowed by the Soviet Union's policy of restricted
emigration, for

instance.

In the respect that individuals obeyed the laws, they were subjects,
but in the respect that they made these laws they were sovereign.

Sovereignty could be said to be lodged in them.

In sum, sovereignty was

inalienable, indivisible, and could not be represented.

This distinction

made it possible, as T. H. Green has shown, to abandon the Hobbesien and

Lockean arguments of obligation or resistance to the sovereign.

Such

notions were now fiction; one would, of course, obey oneself or what was

in one's interest.
The reinterpretation of sovereignty was not unimportant in Rousseau's

—

John Dewey, T heory of the Moral Life (New York:
Winston, 1959), p. 11.

Holt, Rinehart and

^

schema in another way.

It is closely related to
Rousseau's

social institutions in general.

attUude to

While it seems to be in the
nature of

social institutions to require
authority relationships that
stress the
Obedience of one man to another, it
is each man alone and not
his insti-

tutions (any cabinet, committee, board
or any principle of majority
rule)
that is held ultimately accountable
for his actions.
This is taken to
be the meaning of the Nuremburg
Trials, and painful reminders of
the

difficulty of learning this lesson are
found in the My Lai massacre.
Historical example demonstrates so well
how institutions benefit by
creating the belief that obligation,
allegiance, is owed to them solely.
In this illusion they create both heroes
and victims.

Rousseau was well

aware of this gambit, and for this reason
certai.n institutions, in his view
*
ho
were circumspect.
When they destroyed social unity by setting
man

against

man, group against group, or by fragmenting
man himself, institutions were

dangerous.

While his ascerbic chapter on Christianity in the
Contract stands
out, along with his famous phrase of "forcing man
to be free" as the

height of intolerance for many interpreters, the assumed
paradox— of

his presumably disguised totalitarianism—becomes comprehensible.

Thus,

when Rousseau emphasized, "All that destroys social unity is worthless,
all institutions that set man in contradiction to himself are worthless,"

he was enjoining his reader to give concern to the problem of the social
control of necessary, but, nevertheless, still sometimes possibly rabid

Established religion was perhaps his favorite target: "Christianity
preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to
tyranny that it always profits by such a regime. True Christians are
made to be slaves, and they know it and do not much mind: This short life
counts for too little in their eyes...." Social Contract , Book IV, chap,
viii, pp. 137-138.

ho
institutions, and the Catholic
Church, for hi., was a good
exa^le of the
ill-effects of license practiced
as tolerance.^' If
was to be truly
sovereign, in the sense that Rousseau
intended, he surely could not
let
his institutions get out of control.
Rousseau was not against intermediary
associations j^er_se. Indeed, he viewed
some, like the political circles
of Paris, as important associations
for promoting meaningful
conversation
and a sense of mutual respect. .He
was hostile only to those that
generated
animosities within or between societies.
This view was strengthened by
his appreciation for decentralized
and federalized arrangements.^^

Rousseau's appreciation of citizenship rested
not merely on its

value as a virtue, and a lost one at that, but
as a right.

The goal of

society was not something ulterior to the individual
it was the individual
j
himself.

Rights secured this end.

Rights recognized the rights of others;

all, therefore, found themselves on a footing
of equality.

Rights also

bring with them corresponding duties, this aspect placed
serious requirements on the time, energies, and capacities of each of
the individuals
that made up that community or society.

sidered worthwhile.

But the exchange could be con-

The individual was recreated anew; as a citizen, he

hi

"Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably
have some civil effect j and as soon as it has such an effect, the Sovereign
is no longer Sovereign even in the temporal sphere: Thenceforth priests
are the real masters, and kings only their ministers." Social Contract
(Cole edition), Book IV, chap, viii, p. li;0.
U8
See The Considerations on the Government of Poland , chap. V, "The
Radical Defect," in Frederick Watkins' (tr. and ed.), Rousseau-Political
Writings (New York: Nelson, 1953).
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received a non-threatening social
order, a setting in which
he was needed
and valued and in which he could
be sure that his foculties
have been
encouraged to grow and blossom. The
deroands ,nade upon him would be
of a

worthwhUe rather than of

a benign or impairing sort.

Rousseau had gone

beyond the traditional view of letting
the individual a]one, toward the
view that the proper conditions will help
to nurture the human personality.
He had moved in the direction of
a radical liberalism.

Nevertheless, the

balance point between individual and society
had not come to rest.

Rousseau had, however, marked some important
routes for more careful
charting.

Under the conditions of his social contract,
power struggles

would be mitigated.

And when, power, like wealth, is distributed
so

that no one has more of an advantage than anyone
else, then the conditions

have been established for a rational and moral
society in which all
individuals have the opportunity to develop their intellectual
capacities

and sensibilities to the fullest.

ii2

T. H. Green's Contribution
to a Participatory Theory
of Society

T. H. Green, an overlooked
political theorist, also offers an

important contribution to developing
the model of a participatory

society patterned after the classical
Greek city-state.^^

It would be

proper today to disparage the idealism
that he assumes, except that if
we desire a more rational basis for
making social policy, we have some-

thing to learn from this maligned
position, particularly as it sheds
light for a philosophy of mind.
Green, much more than John Stuart Mill,
recognized the dilemma of

the individual versus society.

The problem with Mill, Green asserted.

IS that he had no clear philosophy of rights.

50
This recognition set

the way for Green to come down firmly on behalf
of the realization of
the Self as the telos of the individual, just
as realization of the

Common Good was the telos of the society.
connected.

Ethics and politics were

The result was a penetrating critique of the whole empiricist

tradition, a critique which has been resumed only recently in works
in

moral piiilosophy.

Green's position also offers effective complimentarity

to the materialist position of Marxism which must deserve serious critique

in at least one aspect.

That Marx misjudged the limits of action gener-

ated by one's class position bespeaks the need to focus more attention

w~This is an adaptation from my paper, "Thomas Hill Green: The
Community of the Good as a Basis for Political Obligation." An important
reference to his ideas, not noted here, is Melvin Richter. The Politics
of Conscience; T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 196i|).
50
Green criticized Mill for having "no clear philosophy of rights,
through which alone the conception of liberty attains a concrete meaning;
he had no clear idea of that social whole in whose realization the false
antithesis of 'state' and 'individual' disappears." Ernest Barker,
Political Thought in England
l8i|6-191ii (London:
Oxford University
:

Press, 1928, 2nd ed.), p. h»

—
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on the cognitive processes
that Green prompts.

In the problem of the self,
Green recognized that new
categories
for explaining the special^nature
of mental phenomena and of
their
interrelation were needed.

Green sought to do this by
showing that

social relations are the product
of consciousness, and consciousness
was the special agency of society.
In other words, the ties between
man and his society were obtained
through the one unique feature
that
distinguished man from the animal world,
his ppwer of cognition. The
activity of thought is the unifying
principle of consciousness. This

consciousness brings with it the power to
frame ideals, which Green

considered to be the essence of man's
nature.

The self is a social

self J thought and practice weave dialectically:
The common element to both (theoretical
speculation and
practical willing) lies
the consciousness of a self
and a world as in a sense opposed to each
other, and in
the conscious effort to overcome this
opposition.
...One
(I.e., speculation) is the effort of such
consciousness
to take the world into itself, the other (i.e.,
willing)
Its effort to carry itself out into the world.
...Neither
action can really be exerted without calling the
other
into play.-"^

m

^1
'"^^^ Social Origins of Absolute
^'
Idealism," Journal
„ o
of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Methods 12 (1915) 172^^^173^
Essential aspects of Green's complete pnilosophy include:
A
theology, an organic conception of society and a progressive
view of
history, a view of rights as derivative from society, and the notion
of a non-competitive Common Good (derived largely from Rousseau's
General Will) communicating itself to man by his reason and acted upon
by his will. The Common Good was another of Green's rejections of
Utilitarianism and its principle "the greatest good for the greatest
number."
52
John R. Rodman, ed.. The Political Theory of T. H. Green Selected Writings (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961; ), "Introduction," p. 3Fr~
,
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Green seems to suggest that rights
only emerge around points of
agreement in the social consciousness.
One

cannot have a right except

as a member of society.

Rights and obligations, as the
concrete form

that freedom takes in modern society,
then, only arise in such conditi
ons

of consciousness.

A level of societal development
can, therefore, be

measured by the degree to which the Common
Good is rationalized.

And, it

follows that a person is judged in terms
of the level of desires he

pursues-his degree of rationality in promoting
the Common Good of the
society, hence his own self-realization.

The function of the state maices it possible
for men to realize their

highest potentialities; the state is the highest
realization because of
its degree of comprehensiveness.

(One might wonder why a conception of

a "universal brotherhood" was not superior for Green.

There are some

suggestions that it might be, but his own time was organized
according
to states.)

The process began at lower levels of organization, in

primary and secondary groupings.

It is the function of the state through

legislation, the concrete embodiment of the Common Good, to set the

conditions for the telos of the individual, his self-realization.

Sh

The

law could only set the conditions as a contribution to the fulfillment

of self, moral development; it could do no more than that.
The role of the citizen was not merely to obey the laws of his state,
therefore:

"If he is to have a higher feeling of political duty, he must

53

Sabine, p. lyli. There is some question, however, as to what extent
Green's concept of self-realization had meaningful content. Dewey, for
instance, sought to be less metaphysical and sought to give it a more
concrete and practical content.
51i

"It is the business of the state... to maintain the conditions
without which a free exercise of the human faculties is in^DOSsible."
Quoted by Sabine (from Green's Works, 3:3714), p. 171.

take part in the work of the state."

Citizenship, as the formulation of

public policy, was the important sphere
of rational activity, for it
was
the activity which discerned the Coramon
Good as a regulative principle and

made it more and more determinate.

In certain situations. Green observed,

the duty of citizenship might even require
disobedience.

The function of

participation was a process of developing
intelligence, refining appropriate concepts for legislating, and weeding
away the anachronistic ideas.

Citizenship is neither a means nor an end.

As Sabine says, "Full moral

participation in a social life was for Green the highest
form of selfdevelopment, and to create the possibility of such
participation was the

end of liberal society."

Only through this activity could a more

proximate harmony be achieved between the Ought and the Is.
On several important grounds Green shared a close and
sympathetic

kinship to Rousseau— in their critiques of empiricism and utilitarian
ethics, in their theory of the state, and in their radical individualism.
Yet, Green also offered some angles to his interpretation that go a good

distance to offset some of the totalitarian aspects alleged in Rousseau.

In several ways his work helps us to extend and modify the model of
Rousseau:
1,

Green, with more realism, was not constructing a version of

a Utopia but making the General Will (the Common Good) an idea applicable
to a real, imperfectly realized society.
be worked at.

He saw society as a process to

In this view he was also rejecting an appeal to the rapid,

uncontrollable measures of violent means as, for instance, proposed by
socialists.

—

(Rousseau, similarly, was opposed to rapid social change.

George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York:
Rinehart and Winston, 1965 J 3rd ed.), p. 726.

Holt,

)
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but this becomes more apparent in
his essay on Poland than in the
Social

Contract .
2.

Green makes a better case than Rousseau
for participation in

local settings, seeing participation at
this level of governance as an

important stage for the development of the
personality.

He argued that

from this experience broader experiences could
be encouraged.
3.

The Common Good may gain some content in
Green.

Its sole goal

is the fostering of all individual's
self-development regardless of

class.

This meant for Green the justification of
state interference,

and he strongly advocated legislation that expanded
widely the franchise
and secured the conditions of equal opportunity.

cational system that destroyed privilege.

Essential was an edu-

He sought to promote the

representation of all interests in the determination of social
policy,
generally.

As Holloway notes, Green's recognition was that, "Depriva-

tion was a matter of values and interests as well as jobs, wages, and
housing....

The worker as much as the 'gentleman' should be able to

participate in the cultural values of his society and to thereby build
a better character."

As a reformist in theory and practice, he

affirmed liberal values in ways beyond which most liberals of his day,
including J. S. Mill, were willing to go.

The vision Green charts in

these areas would not suggest the same domain of completeness, therefore,
as exercised by Rousseau's General Will.

stronger liberalism:

In other respects we see a

Green feared the socialization of private property

and sought to remedy the ills of inequalities here by expanding private

Harry Holloway, "Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State,"
Western Political Quarterly, 13 (June I960): 398.
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ownership and resisting concentration.

The one apparent lapse in
the

guarantees of Uberties was occasioned
by his frustrations with
drunken
workers, when he advocated
temperance. Still, Green,
perhaps, «ght
have done ^ore with making a case
for the protection of a domain
for
private life.

Perhaps important, finally, was the
spirit of hopefulness even
in the face of misfortune that Green's
own political involvement and
h.

his writings exhibit.

Ii8

John Devzey's Contribution to
a Participatory Model
Like Rousseau and Green, John Dewey
linked participation in community
life with the growth of the self.
He did so on the basis of
a revision
of English Idealism, particularly
as it appeared in T. H.
Green. Dewey
called his philosophy "instrumentalism-.
it was a method by which individuals through the application of
intelligence could change society.
The
emphasis he placed on philosophy's task
to change reality grew out of
his naturalist perspective, a view of
life as an ever-changing organic

process.

Life was a process, and growth was the
ultimate good and the

measure of social justice.
Dewey, then, began his long philosophical
and activist career by

subjecting to critical examination the concept of
self-realization which
he accepted as an ideal but rejected in
content in Green's formulation.
(More importantly, he rejected the metaphysical
idea of an absolute

Eternal Consciousness.)

A series of articles showed that the self had
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no meaning as a presupposed or fixed schema that was to be
"filled in."

Instead, he proposed the notion of a working or practical self.

The

self was "a concrete specific activity;" self and realization are
not
separated but identified:

To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as
to fill up some presupposed ideal self. It means to act
at the height of action, to realize its full meaning. 58

John Dewey, "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive," Philosophical
Review , I (1892) 593-612, and "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal,"
Philosophical Review II (1893) :652-66ii. Also, "The Philosophy of
T. H, Green," Andover Review , XL (l889) 337-355; "Some Current Conceptions of the Term 'Self'," Mind, XV (1890):58-7U.
:

,

:
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"Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," p. 659.

h9
What Devey was arguing for was the
notion of a "working ideal" of
the
self as opposed to a "fixed ideal."
The problem with the later
conception was that it fractured the individual's
consciousness in an unnatural
way. Dewey suggested that Green's self
had difficulty avoiding some
action for selfish purposes.

As Dewey pointed out, any action
becomes

moral only insofar as it is done for its own
concrete sake.
self must be \dewed as an active agent

Thus, the

;

It's not action for the self that is required
(thus setting
up a. fixed self which is simply going to
get something more,
wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but
action as the
self. To find the self in the highest and
Tallest activity
possible at the time, and to perform the act in
the consc^: ousness of Its complete identification with self
(wriich means,
I take It, with complete interest) is
morality, and is
realization.

Given the opportunities, the human being is able to develop
his/her

personality more and more fully.

That was just the problem for Dewey

as he turned from philosophy to the social issues of his day:

the opportunities for self-realization?

Where were

According to his theory of

knowledge, knowledge was a social, an associational enterprise.

He knew

well that the high level of industrialization was foremost a product of
sharing.

Why did this not occur in regard to social ideas and social

practice?
The Public end Its Problems suggests that a disjunction occurred in

modern society between the capacities for industrial growth and in the
attitudes and institutions needed to respond to it; in other words, there
was a cultural lag.

When Dewey searched for the "public," he discovered

39~
Ibid., pp. 661-662.

.

no .ingle body, „hat he

fo»d

was ..uncertain and obscure,"
..confused and

eclipsed...

What happened was that industrial
development had acted as
a disintegrating force on
the small community and
made difficult the
generation of a Great Co«unity.
Dewey viewed this core situation
as
at the root of democracy's
problems.

Many forces worked against a
reorganization of publics and the
public
1.

Effective political interests (his
paradigm

cases are the

criminal band, the rapacious corporation,
and the self-seeking political
machine) were able to dominate the
situation. For this reason the state

had to have a larger role than accorded
by pluralist theory (the role of
umpire),
2.

Reliance on experts, the faith in technologists,
Dewey viewed

as a dangerous revival of the Platonic
philosopher-king:

"In the degree

in which they become a specialized class, they
are shut off from knowledge
of the needs which they are supposed to serve."
3.

Political apathy is, under this static and unvitalized
social

structure, fostered.

According to Dewey, "Political apathy, which is a

natural product of the discrepancies between actual practices
and traditional machinery, ensues from inability to identify one's self
with
definite issues.

These are hard to find and locate in the vast complex62

ities of current life."

60

John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago:
chap.
IV, pp. 120-12T:
1927),
61
Ibid,, p. 206.
"

62

Ibid., pp. 131-135.

Swallow Press,
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In his lecture, "Democracy and
Educational Administration,"

Dewey also made note of conscious
efforts to restrict participation,
pointing out as well its negative
effects

for the whole social body.^^

5.

The situation is further aggravated
when cheap amusements

shove "the political elements in the
constitution of the human being,

those having to do with citizenship"
to one side.^^

of social knowledge is inchoate:

Our existing state

"Our Babel is not one of tongues
but

"^^
of the signs and symbols without which
shared experience is possible.

In Liberalism and Social_Action Dewey
again affirms that there is not a
social order that has for one of its chief
purposes the establishment

of conditions that will move the mass of
individuals to appropriate and
66

use what is at hand,"

The need was for a "radical liberalism."

"If radicalism be defined,"

he wrote, "as perception of need for radical change,
then today any

liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and
doomed."

67

This

53

Dewey's passage is worth reiterating:
"The very fact of
exclusion from participation is a subtle form of suppression. It
gives
individuals no opportunity to reflect and decide upon what is good for
them. Others who are supposed to be wiser and wno in any case have
more power decide the question for them and also decide the methods
and means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good
for them. This form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more
effective than is overt intimidation and restraint. When it is habitual
arA embodied in social institutions, it seems the normal and natural state
of affairs. The mass usually become unaware that they have a claim to a
development of their own powers. Their experience is so restricted that
they are not conscious of restriction." "Democracy and Educational
Administration," School and Society , kS (April 3, 1973):U58.
^

6U

The Public....

,

p. 139.

65

Ibid., p. IU2.

66

John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York:
Books, 1963 Z1935/), pp. 52-53.
67
Ibid., p. 62.
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and Arnold Ka.f.an.

be shared by the
interpretations of Peter Bachrach

Uisse.-faire liberal!.™ had proved
ite bankruptcy;

adventitious elements had been
i^osed on early liberalise which
™ade it
unresponsive to the emerging social
problem, of a developing
Industrialized
society.

Ways must be found to reestablish
"community^, through revitalizing
the inquiry and discussion and
verification process. This was
first of
all an intellectual problem; but
it was also a practical problem.

Part
of the conditions necessary to
this end are continuous,
face-to-face
commun:Lcation over shared issues.

Out of this interaction, shared

attitudes (based on common interests,
knowledge, and purposes) can be
expected to grow and, thereby, change the
life of the individual and the
community.

This is the development of a social
consciousness; for Dewey

this is what it meant to be "human":
To learn to be human is to develop through
the give-and-take
of communication an effective sense of being
an individually
distinctive member of a community; one who
understands and
appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and
who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers
into
human resources and values. But this translation
is never

finished.""

An account of Dewey's theory of participation should note
that io
locating settings for shared associations— in which meanings
may develop

and new realities form, Dewey held no institution as inherently
sacrosenct.

Even in his discussions of political democracy he minimized the
importance
of institutional and constitutional arrangements.

Dewey, for instance,

refraraed the definition of democracy not as an emphasis on procedure
but

"5B

The PubHc

,

p. 151;.

,

m
.

69
Its classic meaning as a
way of life.
.

Its forms, like universal

suffrage, recurrent elections,
majority rule, were merely the
best means
obtained so far for this end. The
key was experimentation.
It is undoubtable, however,
that for Dewey the public school
was

the most important instrument for
remaking, peacefully, society.

The

purpose of schools was to enable the
forming of future citizens so
that
the society they create is always
an improvement on the previous
generation's.

To this end, Dewey saw no other way
than the shifting from an
authoritarian to a democratic structure:
"Absence of participation tends
to produce lack of interest and concern
on the part of those shut out."^^

The teachers' armui would translate itself
to the students.

Accordingly,

"...th^ democratic principle requires that every
teacher should have

some regular and organic way in which he can,
directly or through representatives democratically chosen, participate in
the formation of the

controlling aims, methods and materials of the school
of which he is a
part."

There is research support to Dewey's theory that now
makes his
72

ideas "truly convincing."

Indeed, the young student can grow, move

His definition:
"The keynote of democracy as a way of life may
be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the
particication of
every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate
the
living of men together: Which is necessary from the standpoint of
both
the general social welfare and the full development of human beings
as
individuals." In "Democracy and Educational Administration,"
p. hSl

70
Ibid., p. U6l.
71
Ibid., p. 14.60.
72
Lavni'ence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education," Humanist , 32 (November-December 1972): 13-16. The series of
studies on which these conclusions are based is discussed in L. Kohlberg
and E. Turiel, eds.. Recent Research in Moral Development (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).
'.

from one stage of moral
development to another,
different from those available
to all teachers.

.Uh

procedures little

Kohlberg in his experi-

mental work with M. Blatt suggests
the nature of his findings:
The educational implications
of these experiments are thpt
^'^'^
o^f
conllicts,
think ll\
about the reasoning he uses
in solving such
conflicts, see inconsistencies
and inadequacies in Ss wav
^
of thinking, and find ways of
resolving them....^?

consiLr~n™f

naf

His conclusions are that.
The classroom discussion approach
should be part of a broader
'
more enduring involvement of students
in the social and
moral functioning of the school.
Rather than attempting to
inculcate a predetermined and unquestioned
set of values
teachers should challenge students with
the moral issues 'faced
by the school community as problems
to be solved, not merely
situations
which rules are mechanically applied. 7ii

m

That small success has been achieved in
this area must be considered a

matter of fact.

Of course, a private educational
institution has an

easier time of justifying its authoritarian
structure with the arguraent
that the student is free to choose his institution.

The pubLic and

state-supported institutions face the problem in another
way-generally

by avoiding any but the safest and most orthodox issues
and tending to
value-neutral skill subjects.
There were other settings, as well, where participation should
occur.

Dewey wrote in The Public and Its Problems
and its home is the neighborly community."
commlunity, in social and business groups.
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Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 16.
75

The Public...

,

p. 213.

;

"Democracy must begin at home,
It could occur in the

What occurred in these secondary
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social groups was important as
it had a bearing on the
formation of dispositions and tastes, the attitudes,
interests, purposes and desires
of
those engaged in carrying on the
activities of the group. In the
broad
sense, all institutions were
educational; and participation in
local
settings would have a broadening
effect on the understanding of the
7A
larger national and international issues
as well.

Dewey's theory of participation for
the construction of a democratic
life was derived from his theory of
knowledge.

He had the strongest faith

that no one knew better an individual's
own needs and troubles than that
indivj.dual himself.

When that individual was given the
respect he

deserved, through the chances and opportunities
of meeting with others
like himself in the community, he and the
others would enhance their

reasoning and moral capacities.
the better off.

For this, society itself will be much

Dewey was not so naive to believe that the mere
coming

together was a situation sufficient to prompt this growth.

It required

patterns of thought and practice encouraged and supported
widely by all
social institutions; for instance, it required the courage to
reject the
old and familiar for the new and untried.

Like Rousseau, Dewey was

equally a strong critic of established, other-worldly dogmas.

He was a

naturalist in the way some today would consider themselves to be ecologists.'.
While Dewey may,

I

believe, have underestimated the force of dominating

economic and political institutions and the depth of repressive ideologies,
he surely deserves significance for the profound appreciation he had of

the strengths and weaknesses of social institutions on the formation of

persons' chai'acter.

Ibid., p. 217.
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Conclusion

The classical vision supplies
an answer to the perplexing
problems
of advanced industrial society,
particularly to its features as a
classfractured society. Our society's
peculiarly debilitating feature is
that
it sets no limits on any sufficiently
forceful promotion, including

governments.

The most egregious feature of this
condition is the

unnecessary repression of the human, creative
personality.
Rousseau's solution would reconstruct the
political society on a

moral basis.

The key to his vision was the character
of the individuals

that made up the society; and, this answer
distinguished Rousseau, for
instance, from Marx who recommended simply a
reconstruction of the economic
base.

A modern society could only bring about a
civilized style of life

when all members of the coramunity recognized the
need to sublimate one's
natural or badly-cultivated impulses, needs, or wants.

One became a

realized "self" to the extent that one was enabled to
develop these reflective and deliberative, moral capacities about the interests
of the

commumty.

The most likely condition for them to blossom and flourish,

it was felt by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey, was in the
participating society

where all would share in the deliberation and solution of issues that
affected their lives.
The view of knov/ledge to which the moral notion of man was connected
was especially developed by Dewey's pragmatic philosophy, and its chief

feature was the view that there is no fixed, authoritative basis for

knowledge.

Knowledge and intelligence were developing processes; and

fundamental was the process of inquiry that this recognition encouraged.

Rejected was the spectator- view of knowledge of the empiricists, for

instance, in favor of a view
of

^n

in the world as
"agent-patient."

ft-on this

philosophical perspective, it
necessarily follows that the
pursuit of knowledge was not the
task of elites but was a
social and
democratic task. Participation
in social decisions is
Justified in
tenns of fund^ental hu^an
rights and for the preferred
consequences to
which this practice leads.

We can see in the liberal-pluralist
interpretation, reviewed next,
that this essential insight-that
the best civil society will
be one that
is foi-med by a moral citiEenry-has
been lost and needs to be regained.
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CHAPTER III
THE LIBERAL-PLURALIST INTERPRETATION:

THE THEORY OF ROBERT A. DAHL

Introduction

Realization of the self has not been
a widely shared aspiration
of
social scientists or philosophers of the
twentieth century. For instance,
considerable attention of mainstreai.i political
science has been devoted
to that anomalous abstraction after which
one study was so aptly titled,

the Araerican voter.

This literature of votingbehavior was
in an important

way the natural evolution of government wartime
studies conducted by behavioral psychologists and rested on a scientistic
assmnption that quanti-

fication of the regularities of human behavior
will lead to a body of
knowledge about political life and make possible
predictability and
control.

It ignored questions related to the quality
of life.

The extensive research commitments of the past two
decades are high-

lighted by a sequence of studies that must include:
The Voter Decide s, Voting

,

The Peoples' Ch oice.

The American Voter . The Civic Culture , and,

most recently. Political Participation in America .

By 1965 a literature

review was necessary to integrate the overwhelming number of periodic
1

and full-length studies and their findings.
The central point that review study made is suggestive of this

group of authors' concerns:

"About one-third of the American adult

1

Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation - How and Why Do People
Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

population can be characterized
aa politically apathetic
or passive, in
".ost cases, they are
unaware, literally, of the
political part of the
world around the.. Another
sixty percent play largely
spectator roles
in the political process; they
watch, they cheer, they vote,
but they do
not do battle...
The correlates of
voting-psychological, sociological,
and political-were cxandned in
the light of this finding,
and ..political
efficacy,.. ..civic duty,., and
similar terms supplied political
science

vith a new vocabulary to explain
participation rates.
The attempt, however, was not to
explain in causal ways the findings.
Very few questions were raised about
the quality of participation, the
effects of participation, or the
question of how participation changes
over time. Finally, there was little
directed attention to explaining the

phenomena of non-participation.
On one issue of fundamental importance
to this study-the conclusions

drawn from the evidence of limited participation-there
was some division
of opinion.

A weak wing, for instance, suggested that the low
rates of participation were not of wide public concern.

These low rates, when contrasted

2

Ibid., p. 21.
3

See Dale Rogers Marshall, "Who Participates in What? A
Bibliographic
Essay on Individual Participation in Urban Areas," Urban Affairs
Quarterly
k (December 1968) :201-223, who emphasizes the "react-ve" and "static"
character of the literature. She writes: "The literature is dominated
by attempts to support or refute theories of mass society and thus
it
focuses on the question of whether or not there is participation."
p. 215.
h

My introductory chapter suggested the work of Heinz Eualau, among
others, as illustrative of this trend. Also noteworthy is the work of
Edward Banfield, Daniel P. Moynihan, Norman Wengart, and James Q. Wilson.
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with the experience of so.e
Western democratic systems,
could be read as
indicative of satisfaction with
the political system.
Qcamined more
closely, the representatives of
this wing showed a distrust
of
behavior and a policy-preference
that key decisions be made
by pro-

h^n

fessionals-by, i„ other words, an
open and democratic elite.
represents the opinion this group
advanced.

Milbrath

For instance, in his con-

cluding summary statement in PoUtlcal
Particip ate nn he suggested!
"Moderate or low participation levels by
the general public plac;e a
special burden or responsibility on
political elites for the successful

functioning of constitutional democracy."

The passage concludes:

If this analysis is correct, present
levels and patterns
of participation in politics do not
constitute a threat to
democracy; they seem, in fact, to be a
realistic adjustment
""^ °^
society.
The
political
processes
?
ol that democracy may not be close
to the ideal of tne
classical theorists, but they may well be
the best possible
approximation to popular control of government
that can be
achieved
modern, industrialized, mobile, mass society.^

m

Another stronger wing, however, developed and
urged the democratic

requisite of encouraging voter participation in the
political process

in order to extend the democratic achievements and
secure the widest
7

range of political legitimacy.
The weak case is obviously disparate from the classic
democratic
5

Milbrath, p. 153.
6
Ibid., p. lSh»
7

Dahl will supply the paradigmatic example for this study. Also
representative are Alan Altschuler's Community Control - The Black Demand
for Pai-ticipation in Large, American Cities (New York: Pegasus, 1970),
and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in Ameri ca - Political
Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

.»del.

But even if „e exaMne
the stronger wing of this
tradition ve
discover that it, too, ^sses
any olose correspondence
to the empirical
and normative theory of such
classic democrats as Rousseau,
Green, and
Devey. The concept of
"participation" has undergone a
revision in both
its criteria of application
and its moral point of view,
a revision

coinciding with the revision of
democratic theory.

Robert Dahl provides

a case in point,
I

believe we can take the work of Dahl,
spanning as it does two

eras-the behavioral period and the period
of the post-behavioral
critics-as representative of the
predominant

pluralist approach and

the adjustments forced upon its
paradigm by critics.

Dahl-s work con-

stitutes a large literature, encompases
an important range of theoretical
issues, and has not shirked the important
task of making recommendations

to associates in the profession, as
well as to practitioners.
capacity, Dahl has been the subject of
appraisal as well.

In this

Dahl's work,

while attempting to respond directly to
certaincriticisms, fails, nonetheless, to incorporate sensitively the
relevant theoretical charges into

his perspective.

Several problems in Dahl's interpretation become apparent
to the
critic:
1.

He has lost the meaning enriched participation had for
the

development of the personality and which the classic adherants valued.
2.

He is unconcerned with and, therefore, cannot show persuasively

how his model of participation will meaningfully effect the current status
of social and economic problems in significant ways.
3.

The more difficult problems of how to implement extensive patterns

£2

of participation, once they
are appreciated,

m

a highly integrated
„«S3

society is skirted altogether.
As a result, his reco„Mendation
for expanding the settings
of partlcipati
is only loosely anchored.
The seriousness of the underlying
theoretical weaknesses of the
paradigm are magnified in the
execution of the Verba and Nie study.
Politi cal Participatlon _in_Agerica;
the meaningfulness of its
empirical
data must be questioned and the
study's social and political
implications
exposed.
The purpose of this chapter is to
exaraine the interpretation of
the

stronger

vring

of the behavioral scientiests, for it
is here that the

contrast between the Rousseauan Arision and
the empirical model is most

significantly revealed.

The limits of the behavioral conception
of

participation will be seen to be connected to the
limits of its perg
spective, the consensus-integration perspective
that guides inquiry.

Dahl will be suggested as proto-typical of the
limitations of this
perspective.

8

The characterization of the "consensus" and "conflict"
perspectives
as competing frameworks for the study of society grows
out of the work of
Half Dahrendorf, John Horton, and Gerhard Lenski among others.
The
presumptions and expectations that make the "consensus" perspective

distinctive are indicated in William E. Connolly, "Theoretical SelfConsciousness," Polity, 6 (Fall 1973 ) :li|-l6. Danl fits the consensus
perspective because, for instance, he attributes social and political
stability in the United States to a widespread consensus as to the
procedural norms of the society, which is sustained by multiple roles
for individuals and the encouragement of social pluralism in the
society.
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As will be this study's general
forn«t, discussion will
proceed in
terms of the follovdng considerations:
First, there will be an examination of the theorist's approach;
secondly, there will be a
characterization of the theorist-s conception
of participation and his
paradigmatic
case and an explanatory account of
the theorist's version of
participation and non-participation. Finally,
a critical assessment of the
account will be presented against the
contrast model for expanded and
enriched participation which is provided
by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey.

J-

6U

Dahl.s Approach to a Politics
of Advanced Industrial
Society
Dahl.s political science has
been framed within the
parameters of
the behavioralist approach and,
with no logical inconsistency,
has been

strongly committed to the recoramendation
of increased participatic
-On as
necessary
and desirable to the evolution
of the democratic process
in
the United States and for other
democratic systems as well. Perhaps,
because of these chief features, it
would be helpful to see Dahl',s

work as firmly rooted in Western
liberalism, in harmony in at least
some ways philosophically, for
instance, w:.th John Stuart Mill and
probably
not widely separated from such
welfare-state practitioners as Franklin D.

Roosevelt or the efforts of John F. Kennedy's
Commission on Registration

and Voting Participation.
This section shall set out certain features
of the theoretical

framework to which Dahl's account of participation
is connected, and

which may, finally, be seen as posing certain
conceptual constraints.

I

shall assume that the main features of the behavioral
approach are familiar,
so that what I shall endeavor to do is bring into
focus those features

most subject to criticism.

There are several important aspects to be

dealt with, and we shall want to focus on the shifts that Dahl
makes

within these issue-areas as he responds to the theoretical pressures
from, mainly, the Left.

The principal issues

I

plan to set out include,

first, the aims and methods of a "science" of politics and, then, the

notion of the "democratic" polity and the role of elections for it will
be considered.

Aims and methods of a "science" of politics .

Dahl's earliest

writings on the study of politics reflects a presumption as to the

desirability of a science of
political behavior.
reference to Easton's

For instance, with

l!-MltlcaLS,sten^^

2£^2litical^cience Dahl was disturbed by
Easton's concern with the
"metaphysical" question of "What is
political science?"

question, he says, it Is trivial:

As a scientific

"...empirical theory can be produced

only by constructing and testing
propositions about the real world,
not
by defining political science."'
He seems never to have
doubted the

possibility of a science of poUtics
whose premises followed that of
the
universal-generalization paradlgra. By the
time that he wrote an article
American Political Science Revj.ew
entitled. "The Behavioral

Approach in Political Science:

An Epitaph for a Monument to a
Successful

Protest," and Modern PoUtical Analysis,
he was firmly committed to that
position.
Its features we need only briefly
recall.

In the article Dahl

indicated "wholehearted" agreement with the
statement of the aims and
methods of political science set out by David
Truman in a much "neglected"
essay of 1951.

In his review, Dahl characterized
behavioralism as a "mood"

whose purpose was science:

It was an orientation which aims, citing

Truman, at stating all the phenomena of government
in terms of the ob-

served and observable behavior of menj it must be
systematic, growing
out of a precise statement of hypotheses and rigorous
ordering of
10
evidence; it must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods.

Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Politics: New and Old." World
Politics , 7 (April 1955) :ii8l-U82.
10
Trujiian's essay was entitled, "The Implications of Political
Behavior Research." Dahl's article was published in American Political
Science Review . 55 (December 1961) 763-772 . Page references here are
from the reprint in Melanson, ed.. Knowledge, Politics and Public Policy
(Cambridge: Winthrop, 1973), pp. 50-51.
:
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UndeniMng Tr^an-^

words, Dahl reminded hi.
readers:

.....The ultimate
goal Of the student of
political behavior is the
development of a science
of the political process."

Dahl goes on to suggest that
the measure of this new
outlook must
be its results:
...if all of these activities
do not yield exTil;,n=+n
°'
thft^are^m^'r h

v:r?fi:ri:f ^^'^r

^..e

^ug

xui oil.,! explanation, and
.,
more u'?pfnl fo-r
meeting the perennial problems
of political Tife than fhe
explanations they are intended to
replace- if in sWt
•

-tlook do not m^L^e

up
irl'^'^'.t
standards
thatf--^^^serious students of politics have
always
confidently expect that the
a^temnt tto I
"^f^'
attempt
build
an empirical science of politics
will lose
^"^^
''^''^ generation that it
gained
in the
last!l2

A "tentative if deliberately incomplete
assessment" indicates positive
results; for instance, of the research
bracketed by The Peoples' Choice

and The American Voter he suggests:
It is no exaggeration to say that in less
than two decades
this series of studies has significantly
altered and
greatly deepened our understanding of wnat in
some ways is
the most distinctive action for a citizen
of democracydeciding how to- vote, or indeed whether to vote
at all, in
a competitive national election. -^-^

Also highly regarded by his criteria are Lane's works
and the work done
towards understanding the psychological characteristics
of homo poll ti cus
attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors.

Names cited

in this literature include Lasswell, Cantril, Lane again, McCloskey,
Adorno and associates. Almond, Stouffer, and Lipset.
11
Idem.
12

Ibid., p. 52.
13

m

Idem.

Ibid., pp. 53-5i4.

In 1961 Danl's

:
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expectation was that the beha^doral
mood would disappear as an
issue,
"because it had succeeded."
Behavioralism as a protest movement,
he'
concluded with a few caveats that
history nor speculation be spurned,

was needed to bring political science
into stride with the other social
science disciplines.
This model of a science of politics
also involves a logical positivist delineation which Dahl follows.
He assumes the possibility of a
clear distinction between fact and
value statements and that empirical

knowledge can be objectively developed.

While values should not bias

empirical findings, the unimportance of values
was not implied, nor was

any form of value relativism.

Dahl made the assumption that the forms

of knowledge were different and that
evaluations, nevertheless, are

important to make.

Dahl's approach brought together consistently

epistemological individualism and the emotivist position
in value noncognitivism.
To achieve objectivi.ty it is very important to be clear
about one's
words.

While this proposition can hardly be disagreed with, the recom-

mendation Dahl follows is problematic.

His goal, shared by other be-

havioralists and notable for the persistence with which it is held, is
to "operationalize" key concepts in the propositions one is testing.

The concern to eliminate the multiple meanings of political terms is
profound.

In Modern Political Analysis Dahl writes, with his own

standpoint objectified:

15

For this discussion see Dahl's Modern Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963;, pp. 101-107-
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Probably most Empirical Theorists
would argue that the
ordinary language of politics
does pose serious p^ob^ems
because many political terms in
ordinary usage have a
multxplxcity of meanings even a^ong
poUtical scilntists.l^
In Polyarchy Dahl again presses
the
point:

The problem of terminology is
formidable, since it seems
impossible to find terms already in
use (hat do not carry
vjth them a large freight of ambiguity
and surplus meaning.
The reader should remnd himself
that the terms used here
are employed throughout the book,
to the best of my
'''' '''' "'""""^^ '^^'^"^^^
preoe^ng
paragrajhs^i?

The concern is carried, for example,
deeply into his treatment of demo-

cratic theory and construction of a model of
democracy befitting the

contemporary industrialized society.

The substitute for democracy and

its historically overladen meanings is
"polyarchy:"

Some readers will doubtless resist the term
polyarchy as
an alternative to the word democracy, but it is
important
to maintain the distinction between democracy
as an ideal
system and the institutional arrangements that have
come
to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation
of an
Ideal, and experience shows, I believe that when the
same
term is used for both, needless confusion and essentially
irrelevant semantic arguments get in the way of analysis.

For similar reasons Dahl rejected ajiother

terra

of central importance

to the vocabulary of contemporary political inquiry, "elite."

This term

has been transmitted through the vocabulary of Mosca, Pareto, and
Michels

down to both a conservative and a radical tradition in contemporary

16

Modern Political Analysis

,

p. 105.

17

Dahl's Polyarchy - Participation and Opposition (New Haven:
University Press, 1971}, Fn. U, p. 9.

Yale

18

Idem.
and Democracy
Press, 1973),
See pp. 25-27

It ought to be pointed out that when Dahl co-authored Size
with Edward R. Tufte (California: Stanford University
he reverted to the more "loose" phrase of "democracy."
for the explanation.

"

"
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political thought.

Dahl has directly rejected
the application of "elitis."

as a description of his own
work, and he has cited the
importance-again
for rational, scientific
discourse-of a more neutral term, of
terms
"rather more descriptive and
discriminating."^^ His own formulation

supplies the term "leaders" and the key
dichotomy in politics of industrialized society is the one between
"leader and supporter.
The effort to escape the rich meanings
of our ordinary language

appears to be pursued to the extreme in
Dahl's later works which are

largely bereft of the narrative that tempered
the New Haven study.

From

merely the point of view of literature, the
contemporary empiricist
style is rarefied and empty.

The reader is invited to follow the mean-

ings of concepts whose criteria are
apparently closely and narrowly

stipulated— and yet the terms remain vague and have
little essential
reference to everyday life, our shared public world.
is that the language is non-dialectical.

Another problem

This representational view of

language will be critically inspected for its implications
in concluding
conanents.

To meet the charge that the empirical theorists "smuggle their
own

values into their theories," Dahl suggests that these theorists
do con20
cede support for democracy and open inquiry.
Since Dahl is consistently

19

See Dahl's "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of
Democracy,*" American Political Science Review 60 (June 1966), Fn.
7,
"I suggest that this difference in tne choice of words is more
p. 298:
than a mere taste or distaste for certain labels. It also reflects a
conviction on the part of Key, Truman, myself and others that 'elitist'
interpretations of American political life are inadequate both empirically
and normatively.
20
Modern Political Analysis » pp. 106-10?.
,
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Pledged to the advocacy and
promotion of "democratic values,"
it will be
important to see just what he
means by them in the next
section.
The

point to be made here is that the
nature and

Action of normative theory
for Dahl is essentially
different and unscientific and
succeeds empirical
analysis. It is, from the point
of view of that position
interesting to
note that KodeHLPoli^^
while clearly staking out a
place
for values in political inquiry
never suggests how they are to
be determined or may be reasoned about. Nor^is
conduct of this discussion to be
found anywhere else in his writings.''
At best, his Preface to Democ ratic
Theory promises this sort of discussion
when it sets out the Madisonian
and populist models as the limits of
democratic possibility.

But even

here the position that is developed
follows from a linguistic slide
"^^
which amounts to "claiming facts may refute
ideals.

Both ideal models

are to be rejected and replaced by a more
"realistic" model, polyarchy.'^

Dahl's confusion is representative of the
behavioralists

'

misunderstanding

21

This is because Dahl and others who share his
perspective misconceive the nature of moral' argument . They maintain
that ultimately moral
Ideals and commitments must rest on subjective and
irrational grounds
and do not recognize that "good-reasons" can be given
for value preferences,
See discussion of Kai Nielsen, "History of Ethics,"
Encyclopedia
of
'
'
Philosophy, 3:110-112.
22

This argument is suggested by Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes in
"The New Democracy," in McCoy and Playford, eds.. Apolitical Politics
(New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 168. They suggest that "it needs
to be shown exactly how and why the ideal is rendered improbable or impossible of attainment. This has nowhere been done." p. 171. See also
Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy,"
American Political Science Review , 60 (June 1966:288-289, where he
emphasizes the shift from the prescriptive element in classical theory
to apology.
23
It should be noted that Dahl's claim to "realism" throughout his
work trades on the assumption that his readers share that "reality" with
him. Philosophically speaking, Dahl's community of reality" bears,
however, further examinati.on than Dahl would want to give it.

—
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of political science -s co^ection
to political theory and
political philosophy.
A3 has been persuasively
argued, the logical
positivlsts fail
to appreciate the differences
between ^^the^atical and
logical questions
(to which they^erroneously
reduce social science questions)
and philosophical ones.

This misunderstai^ding is expressed
in Dahl's cynical attitude to
claims made on behalf of the relevance
of classical ideals for conditions
of advanced industrial society.
For Dahl, not much worthwhile
knowledge

can be expected from reviewing the
classical political theorists because
social and historical conditions have
changed. Conceptions of democracy
are regarded as "nostalgic" and "utopian"
and are seen as inducements to
26
cynicism rather than as spurs to action.
This attitude is portrayed by

Dahl as one of "realism,"
The significance of Dahl's approach is that
he is consigned to a

narrower theoiy of democracy, and this view weakens
the case Dahl is able
to make on behalf of expanding the settings of
participation and opens it
to charges of being "cooptive" and even "repressive,"

25

For a positive view of what this connection must be see
Connolly

op. cit., pp. 3h-3S*
25

The argument is made by John Wisdom, "A Feature of Wittgenstein's
Technique," in Fann, ed., Ludwig Wittgenst ein; The Man and His Philosophy
(New York: Delta, 1567), pp. 353-365.
26
For his castigation of classical theory see, for instance, A Preface
to Democratic Theory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. Ij
After the Revolution? Authority in A Good Society (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1970), pp» 2k, 59, 52; and Size and Democracy p.

^

,

The^vision
S?I2lution? and
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of demo cratic_the^

Size_and_De2^

Dahl's two studies. After
the
be regarded as counter-responses

to the recent efforts of pluralist
critics who have endeavored
to reassert the applicability of the
classical democratic vision/^
Danl's
analysis in the first citation and
his empirical model in the
second
should be seen as efforts to reconcile
the contrasting propositions
of
the classical democratic theory
and the facts and realities of
political

experience.

A characterization of the Rousseauan
model pro^^des Dahl

with an explicit contrast model for
arguing his viewpoint.
First, let us consider the matter of
how Dahl perceives the argu-

ment of classical democratic theory.

A brief review of Dahl's inter-

pretation of Rousseau's ideas, which he mainly
takes from The Social
Contract, will suggest that Rousseau's model
of a democracy of partici-

pation is incompletely perceived and, in part,
misconstrued.

Dahl

sketches most forthrightly the paradigm of Rousseau
in the following

passage and it is from this sketch that the particular
accent Dahl gives
to his interpretation can be discovered:

A democratic polity must be completely autonomous, because
otherwise its citizens could not be fully self-governing:
Some of their decisions would be limited by the power or
authority of individuals or groups outside the citizen
body. A democratic polity must have so few citizens that all
of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to
listen, to vote, perhaps even to speak. Smallness, it was

27

The relevance of the Rousseauan argument was suggested by Walker,
op. cit.; Duncan and Lukes, op. cit.; Peter Bachrach in The Theory of
Democratic Elitism - A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Robert J,
Pranger in The Kclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965); and see W. E. Connolly, "The Challenge to Pluralist
Theory," in Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 22-2k.

8
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opportunities for participation
in and
contSI^?'^^''^'^
control
of the government in many ways.
For examole in !
^'^^
^^^^^
™^of\'eing
Chosen
by lot at least once in his^
en'bi'L^tTL^'r^^"
lifetime to sit on one of
administrative bodies. Smallness made
i?
^o^.th^
possible for every citizen to know
every other, to estimate
his qualities to understand his
problems, to de^el^rfrLndW
feelings toward him, to analyze and
discuss with com^rehension the problems facing the polity.
To be sure, i?^a democratic polity was to be both small
and completely autonomous
there was a price to be paid: The
citizen body must be seS:
sufficient and life must be frugal. But
frugality was considered a virtue in a. democracy, since
it helped to reduce
inequalities and jealousies among citizens
and to toughen them
for the rigors of military life, which
all must exi.er!ence
from time to time if autonomy was to be
maintained'. 2

In this sketch the accent is on the
efficaciousness of "size."

The

accent is not on the requirements placed on
a community of individuals
to act in socially responsible and principled
ways, which Rousseau viewed

smallness of size as supporting.

It is from this perspective that Dahl

misunderstands Rousseau's criticism of representative
processes of demo-

cracy for not encouraging the development of these
cognitive and
affective capacities.

Indeed, Dahl makes a mockery of Rousseau.

29

This

distorted interpretation constitutes the basis for Rousseau's
dismissal:
"For in founding authority on personal choices Rousseau was as
modern as
2^^

Size and Democracy , pp. 5-6.
29

Dahl makes the suggestion that Rousseau did not even take his own
ideas seriously: "In fact, it was the impossibility of arriving at all
the conditions necessary for direct democracy, including the impossibility
of keeping the people constantly assembled
order to decide public
affairs, that led Rousseau to conclude that 'democracy,' in his sense, had
never existed and never would." See "Further Reflections...," pp. 296-297.

m
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yesterdays existentialist

=

It was only in limiting
the legitir,acy of

authority to the city-state that
he locked hi^elf into the
prison of
the past,"
Several obvious historical
developments, according to Dahl,
had

^de

the idealization of the small
city-state anachronistic; mainly
these
were the development of the
nation-state, the emergence of
representati ve

legislatures, and the philosophic and
ideologic adaptations of democrati
c
theory to this grander scale.
Simply, the shifts in the historical
sit-

uation and in the response of the
theorists was so commanding as not
to
require further serious consideration.
From the critical perspective,
however, Dahl-s was a false historicism
which never viewed classes and

human beings and their language and symbolism
as having a constitutive
effect on the world.
In recognition of the more complex conditions
of a mass bureaucrat! zed

and industrialized society, Dahl suggests that
no one principle can be
evoked to make a case for the single best structure
for democracy as, it
is alleged, Rousseau thought.

Rousseau's concept of "general will" is

effaced by Dahl's imposition of a Lockean notion of authority.

The

relationship individuals have towards the "general will"— one
that seeks
to identify it and act according to

relationship of five types:

it— is

transformed into an authority

Committee democracy, primary democracy,

referendum democracy, representative democracy, and several forms of
32

delegated authority.

The argument is that we need associations of

30
After the Revolution? , p. 80.
31";

Size and Democracy , p.

8.

32

See After the Revolution?, chap. 2.

.
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different dimensions for different
purposes; all necessitate
organization
by authority. This proposition
reinvites DahLs appeal to the
.etaphor

of

the Chinese boxes suggestive
of multiple settings for varied
stylos
of participation.
The problem is not that the
argu^nent for varied
settings is wrong, but that it is
incomplete, for Dahl fails to give
recognition to the fuller insight Rousseau,
Green, and Dewey had about
the nature of democratic participation.
Obligation, under the classical
model, was obtained less by coercive
authority than by a certain kind of
choice; this choice necessarily involved
sublimation, but it was per-

sonally not institutionally derived; it
was necessarily moral choice.
The concept of self had disappeared in
Dahl-s democratic theory.

Like many other political scientists Dahl had
followed Schumpeter's
critique of democratic ideology and his revision
of democratic theory

along non-substantive, procedural lines.

We need only recall Dahl's

substitution for democracy in practice, polyarchy,
to make this point.
"Polyarchies" were defined as "systems with broad
electorates, extensive

opportunities to oppose the government and contest it in
elections,
competitive political parties, peaseful displacement of officials
de-

feated in honestly conducted elections, and so on."

For Dahl, the

pluralist, the keynote of democracy was the opportunities of choice that

33

After the Revolution? , pp. 88-89; and see Dahl's "City in the
Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61 (196? ): 953-970,
3h

This general argument is made, for instance, by Bachrach in Tneory
of Democratic Llitism pp. 17-19.
,

IB

After the Revolution? , p. 78; also. Preface.
Polyarchy , pp.

7^

.

,

p.

8Ij;

and

occurred ror .he voter, u„aer
oondUions or

.oUUc^

competing candidates for public
office and competing
pro.ra^s.
F,lecti ons
were decisive for three reasons:
Because they had finality,
because
they vastly increased the
si.e, number, and variety
of .tnorities whose
preference .ust be talcen into
account by leaders in ^a.ing
policy choices,
and because elections occur
within a social process,
"for politicians
subject to elections must operate
within the limits sot both by
their own
values, as indoctrinated members
of the society, and by their
expectation,
about what policies they can
adopt and still be reelected.-.^'
Tne electoral
process held the possibility of
accountability and responsibility
through
final control, having the "last
say."
In suinmary, two chief aspects of
Rousseau's model were overlooked or
too easily dismissed:
(1) The moral development of the person
that democracy promoted, and (2) the conditions
requisite for its nurture, which
smallness of community facilitated but by
itself was insufficient.

There were other conditions as important:

Social equality, respect for

persons, opportunities for solitude and
reflection which would nurture
dialogue.

Voting in the classical scheme was more
than simply a checking

or vetoing-type of process.

As Duncan and Lukes point out:

"To the l8th

and 19th century democratic theorists, voting was
perhaps the citizen's
most important act, in which the people as a whole
were to reveal their

political energy and virtue.

It was to be the culmination of long,

thoughtful, and fair consideration of the relevant issues."

37

The norm-

ative character of Rousseau's model, which Kant had recognized
and which

~3rPreface..., pp. 132, 12$,
37

Duncan and Lukes, p. 165.
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Cassirer had endeavored to capture
in his interpretation, slips
out of the
grasp of the positivist/consensus
paradigm which forces the
prescriptive
theory to fit a much tighter empirical
mold.
In orxier to clean up the

contentious features of appraisive concepts,
the empirical theorists
had to destroy the moral point of
view by which "democracy," for
example,
obtains its valued, but controversial,
meaning. Thus, for instance, Dahl
is induced to protray Rousseau's
Social Contract as a charming Utopia

which would be unacceptable to any
"reasonable" or "realistic" person.
This effort, however, can only be viewed as
successful within the

language-game of which it is a part.
to be noticed as well.

Another important implication is

The constraints placed on the democratic
model

by Dahl's perspective must have theoretical
implications for the concept
of participation that he employs, encourages, and
defends.

38

IB

The argument for the contextual nature of certain kinds of concepts
is set out William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics"
(Paper presented at American Political Science Convention, September ii-8,
1973), pp. 1-19.
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Dahl and the Pluralist
Account of Participation
There are a number of
questions to which a theory
of participation
-St supply answers and according to
which I will elucidate and
appraise
Dahl. Significantly, differing
interpretations will place emphasis
on
these questions in differing
ways, and, indeed, so.e
questions n.y see.
to be overemphasized. Other
questions not cited .ay receive
consideration
as well.
I propose this set as
possessing sufficient range to
apply to
the interpretations under
consideration in this study initially:
Who participates?

Why?

What are the doMnant and limiting
forms

of the legitimized participation?

What impact do these forms of
parti-

cipation have on the policies affecting
society, for the rules of the
system, for the lives of the participants?
Who should participate? How?
Who doesn't participate?

Why?

What is the impact of non-participation

for public and private policies, for
the rules of the game, for the non-

participants when there is no meaningful role
for them?
in the society exist to induce expanded
participation?

prevail to discourage it?

What is the net effect?

What factors
What factors

That is, from the

viewpoint of classical democratic theory, what is
the trend with regard
to the widely shared practices and attitudes
towards participation in the

society?

I

shall try to show how Dahl's account supplies answers
to

39

The Verba and Nie study suggests a more limited set of
questions
because of the authors' view that certain questions cannot be
examined
empirically. Thus, it dismisses as "endless" the debate set out by
the critics, Walker and Bachrach, and bring quite sizeable research
commitments to bear on the old question of rates of participation, a
topic "more amenable to study." See pp. 5-6.
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these otters and shall show by
way of contrast that by what
it neglects,
disoom^ts, or overrides with other
considerations it is subject to
critical measure.
The starting point of Dahl's inquiry
is fi^ed by the perspective
he
brings to inquiry.
By adopting the emergent political
science framework
of the 193'0's, the consensus
perspective, he has selected for
hmself
useful phenomena for attention, and
these he embraces with a particular

attitude and holds in focus in specific
ways.
Notably, the conduct of Dahl-s empirical
research (e.g.. Size and

Democrac y) is deteimned by the familiar
"systems" model.

This model

also serves the purposes of Verba and Nie's
Political Participation in
America.

This analytic construct, the systems model,
sets up a flow chart

of key political relationships which are
schematized as inputs, conversion
procecesses, and outputs.

Significantly, the model as typically diagrammed

presupposes the initiating natur-e of the individual.

And, the individual

is regarded in a selective way, in his role as a
voter with congealed

interests.
The potential impact of the individual on public policy
is treated

through the aggregation process.

"Voluntary" and "special interest"

groups and the major political parties provide the essential intervening
sets of social institutions (with political functions).

coalesce individuals' interests.

They serve to

Parties are chief agents in modern

democratic society for "institutionalizing" and resolving conflict.
The relationships between these aggregating institutions as they press their

claims on to the institutions of the governmental arena is defined and
sus tained by the "support" structures of the society.

The political ethos

.
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and the constitutional fra^ewor.
provide theae supports,
but even apathy
might be considered positively
in this
regard.

Dahl-s interpretation of the
systems model would view
the conversion
processes of government as the
decisive ...rena" for controlling
decisions:
relatively
powerful. In a
p»erm"*
""m"'
wide variety of situations,
in
a contest
between governmeatal controls
and other controls ?he
governmental controls will probably
prove mo^e decrs^ve
than competing controls....
It is'^reasonable to asfui:
i/aat in a wide variety
of situati ons whoever mnt-rnTc
governmental decisions will have
significantly Seat er
control oyer policy than individuals
who do
not Control
control
" ''"^
governmental decisions. ^0

In this arena the process of
negotiating, bargaining, and
compromise takes
place, and this process ultimately
yields official decisions and
practices
concerning a wide range of issues. These
decisions are regarded as resultants of social vectoring-an equivalent
to the "public interest" if
the term is applied^at all. Mainly,
it is a goal-less system, or a

random-goal system.

Stability is promoted by the smoothly
functioning

(predictable) process, and individuals can
begin to aggregate their

interests anew.

The model is recognized as simplistic by
its practi-

tioners, for this is recognized as the problem of
all ideal models.

But

its serious distorting effects on the conduct
of empirical research are
not recognized.

Advisedly, some of these distorting effects should be
pointed out.
For one thing, the systems diagram has a built in bias
by regarding tne

individual's demands as pure inputs (based on abstractly defined
needs.
ho
Preface. . , pp. US-ii?.
hi
This abstract goal, set by the framers of the systems model,
nonetheless conceals certain commitments, certain interests.
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wants, purposes).

It is to be observed that
no compensation is

^de by
also regarding the individuals
as conditioned political
entities, not
only as purely needs-satisfying
individuals. Deeper than this,
then, is
the abstract nature of the
.odel-that is, the political syste.
is nit
portrayed in ter.s of any fundamental
connection to the economy and its
tendencies. Finally, by avoiding
the constellation of questions
that
arise when treating the system
in terms of political economy,
the
problem of the conunercial stimulation
of pseudo-needs is neatly
avoided,
as is the construction of the
whole system of rationality that
holds the
economy together as a system of
practice.
.

In addressing the systems model we
are, in fact, addressing the

core metaphor of the dominant conceptual
paradigm of political scientists
The core metaphor is mechanical and
may be symbolized by the clock, or
perhaps as well by a motor.

The clock exemplifies a closed, finite

energy system according to which the energy
input is totally accountable
in the output.

The clock is the symbol of Newton's
mechanistic universe.

It stands to be argued, however, the extent
to which this core metaphor

is applicable to the human world.

Immediately, we can show that this hidden metaphor invites
certain

presumptions.

In particular, let us look at the presumption it sets
for

participation.
The systems model screens out the multi-faceted and interconnected

—
See also Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York:
Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1970) who suggests the metaphor of a thermostat,
p. 76.
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roles Of the individual and
the social pressures on
the individual as well.
It focuses on the
conventionally ascribed role of
the individual; it reveals the individual in his
single (abstracted) role
as a chooser between
two alternative leadership
groups. Sinply put, it is
an image of a
political actor of rather reduced
dimension. And the bulk of
the population is viewed in this way, falling
some place on a one-dimensional
continuum extending from apathetic
to frantic activist.
Most of the

population are seen to fall into the
broad middle voting segment. Similarly, Verba and Nie construct a
range of the following sort:
The inactives (22^), the voting specialists
(21^), the parochial participai^ts
(l40^),

the communalists (20^), the
campaigners 03%), and the complete

activists (11^).

'

Although Verba and Nie's continuum
suggests a larger

number of activists, both Dahl's and their
ranges are closely similar
to the one proposed by Milbrath.

The paradigmatic case of participation

in pluralist theory is voting, according to
the rational econom.Lc model.
Self-interest may impel one to further participation
in campaign or special
activity.

Dahl has closely allied himself with this position.^^

Where

he has diverged in his recent years is on the
policy recommendation to

After the Revolution?

US

,

p. U7.

Political Participation...^ pp. 118-119; Cf. Milbrath,
pp. 16-22.

See After the Revolution? , where his criterion of economy imposes
limits on the kinds and levels of activity of a participant and Size
and
Demo cracy pp. iiU-US; see also Verba and Nie, pp. 2-3, which emphasizes
"the acts that aim at influenci ng the government, either by affecting
the
choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel;" and Altschuler, p. vii, wMch includes "the right to be
consulted at one end of the spectrum to near absolute community control
of vital public functions at the other."
,

.

the question. I. the
leveX of participation
a p.oble..

The a„.„e. to

t^his

thought
First, during the 1950's
Dahl followed the findings
of the early
voting studies wMch showed
that the level of
participation-voting

turnout-fell far shorter than was
expected by the researchers.

These
findings led Dahl, like Eulau,
Hilbrath and others, to draw
the conclusion
that a democratic system did
not need high levels of
voter participation.
In his 1955 essay, "The
Problem of Participation,"
Dahl extended the
political findings to develop their
implications in ter:.. of the
following^
h^othesis: "The proportion of
individuals who will avail themselves
of
normal opportunities to participate
in decision-nuking, at least in
the
United^States, will be relatively
sn^ll in all forms of social
organization."
This suspicion led Dahl to
propose several tentative conclusions
at that time.
For the democratic process to
function properly several

conditions were necessary; they were not
dissimilar to Milbrath's conclusions:
(1) Reliance on the competitiveness between leaders
was crucial,
(2)

an opportunity for non-leaders to switch
from one set of leaders to

another was needed,

(3)

the classic assumptions about the need
for total

participation were, at the very least, to be viewed
as inadequate, and
(li)

bargaining between other leaders inside and outside
the system became

important as checks.

This adaptation was widely shared by political

scientists, as was the conclusion:

"...What we call 'democracy'— that

B
Robert A. Dahl, "The Problem of Participation," reprinted
in
Williams and Press, eds.. Democracy in Ur ban America (Chicago:
Rand
McNally, 1961 ), p. k07 ,

—

81,

a sy.te. of

deciaion-^„g

i„ „hich leaders are
.ore or lesa re-

sponsive to the preferences
of non-leaders-does see.
to operate with a
low level of citizen
participation. Hence it is
inacc«-ate to say that
one Of the necessary
conditions for .democracy,
is extensive citizen
participation. It would be .ore
reasonable simply to insist
that some
-ninin.1 participation .s
required, even though we
cannot specify with

any precision what this minimvm
must be."
A second period, inaugurated
by A Preface to Democratic
Theory
may be viewed as bringing into
detail some of the problems
out of focus
in the early assessment. The
Preface outlines the task for
much of
Dahl's later work toward developing
a defensible model of the
possible
levels of political activity and the
proper mix of poUtical roles in
the optimal system.
,

In this study the limits of democratic
possibility are posed by
the Madisonian model at one extreme
and the populist-Jeffersonian model
at the other.

Dahl examined these models from the
viewpoint of the

critical-realist, asking the question. What is
possible given the constraints of the real world of advanced
industrial society and individuals

who have many different pursuits to occupy
their time?

answer is supplied by his critique of the two
models.

Briefly, his

The problem with

the Madisonian model is that it fears too much
majority's tyranny of the

minority.

For Dahl, Madison's analysis does not make good
political

science, though it made good ideology.

It is not constitutional struc-

ture, but man's "social" nature, his willingness to form
a consensus.

H7
Ibid., p.

1;08.

.

that

Urdts tyranny.

The populist model Is
objected to on the grounds

of its Singleness of purpose,the goal of political equality
and popular
sovereignty is not balanced against
other warrantable goals. As
Dahl says:
"For most of us-and this may
be particularly true in
countries that have
managed to operate democracies over
long periods
of time-the costs of

pursuing any one or two goals at the
expense of others are thought to
be
excessive. Most of us are marginalists."
Dahl's case, of cour-se,

rests on the unargued assumption of
a widely held diversity of
interests,
all worthy of pursuit:

Political equality and popular sovereignty
are not absolute
goals; we must ask ourselves how much
leisure, privacy
consensus stability, income, security,
progress, status,
e.nd probably many other goals
we are prepared to forego
for an additional increment of political
equality. It is
an observable fact that almost no one regards
political
equality and popular sovereignty as worth an
unlimited
sacrifice of these other goals. 50
Behind this critique lies the image of the
citizen as "rational economic
man," whose values are bour-geois.

By following the Aristotelian rule of moderation in
all things, Dahl

resolves the tensions between the two democratic (and axiomatic)
models

by proposing a compromise solution, an optimal model, which he
proposes
to speak of as "polyarchy."

He finds, not surprisingly, that the

American case fills these minimal conditions.

The chief character of

polyarchy, and the American case, is the extent to which the operations

of such societies cannot be described in terms of contrasts between

majorities and minorities:

ITPreface .

.

,

chap. 1, esp. pp. 30-32,

h9
Ibid., chap. 2, esp. pp. 50-51.
50
Ibid., p. 51.

86

We expect elections to reveal
the "will" n-r
^
^
of a majority on a set of
issues!
s is one tH
'T'"'
tions rarely do, except in an
aLs^
trittal fasSon
Pite this limitation the election
process is one o? ko
fundai>iental methods of social
control which, operati^P
^"'""'^^ ^'^^^'^
responsT^e to nonlelderr^h^?'?^
^^^^,^^\^^^^^"^tion between democracy and dictatorsMn still makes sense. The other
torship
method of social control
IS continuous political
competition among individuals
parties '
or both, elections and
political competUion 1^ not r^lake
for
majorities
any very significan? w^y, tu
tney
v^Iuv inLe^
vastl;y
increase the size, number and variety
of
minorities
whose preferences must be taken
into
by ^aSe^s .n
mking policy choices. I am inclined account
to think'^that it is
in this characteristic of elections not minority rule but
"
"^"^^
tLe essential
ITflll""""
'^f
differences between
dictatorships and democracies.51

S

-

m

Dahl is aware that the constitutional
structure, for instance, has lead
to the over-representation and
under-representation of specific groups .^^
V.'hat

I

ara

concerned to show is the, disputable, meaning
that he draws

from this recognition.
control.

Dahl recognizes that not everyone has
equal

Even though it appears to be a creaking
structure-for instance,

in arriving at foreign policy-the system has
the virtue of its vices.
Dahl asserts:
With all its defects, it does nonetheless provide
a high
probability that any active and legitimate group will
mke itself heard effectively at some stage in the process
of decision. This is no mean thing in a political
system.53

The conclusion ignores structural biases that favor the
organized as

against the unorgarized groups in society; as well, it pretends that
"being heard" is equivalent to having political impact.

The task that

Dahl saw, at one point briefly, as important for political science is

Ibid., pp. 131-132.
52

Ibid., p.

li;5.

53

Ibid., p. 150.

•

.
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not that one addressed in the Preface's
conclusion.

'

Where is his

recoirunendation for maximizing political
equality for the disenfranchised

.groups he identifies-Negroes, sharecroppers,
migrant workers?^ Instead,
the study ends uncritically on a passifying
statement of conviction.

And that conviction must be questioned.

It is problematic whether

the system is "decentralized" as Dahl claims
or whether it should be,

more correctly, viewed as a system of fractured
power.

Perhaps, it is

a veto-system that protects some interests against
other interests?

There is another problem as well.

Just because a majority is found not

to rule, to conclude that it is a system of minorities,
rather than a

decisive minority, that rules is fallacious.

Obviously, that was the

point of the New Haven study— to confirm by the key decision method
that

different individuals made decisions in different issue areas.

But the

study's method failed to show adeqioately, as Bachrach and Baratz contended, the "mobilization of bias" in the community.

These matters are

significant themes in the interpretations of all the critics to follow

in this study.

The third phase marks a more decisive departure for Dahl in terms
of his recommendations for participation; yet, his mode of analysis is

scarcely altered.

Central to our attention is After

t he

Revolution?

Authority in A Good Society , which apparently is conceived as a liberalpluralist answer to the disturbances of the 1960's and the New Left
5h
See Preface.
"For what we desperately
p. 83, where Dahl states:
,
want to know (if we are concerned with political equality) is what we
may do to maximize it in some actual situation, given existing conditions."
If I read Dahl correctly, what he does is say this is a problem and then
discovers that extension of the franchise has been an evolutionary
(apparently "natural") process so that no particular attention is required.
Even the 1970 's studies are not concerned with extending participation to
the lower classes.
.

56

critiques of that period.

The New Left is not taken seriously as

offering any theoretically coherent analysis
or any specially developed,
.

systematic and constructive program.

This is a typical Dahl-ian bias,

which suggests he is either truly unaware of
the literature or simply
does not want to be aware of it.

After the Revolution?, along with Polyarchy and Size
and Democracy ,
proposes for consideration ways to extend participation—
that is, to

identify settings in which participation could be encouraged.

The meta-

phor of the Chinese boxes is reappropriated to suggest the
need to find
units which would encompass the principle of affected interests and
at

the same time not be too small so that rule becomes inconsequential.
is now recognized that polyarchy has a fatal flaw:

government from the citizen.

It

The remoteness of the

Dahl invites us to consider four recommenda-

tions for deiiiocratizing polyarchy:
1.

He proposes that we consider the corporation as the unit most

satisfying the problem of size and affected interests, and he recommends
"self-management" as an appropriate parti

cipator::>^

solution.

Alternatives

55

Ibid., p. 117; see Table 3.

56

After the Revolution? is best regarded as a polemic. Its style
is assertive; its reasoning is not tight j and tksa title itself is inapplicable to the contents as well as presumptimas. The criteria offered
for authority to become legitimate that decisLmis correspond to personal
choice, are infonned by special competence, and. economize on the citizen's
time, attention and energy are a priori. See p,. 8 and chap. 1. The socis
injustices of our time - racism, poverty, milit«G.!rism - are dismissed with
the most simplistic ad hoc explanation the Ame.iri'can people are to blame.

—

—

—

57

This naivete is expressed, for instance,, iin his discussion of the
private corporation: "Yet Americans have all buA abandoned any serious
challenge to the appropriation of public authority by private rulers
He continues:
Ibid.,, jx. 115.
that is the essence of the giant firm."
"Why are Americans half colorblind when they loeSk at economic enterprise?
An important reason is that our history has left: lus without a socialist
tradition." Ibid., p. 119.

89

of "interest-group" management and
"bureaucratic sociaUsm" are rejected/^
The self-inanagement model of industrial
democracy that Dahl makes reference
.to is the Yugoslav3.an one, which
occurs within a setting of economic
and

governmental controls.

property ethic.

For the first time, Dahl challenges
the private

The limitation Dahl senses with regard
to this proposal

is that the workers probably will not want
to spend the time or hold the

responsibility that this practice requires.

(He does not see t hat t^iis

is a cultivated attitude, not a necessary
one.)

Dahl suggests that the

impetus for participation in the corporation would
likely come from the

white-collar employees, technicians, and executives

therriselves

.

(But he

does not suggest that there may be resistances from the
major ownership

of the corporation.)

Dahl would recommend expansion of industrial demo-

cracy to the political parties, trade unions, and universities as well.
2.

Dahl also proposes considering restoring the ancient device of

lot-selection as a method for choosing advisory councils to every elected
official of the giant polyarchy— mayors of large cities, state governors,
60

members of the U. S. Senate and House, and even the President,
3.

Of more limited practicality would be participation in neighbor-

hood corporations, he says; reference is to the model characterized by
Milton Kotler in Neighborhood Government .

Participation should be

Ibid., pp. 130-lUO.

59

After the Revolution? , pp. 121-129, after a non-socialist model
of "industrial democracy."
60
Ibid., pp. m9-l53.

90

encouraged here, but Dahl suggests the
reservation that its limited scope

of decision-making would make it less attractive.
h.

The optimal unit for participation, according
to Dahl will be the

middle-sized city, which ranges from 50,000 to several
hundred thousand in
population.

Dahl comments:

"Within this range the decisions (or non-

decisions) of the city government cut pretty deeply
into the lives of the
62

inhabitants, and they could cut deeper still,
Dahl's recent writing on the subject of participation reflects
an

attempt to construct a more responsive point of view within his basic
con-

ceptual framework.

Dahl begins to see the opening up of varied settings

for participation (loosely conceived) as both a continued extension of
the democratic process and appropriate to sustaining a pluralist social

process in face of the growth of large governmental and corporate units.
But Dahl does not go much beyond asking his readers to consider his

recommendations,
Dahl, for instance, would appear close to the participatory model in

terms of his advocacy of expanded settings for participation.

But his

account remains deficient in the extent to which he fails to take note
of the particular requirements Rousseau, Green, and Dewey place on the

individual, the realizing self.

He has not noticed the extent to which

social and political arrangements must be consciously regulated on behalf

of a teleological principle, the community, and that this will require the
limiting of certain individual behavior and institutional practices.
Because he does not recognize the specific moral feature of the Rousseauan

^1
Ibid., pp. 159-160.
62

Ibid., pp. 160-165.

(I

would disagree with his assessment here.)
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vision, Dahl's interpretation is
vulnerable to the charge of being

"cooptive," a charge made by both the
constitutional republicans and

radical-liberals, and the charge of being
"repressive," Marcuse's claim.
This inadequacy in Dahl's account

ma.y be

attributed to some interre-

lated theoretical problems which are not
re-assessed in the latest phase

of Dahl's writing.

They are, first, the problems associated
with the

rational economic model of the voter and, secondly,
the analytic problems

associated with liberal-pluralist explanations of
non-participation.

Why participate (vote)?

The answer to this question is viewed as a

matter of rational choice, a decision left up to the individual.

The

principle motivation, according to this ethic, is the degree to which
one's self-interest is maximized.

For as Dahl reflects:

satisfactorily gain my own ends unless

I

"I cannot

allow others an opportunity to

63

pursue their ends on an equal basis."

For Dahl, political equality

means "the personal choices of others have equal dignity with my own."

6h

The problem with this conception, for a Rousseauan, develops when the

individuals do not mutually share the same interest, of determining and
acting within the common good.

And that is not what the rational economic

model requires, whatever else its conception of self-interest may be.
Note, for example, the six conditions that would make one more likely

to value and, therefore, choose to participate:
1.

The more you enjoy taking part...

2«

The more important to you the matters the association is
concerned with...

33
After the Revolution? , p.
'

6ii

Ibid., p. 26.

12.
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3.

The greater the differences in the
alternatives at stake in
the decisions of the association...

h.

The more likely it is that by participating
you

wi.ll

change the

outcome in the direction of your choice...
5.

The more likely it is that the outcome

win

turn out badly if

you do not participate...
6.

The more competent you are with respect to the
subject at hand.

If the value of participation is derived from the meaning
it has for the
maximization of an individual's goals, then, conversely, when
none of
these advantages accrue to individuals, it is "rational" for them
not to
participate.

Dahl, thus, accepts as rational the non-participation of

the working class and even

drav;s

the conclusion that its members could only

with difficulty be induced to participate, given the opportunity:
...affluent American workers, like affluent workers in many
advanced countries and the middle class everywhere, tend
to be consumption-oriented, acquisitive, privatistic, and
family-centered. This orientation has little place for a
passionate aspiration toward effective citizenship in the
enterprise (or perhaps even in the state! )66

The cultural and structurally-related aspects of a consumptive living
style is unrecognized.

Substantive rationality is not Dahl's concern,

for this would require attention to the quality of human life.

Participa-

tion is an instrumental activity; it has extrinsic value for an individual
67

(notably, for individuals of a certain class), not intrinsic worth.

—

5r~
Ibid., pp. U6-Li7.

This model is more con^iletely articulated in

Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957); in the work of W. H. Riker; in Brian Barry, Sociologists ,
Ec onomists and Democracy (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970); and in
William C. Kiitchell, Why Vote? (Chicago: Markhara, 1971).
66

Ibid., p. 135.
67

After the Revolution?, p. 100.

See also Verba and Nie where this
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There are several difficulties with this
conception of the way the
voter should go about considerations involved
in voting.
First, by structuring the choice open to
the average individual in

terms of preferences to be maximized, Dahl
begs the question of whether

the alternatives are real ones.
interests at play in society.

In other words, it veils the class

The bias in the way issues are framed,

the way the agenda is set, makes it irrational for
members outside the

consensus (usually, members of the lower class, minorities,
women) to

participate.

But Dahl cannot see that, say, for blacks, in a largely
black

ward of Baltimore to go out and elect a white businessman for
city council

usually makes little sense.

Moreover, "having the last say" is neither sig-

nificant nor, indeed, real since elections do not act like vetoes.

In a

winner-take-all, two-party system, in a contest between two crooks, the
electorate must expect one of them to be victor.

The notion of rationality as an accountant's balance sheet with
debits and credits columns is a most primitive way of determining broad
choices for public policy, anyway.

profit-loss statement?

Thus, should deterrainat-L.on of a school bond

proposal hinge on whether
school?

Are all problems reducible to a

I

have a child who can make use of the new

What opportunity does Dahl's theory allow for other considerations

is explicit, p. 5> and inter alia
Also, they state more clearly than
perhaps Dahl does, their commitments on how the participant arrives at
choices. Rejecting the classic view, they assert:
"A more modern view
better
public
participation
lead
to
policy
even if citizens
is that
can
bring their own narrow and selfish interests into politics. Through
such "selfish" participation, the government is informed of these interests
and pressured to respond. In this way it produces public goods more
closely attuned to citizen needs than it would if there were no participation." p. 11. The authors note Lowi's critique of this version of
interest-group liberalism but refrain from dealing with it.
.

9h

in the determination of issues-such
other considerations as biological
and environmental ones, social ones,
ethical ones, aesthetic ones? And
if these other considerations are not
given favor, does the model too not

encourage segmental and short-run
determinations over comprehensive and

long-term ones?

Dahl's criteria, it appears to me, are
non-existent.

Finally, there is the problem facing the
individual of coordinating

his or her conduct in everyday life so
that some consistency is obtained.

The paradigm of voting according to the rational
economic model, however,
does not endeavor to embrace the several roles
an individual holds in a

coordinated way, nor does it indicate ways to bring about
a mental resolve

when matters are in contention.

The individual may sense the discordancy

of the role as producer and the role as consumer and
the role as voter,

nonetheless.

Is this discordancy best resolved by non-voting?

Do not

the consequences of one's activity, aside from voting, also have
im-

plications of a political sort?

Does not one's role, say, as producer

have profound political implications that ought to be integrated as well?
I

am suggesting there are areas of activity in individuals' lives that

Dahl's paradigm of participation does not make coherent.

Dahl's treatment, it seems to me, obscures the interests that are in
contest in the American polity, and it obscures the way interests are

formed and how they come to prevail or even dominate, and it obscures the
fact that an individual can be a reflection and embodiment of these con-

tradictions.
"agency."

This can be attributed to the failure to acknowledge human

To make the point I shall quote from a passage suggestive of

a growing insight among some analytic philosophers and held, as well, by

Dewey:

"No matter how difficult it may be to specify criteria for what

—

—
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is to count as agency, and granted that there
are many difficult border-

line

cases— where

happened to
00

X— the

it is unclear whether X did something or something

concept of agency is basic to what sort of creature

man is."
The way the class interests for framing choices is concealed
by

Dahl's analysis is disclosed in his explanation of non-participation.
This is explained as non-class related.

According to Dahl, the restraints on participation are mainly
legalistic and relatively easily alterable economic ones.

The main

causes are identifiable and capable of being mitigated, Dahl claims:

Many of these, and certainly the most unjust ones
registration and voting lav;s and practices that make
participation unnecessarily difficult; discriminatory
laws and practices 3 severe lack of education; inadequate
organization and mobilization; apathy produced by poverty
or a group history of subjection and defeat can be
elimj.nated or at the very least greatly reduced.
Greater
equality in political resources. . .would reduce gross
°°
differences in opportunities for participating in decisions.

—

V/here economic constraints intervene, they are not seen as especially

significant in the way social scientists who follow the "power elite"

formulation view them.

The reason is Dahl's presumption that there is

an overriding tendency in advanced industrial societies to soften the
tendencies for cumulative advantage.

Dahl does not need to refer to the

evidence on the distribution of inequalities as he argues in the following
way:

5B

Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies
of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971),
p. 269.

69

After the Revolution?, pp. Ih2-lh3»

)

)
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To be sure, advantages and handicaps
tend to be cumulative
in all societies. However, in advanced
industrial or postindustrial societies, particularly if they are
governed
by polyarchies, this general tendency is
somewhat softened
by another. Extreme deprivation is
attentuated by government
policies and rising incomes, while the inequalities
that
remain tend to become somewhat less cumulative
and more
dispersed. By dispersed I mean that persons who
ar e poorer
^RJ:^J:^^^^^. ^^c^ as wealth and status often (n ot al^^
have a ccess to others sucn a s the ballot, their
sh eer numhp'r.s,
their soliaarity, t heir special knowledge, and
even some
amoant of collective economic weight to throw aro und.
(Emphasis added.
71

The reasoning is a familiar one.

The argument, typically, is addressed

to the Marxist critique of political economy.

Particularly, it belongs

to a set of arguments that attacks Marx's account of the development
of

social classes

m

72

modern capitalist societies.

If we follow Bottomore'!

analysis, however, it becomes evident that "the changes which have taken
73

place are still open to various interpretations."

For, the evidence is

by no means conclusive, and some aspects of the working class have been
hardly studied at all (e.g., the extent to which manual workers have
acquired a new outlook and new standards of behavior which resemble those
7ii

of the middle class).

70
Ibid., p. 109, and see entire passage.
71
This is the usual argument of businessmen, for instance, who want
to make a persuasive case for closer connections between government and
business. Dahl expresses the association more directly in his essay,
"Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science," in
Dahl, Haire, and Lazarsfeld, eds,. Social Science Research on Business
Product and Potential (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 1
:

72

See T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (New York:
1966), pp. 22-30.
73

Ibid., p. 30.
7U
Ibid., p. 31.
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My interpretation would suggest that the
sanguine terms of Dahl's
analysis are inappropriate.

Dahl's account, first, rejects the
notion

of a politically-significant, biased pattern-one
that has design to

it— in

the distribution of burdens and benefits.

Secondly, he rejects

out of hand the view that there is a consensus
formulated in terms of

the dominant class interests.

He says, in sum, that there is "no a

priori reason for supposing that the rich will display
more unity than
the poor; and even if they do, it does not follow that
the combined
resources of the well-off strata will inevitably exceed the
combined
75

resources of the badly-off strata."

The importance of this point is

that these processes affect opportunities for lingui.stic and cognitive
development.

The greatest obstacle to democratization and reducing

inequalities is not the bugbear of the New Left, an elite of wealthy men,
but, he asserts, "for the want of a more appropriate term, the American
76
people."
He goes on to repeat himself:
"...Americans are curiously

tolerant of the inequalities in opportunities, freedom, and influence
77

that inherited wealth create."

In the face of all the disturbances of

the 1960's, Dahl resorts to a most elastic category for his explanation.

Dahl maintains that political equality will reduce the economic
inequalities in American society, and he points to the historical trend

toward the expansion of the franchise as an example of this possibility.
Dahl does not notice how a position of power is more likely to accrue to

itself further advantages so as to protect its position, so as to prevent

"75

After the Revolution? ,
76

p.
.

Ibid., p. 110.
77

Ibid., p. 113.

llU.

98

the expansion of political equality in a meaningful
sense.

Some of the

advantages that accrue to the dominant class are suggested
by Domhoff and
include those of political recruitment; political resources
(as for instance,
incuinbancy allows); elaborate channels of intra-class and
power elite

communications; personal participation in historic issue decisions;
and

Irequoncy and ease of access to decision centers.

The opportunities

available to the dorrdnant class by virtue of its position of wealth,

education and technical resources for develop: ng

elaborating its own

aiid

ideology, and control of information, are also ample.

As Rousseau, how-

ever, framed the matter, the relationship between economic equality and

political equality was fundamental.
In addition, class structuring and the forces that perpetuate it

are basic factors for disadvantaging some individuals more than others.
Thus, to treat the disadvantaged as advantaged in terms of more numbers,

capable of some force when aggregated, does no credit to the complex

nature of the problem

— as

the history of mass and other social movements,

rightist or leftists, attest.

The interacting factors that make the

social world quite a different reality than

ttiat

of a mecharasm is just
In a mechanical

what the systems model is incapable of suggesting.

system the energy is clearly definable and accountable by the inputs.

In social processes, however, the energy level is not definable in
this same way and cannot be limited to the visible and measurable factors;
the less-easily quantified forces of belief systems must be considered
as well.

tb—
From G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles
in America (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. 105.

-

The Governing Class
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Yet, Dahl's account has no place for this
examination.

Dahl is

uncritical of the rules and practices of the consensus,
or of the very
nature of that consensus, in the United States.

Indeed, he depicts

American politics as ideology-free and, therefore,
static.

Dahl simply

does not treat the human being as having unique
capacities capable of
development and as, simultaneously a member of a class or
group pressured
to conform according to the class's or group's needs and
goals.

It is

this nature of social existence that requires critical examination
in

terms of the extent to v/hich it contributes to and frustrates human
development.

Class differences arise from differing relations to the

social structure and language capacity (in other words, level of con-

ceptual development) may appropriately be hypothesized as a root struc-

turing factor in advanced industrial society.

This consideration merits

at least some cursory attention and not disdain.

The reapportionment formula of "one man, one vote" as the expression

of political equality can be viewed as illusory unless the disadvantaging
factors

— economic

and linguistic limitations

— are

attended to for bring-

ing individuals to something like the same starting line.

As Bayard

Rustin recognized by the mid-1960 's, the civil rights movement could not

merely be a voting rights movement if it was going to be successful; it
had to become a human rights movement as well.

In summary, the analysis has endeavored to show that the concept of
participation which Dahl proposes falls short of the classical version.
It also falls short in terms of being a scientific approach.

In pro-

posing a form of argument and then arguing in favor of (justifying) its
propositions, the attitude is that of a promoter.

A scientific attitude

would involve a listing of the limits of possibility, with consequences
and derivatives.
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The argument on which the case for Dahl's narrowed
conception of

participation rests misses the normative aspects of the
concept, set
out in the first chapter, of Rousseau, Green, and Dewey.

This leads to

a false emphasis on the importance of size of community
and setting and
a misplaced rejection of Rousseau.

Dahl, proceeds, nevertheless, to make

a case for expanding participation, at least in terms of its number
of

settings.

The argument is that the sense of legitimate authority in

polyarchy can be further secured in this way.

But if the causes of non-

participation are not correctly identified, even that sense of legiti-

macy may not necessarily develop.
Dahl asserts that this is a non-Rousseauan model which he proposes,
which it is for the wrong reasons.

As my first chapter suggested,

Rousseau, Green, and Dewey afford a cogent argument for the multiple
settings for participation, governmental as well as non-governmental.

Rousseau in his practical writings makes clear his relevance to the
small setting 3 Dewey develops the case more strongly.

Other studies

have similarly made this claim that Rousseau is applicable to a case for
79

participation in the small setting.

The chief contribution of Rousseau,

then, was not any focus on the necessity of a small all-embracing polity
but the ethical character of citizenship,

"Participation" was a moral notion.

It implied that an individual

would have adopted a moral point of view by which to act as a (privileged)
member of a group, community, nation.

In other words, one's actions

developed out of a process of identifying the "general will" or "common

79

For example, see Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970}.
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good."

Of necessity, the varied roles of the individual had
"political"

implications, and it made little sense to treat them segmentally,
analytically, after the fashion of the rational economic model.

The weak-

ness of Dahl's case is that it is unassimilated to a theory of human

development; the effects of participation are to get people

wliat

they

want, what they have already been encouraged to want, not to promote a

growth in the distinctively

"hujrtan"

capacities which develop when

individuals are encouraged to act for social reasons, principled reasons.

—
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A Critical Assessment
In important ways the perspective a student of
politics brings to

inquiry sets the problems for examination, the relationships
explored,
and, finally, limits possible recommendations offered
as guides to action.

If a "science" is at all possible in political and social
inquiry, it
has surely not been realized to the present by the political
behavioralist
paradigm, for so much that is a feature of politics is left out by it.
A theorist's perspective is, therefore, an appropriate subject to

address.

On the surface, the behavioralists, Dahl among them, seem to have

fashioned a system of thought so protected that the challenges to it seem,
on purely logical grounds, to be virtually impenetrable.

The basic char-

acter of this paradigm remains significantly untouched by the serious
criticisms raised in the literature in the past decade.

While there are

gestures toward counter-argument, Dahl's most recent three studies hardly

signify a real comprehension of the philosophic and linguistic issues.
Or, for another matter, the work scarcely reveals a sensitivity to the

stakes that these philosophic issues, at the political level, imply.
For, to assert a certain picture of reality plays some part in also con80
The details of Dahl's interpretation, not unlike other
stituting it.

interpretations, truly frames a language-game in the Wittgensteinian
sense.

My claim is not that Dahl's, or the behavioralists', interpretation
does not succeed in some matters.

all too well.

Under limited conditions it succeeds

For instance, quantitative political science is all too

"Bo

"Theoretical Self-Consciousness," op. cit., pp.

12-lli,

26-31.
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successful in the way it has been able to support
a technology-industry
of electioneering, its claim to impartiality not
withstanding.

For,

predictability and control is possible under limited
conditions of time
and space.

It is at the level of social and political
theory that the

paradigm fails and fails abysmally.
Well-developed arguments have been presented elsewhere and, for my
purposes in this study, it is not necessary to become detailed about
them.
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A few general points should suffice by way of offering objections to
the

behavioral model.
to come.

I

vjant to

Many others, in more detail, will follow in the chapters
offer some comments first on style and then on the

problem of the systems model; and, finally,

I

want to comment on the

ideological aspects of Dahl's interpretation.
First, Basil's style is assertive rather than discursive or per-

suasive; it is not freely hypothetical.

adequacy of

Yils

plained by it.

This means that one criterion of

theory must be the completeness of cases that can be exUnfortunately, from my point of view, there are many

issues that cannot be rigorously dealt with by the theory so that the
style itself becomes illicit.

One can note how Dahl establishes himself

as an authority in controlling the meanings of words--a process which,

anthropologically, is social.

Many of Dahl's terms are drawn at a high

BI

For the case against abstracted empiricism see 0. Wright Mills,
Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^9), chap.
A Critical Evalua3} also Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo-Politics:
tion of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review ,
59 (March 1965): 39-51 J and for a lengthy critical essay of Basil's approach
see Peter Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," in Green and
Levinson, eds.. Power and Community - Bissenting Essays in Political
Vintage, 1969), pp. 3-58.
Science (New York:
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level of generality.

Note that making "choices" (the
electorate's

prerogative) and making "decisions"
(the elected officials,
prerogative)
•is not quite the same occupation;
Dahl's language would not have
us recognize the significant political
differences. This level of generality
also leads to equivocation.

To illustrate, let me quote Dahl:

'-By

dravdng on the resources they do have, the
less advantageous can often
"^^
(not always) acquire leverage and
bargaining power.

Also, the

vocabulary is so neutralized by attempts to
"operationalize" that
language's connections to human problems have
been stripped away.

The

result is an esoteric language system, not
unlike some forms of sociological

explanation which Ralf Dahrendorf likened to Utopias.
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The sciences and the social sciences at their
lim:.ts seem to need to

work with metaphor.
analysis has been.

I

have tried to show what the core metaphor of Dahl's

But metaphors are also circumspect, and, finally,

they tend to call for replacement.

As I. A. Richards has observed:

"What we have to do is to watch metaphors at work tricking us
and our

fellows into supposing matters to be alternatively much simpler and
much

more complex than they are."

In the case of the behavioralist its core

metaphor, expressed by the systems model as a self-regulating mechanism,
is brought into considerable doubt by the paradigm shift that has

occurred in the natural sciences of the twentieth century.

Perhaps this

can be captured representationally in the Heisenberg Principle of

82

After the Revo lution? , p. 109,
83

Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia - Toward A Reorientation of
Sociological Analysis," in his Zssays in the Theory of Society (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. IO7-I2BI
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Uncertainty, which suggests that the
object of research is not any
more
nature as such but nature as exposed
to human questioning. Research
focuses
on the netv;ork of relations between man
and nature. The question pre-

senting itself is whether empiricist
epistemology and its mechamstic
model of reality is applicable to the natural
and human world, when a
chief feature of the contemporary outlook
seems to be the assuredness
of the inconclusiveness of sense experience
as opposed to earlier con-

fidence in its conclusiveness.

The philosophic task as Wittgenstein had

come to see it was one of human self -under standing,
and the
ok

t

ask was

linguistic.
But the practitioners of the systems model have
no doubts that they

can conduct their research and develop their considerations
"scientifically,

outside and apart from the study of man.

They are able to assert the claim

with some amount of persuasiveness because the case they make (e.g.,
Verba
and Nie) proceeds by the development of small issues.

Participation In

America amounts to being a case of very skillfully developed detail.
This style in art is, not without reason, called "trompe I'oeil."

Important specific and distributive features are omitted by the
systems model.

An observation of Toulmin helps to suggest the source

of the inadequacy of the systemic metaphor.

Toulmin writes:

—

For human affairs notoriously, in Descartes own view
lack precisely the kind of tight and self-correcting, or
"systemic," organization typical of physiological systems
in organisms. The "organization" of entire societies is

BIT"
This is the interpretation of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin in
Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 197 h) , chap. ?•

—

—
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something less than organic; the
behavioral "codog" of
human groups are only very
partially codifi.bJe the
so-called "social System" is a
good deal less than
systenac.
(And Toul.dn adds in a note:
"I?Lr years
of loose talk about "ecosystems,"
many leadir^g ecol ovists
are now shying away from the
term, for similar reasons
The phenomenon so referred to
/food-chains, etcj a^so*
lack the staW.e, self-restoring
character of physiological
^^^^ "systemic." If^oVthey
JeTe'lJs
The chief feature of the human
species, consciousness and
susceptibility
to symbolism, means society must be
viewed as an open-energy process,
and

this will have historical specificity.

The chief feature of the systcirdc

view, of the positi.-ist philosophy of
science, is its closedness.

Piaget

brings this out clearly:

Positivism is chiefly a philosophy of science
which
forbids science to cross certain barriers
and which '
consequently, prejudges the future. In anathemas
and prophecies (all subsequently denied in the
course
of history) from Auguste Comte to the
"propositions
without significance" of the neo-positivisra
characteristic of the Vienna Circle, ppsitivism is presented
chiefly as a closed doctrine,
Indeed, it may well be that the systems model, as
a theoretical framework

for generating hypotheses, excludes more than it encompasses.
As unsystematic normative discourse, the analysis of Dahl
can be

seen to reflect some unexamined commitments.

Specifically, the case for

expanding the arenas of participation, without attention to developing
competences and conduct, continues and reinforces the social trend away

from indi.vidual autonomy, self-respect, and social responsibility
against, in other words, the humanization of civilization and in the
85

Stephen Toulmin, "A Biology of Russian Dolls," New York Revi ew of
Books , (July 18, 197h), pp. 30-32.
86
Jean Piaget, Psychology and Epistemology - Toward A Theory of
Knowledge (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 93.
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direction of the further techrdcalization
of it.

That,

I believe, is
the certain implication when
individuals are encouraged to act
on the

utilitarian grounds Dahl encourages,
given the present culture.

Further-

more, Dahl himself exhibits little
awareness of the frustrated efforts
of some groups to gain the franchise
and meanilngful participatory power;

in this his own work does not seem
to show "respect for persons."

But,

still further, he also fails to be
concerned about, objectively, these
persons' need to develop their capacities
in matters that, at a mini.mmn,

directly affect their lives.
By now it should be sufficiently clear that
his analysis does not

consider the bias of the ground rules and the bias
of the political
culture in the United States.

As a consequence, he serves to reinforce

the American myth that voting is a meaningful
right and duty for the
mj.ddle class, when the conditions are such that
voting becomes a highly

questionable activity for a wide segment of the population.

For those of

whom this myth remains inoperative, the political process continues
to
remain illegitimate, and it may be infelicitous to characterize
them as
"uninterested,"
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CHAPTER

IV

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICAN INTERPRETATION:
THE THEORIES OF GRANT McCONNELL AND
THEODORE J. LOWI

Introduction

Both participation in the classical sense and
participation in the

constricted pluralist sense seriously misrepresent
the aims and processes
of the constitutional republic.

This is the claim of an interpretation

that constructs a critique of the dominant explanatory
theory of the

political processes in contemporary American society.

It is a critique

that traces its roots to the theory of factions of Madison,
the fears of

majority tyi-anny of DeTocqueville, and the idea of the rule of law of
F. A. Hayek.

The common bond of this perspective is the idealization of

an extreme individualism.

In this chapter

I

shall endeavor to show how

this perspective leads to an account of participation that, on the one
hand, correctly perceived the condition under which participation can

become cooptive, but that, on the other hand, in assimilating a generally

low estimate of human potentiality, dismisses the individual and social
advantage obtained through expanded opportunities for participation.
Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi are familiar enough in the

political science literature, they have explicitly addressed themselves
to developing a theoretical perspective, and taken together they nicely

supplement one another

— historically

and in the cases they survey

— to

warrant their selection as contemporary exponents of the constitutional
1

republican interpretation.

Both McConnell's Private Government and

1

One political theorist writing from another perspective considers
Lowi's work, for instance, "to be one of the very few expressions today
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^51£li£-Ce^^
studies

I

and Leva's

Th^d_oLLiber^

which are the main

shall draw upon, are framed in
terms of a first part which

critically analyses the limits of
liberalism and a later part that
illustrates these limits in the
formulation and implementation of
selected public policies.

McConnell's attention, for instance,
is dir-

ected to the illustration of the
problems of the delegation of power
at
the state level; the indistinct
roles of private and public agencies
in-

volved in the determination of land and
water policy; and in the, partic-

ularly^administrative, problems of functional
autonomy of business and
labor.

Lowi traces the determination of
policy in foreign issues; in

the cities-the problems which are
interconnected of political juris-

diction, housing, schools, race; and in "old"
and "new" welfare.
The task ahead necessitates, first, a sketch
of the critique

McConnell and Lowi provide of the liberal-pluralist
system as it has
evolved.

It is a critique that rests on some incompletely
detailed dis-

crepancies—discrepancies such as exist between liberal rhetoric
and
practice and between such practice and the ideal of the
rule of law.

Following this sketch, it will be possible to suggest how and
why parti-

cipation is identified, from the point of view of the constitutional
of a major intellectual tradition whose insight and failures both
can
contribute to an adequate theory and strategy of change." See David
Kettler, "Beyond Republicanism: The Socialist Critique of Political
Idealism," in Surkin and Wolfe, eds.. An End to PoUtical Science The Caucus Papers (New York:
Basic Books, 1970), p. 1|8.
2

Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York:
Vintage, 1966).
3

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism - Ideology, Policy, and
the Crisis of Public Authority (New York:
W7 W. Norton, 1969).
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repubHcan, as a hortatory word
in the Hberal lexicon.
of this formulation «ill be
guided
by these questions:

Our appraisal

How are

MoConnell and Lowi correct in their
interpretation in suggesting the
distorted nature of much of
contemporary participation? And,
why, In
ter^s of their strategy for realizing
a set of wider, public
interests,
are they mistaken that participation
cannot be a valued goal in an advanced industrial society that aspires
to be democratic?

Ill

The Theory of Interest Group Liberalism

The contemporary liberal's model of power portrays a system
of

relatively harmonious social equilibrium maintained by the integrating
process of the voluntary association and by the process of negotiation,
compromise, and bargaining that occurs in the political arena between
economic, social, and political groups.

The function of the state is

the mediation of the conflicting sets of claims that emerge before its

agencies.

Out of this process policy reflective of the general interest

is expected to issue.

And, the individual, as J. S. Mill would say, is

left a realjn of freedom of action so long as it does not harm others.

Social problems of a wide variety— the racial disturbances of the
1960's, as well as other issues of equity, the difficulties of obtaining

regulatory policy in areas such as pollution that would serve the widest
public interest, increasingly technocratic institutions of learrdng just
suggest a few of them

— give

rise to McConnell's and Lowi's suspicions

that the proper function of the state has not been realized.

Properly,

they suggested, against the liberal's "public philosophy," there was a
crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of public authority.

"Interest-group liberalism" is the liberals post-1937 ideology for

accounting to the public the actions of government.

As Lovd formulates

it:

It may be called liberalism because it expects to use
goverrjnent in a positive and expansive role, it is
motivated by the highest sentiments, and it possesses
strong faith that what is good for government is good
for the society. It is "interest-group liberalism"
because it sees as both necessary and good that the
policy agenda and the public interest be defined in
terms of the organized interests in society.^
n

Ibid, p. 71.
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The main consequence of the historical
developments that crystallized in
the New Deal was the delegation of power,
the exercise of governmental

power by what might otherwise be considered
private groups, and, concomittantly, government's incapacity to achieve
justice/

This delega-

tion of power takes many forms->for instance,
increased Congressional

reliance on administrative departments' discretion,
the increasing use
of the executive agreement and executive order, and
in the regulatory
commissions, where there was little other directive than
the admonition
to follow the "public interest," McConnell suggests,
the commissioners

were "forced into a search for accommodation, and accommodation
shifted
6

imperceptivly into corruption."
McConnell and Lowi are clearly stressing the shifting of the general
rule-making function out of the hands of duly elected and appointed bodies
into private and quasi-private associations in the society.

So, while

they are rejecting the characterization of the group process as described
and appreciated by the pluralists, they also do not embrace the portrayal

provided in the "power elite" model of

C.

Wright Mills, for instance,

5

McConnell' s normative concept is "the public interest j" Lowi's
is "justice." In The End of Liberalism Lowi has a passage that suggests
the nature of the ideal they hope to approach: "Considerations of the
justice in or achieved by an action cannot be made unless a deliberate
and conscious attempt was made by the actor to derive his action from a
general rule or moral principle governing such a class of acts. One can
speak personally of good rules and bad rules, but a homily or a sentiment,
like liberal legislation, is not a rule at all. The best rule is one
which is relevant to the decision or action in question and is general in
the sense that those involved with it have no direct control over its
operation. A general rule is, hence, a priori ." p. 290,
6
Private Power and American Democracy, p. 50.
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either.

For, that model is stressing the
combination of interests that

occurs between top economic and top
political decision-makers, a combination which constitutes a class consciousness/
For McConnell and Lowi
the accent is placed on the diffusion
of power that has occurred in the

political process.

The function of government has come
to be the provi-

sion of system maintenance for the organized
groups in society rather
8

than for the society at large.
How, according to this interpretation, did
the distinction between

the public and the private spheres of authority
become blurred?

The

answer may be suggested in the following brief sketch.
By the end of the nineteenth century the historical
forces of

industrialization and urbanization had bureaucratized and
rationalized
most types of organizations, the state being only one among
many of themj

and neither was it, given the realities of capitalism and the
laissez-faire

7

While the power elite model is considered more correct than the
pluralist version in that it recognizes not all coalitions are equivalent,
Lowi finds the power elite model unacceptable because it "wrongly assumes
a simple relation between status and power."
According to Lowi, both the
social stratification school and the power elite school "mistake the
resources of power for power itself, and escape the analytic and empirical problems by the route of definition." See "American Business, Public
Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics , 16 (July
196Ij):679. And, see McConnell 's Private Power and American Democracy
,
chap. 10, esp. pp. 337-338.
Lowi, and McConnell, prefer the model of
power characterized in the work of E. E. Schattschneider, which was
erroneously received as a pluralist account. "His political arena was
decentralized and multi-centered, but relationships among participants
were based upon 'mutual non-interference' among uncommon interests.
The 'power structure' was stabilized toward the 'coramand posts '..., not
because the officials were above pressure groups, but because the pattern
of access led to supportive relations between pressure groups and
officials." p. 680.
8

Lowi uses this formulation to characterize the main theme of his
study, The Politics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

llh
ethos, the most advanced in that
direction.

The process, in Lewi's

account, did not follow the Marxist theory
of a revolutionary stratifi-

cation along class lines but rather evolved
in the direction "where the

addition and mu3.tiplication of classes tendsto
wipe out the very notion
of class stratification."
makes two observations:

This is McConnell's point as well.

Lowi

(l) That in the modern pluralist systems,
modern

developments have brought about a discontinuity between
that which is
socioeconomic and that which is political, and
(2) that in a pluralist

society there is always a discontinuity between politics and

government."'''^

It might be helpful, for the purposes of future argument to
see that this

interpretation has placed emphasis on the multiplicity and diversity of
interests developing in huraan society.

It is a conception of interests

which has connections to the existing modes of production and consumption and, yet, is also tied to claims for universal values— liberty,
12

justice, morality.
McConiiell's account is useful in providing a history of some of the

9

End of Liberalism , pp. 33-Ul.
10
Ibid., p. ii2.
11
Ibid., pp. i;5, U8.
12

draw this conclusion from McConnell's own characterization:
"Another difficulty derives from the fact that no individual has a
single interest, opinion, or characteristic. He may have a very clear
and dominant interest as a producer, but he will inevitably also be a
consumer. He may also be a Catholic, a fisherman, and a stamp collector.
Inescapably, people differ in many ways and there are many dimensions of
social difference." Private Power and American Democracy , p. 101. See
also Kettler's comparison of Lowi to Hegel on this point, "Beyond
Republicanism," pp. h9-50.
I
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ideas instrumental in defending the evolving
group process.

McConnell,

for one, attributed significant responsibility
to the Progressive move-

ment's response.

One of the irom.es of American politics,
for him, was

that the most viable political movement to
attack the corruptions of

private power turned out to be a "justification and
acceptance of the
ends it set out to destroy."

The Progressives took the power out of

politics (in their non-partisan reforms, for instance),
and they unifittingly
failed to question the power of private groups and the
use of power in the

decentralized political locale.

Furthermore, they lent an assist to the

creation of administering agencies which were unguided by any clear
standards of the public interest.
The accretion of public power by the private sphere was supported
and defended in many ways.

Business

's

main doctrine against the concen-

tration of governmental power banked on the model of cooperation between

government and corporation worked out during the war and under the theory

of administrative decentralization of Herbert Hoover; it took the forms
of voluntary cooperation, voluntary self-regulation, and the idea of the
lU
trusteeship.
Agriculture found rationalizations for the decentralized
structure that evolved out of the farm bureau movement by appealing to
the long-standing, and rhapsodized Jeffersonian tradition that identified

the small, local political unit with democracy.

IS
Labor>" anti-statist and

seeking its own economic autonomy, appealed to the slogan, coined by
16
A shared attitude to government was common
Gompers, of "voluntarism."

13

Private Power and American Democracy , p. 32.
11;

Ibid., pp. 50-70.
15

Ibid., pp. 70-79.
16
Ibid., pp. 79-88.
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to all these groups.

It composed three doctrines.

First, was "a very

loud and persistent appeal for liberty"
(which was a view of liberty
represented as the absence of compulsion,
mainly, by the state); secondly,
"a belief in small units of association
as the essence of democracy," and
17
thirdly, "a dislike of law and formal
authority."

The historical perspective on the relationship
between government and

private groups is brought up to date in Lowi's
The End of Liberalism .

The

New Deal fixed the old conservative-liberal
dialogue about positive government by establishing the mechanism of politics by
administration in 1937.

Rule of law gave way to rule by adraini.stration;
legislation of integrity,
such as the Social Security Act of 1935, gave way to
public policy by

non-law, such as the Economic Opportunities Act of

1961;,

Issues of moral-

ity such as civil rights gave way to problems of equity and the
legislation of payoffs.

Formalism and impersonality, seeming to imply compulsion

and inflexibiUty to the "faint-hearted" liberal, gave way to discretion-

ary and arbitrary practices.

The characteristic feature was the avoidance

of standards; the public interest, lacking precise and absolute criteria,

became little more than a cliche, and found easy ratification by a

political science profession made up of group theorists for whom valuefree science might even require the denial of a public interest.

The new public philosophy, "interest-group literalism," was bought
at a price.

While it made the state an acceptable source of power and

justified positive government for the twentieth century, and while it
also helped to disprove the Marxian notion of solidarity of classes and
class dominated government, its costs ran high:
But the zeal of pluralism for the group and its belief
in a natural harmony of group conpetitiasi tended to
break down the very ethic of government by reducing
the essential conception of government t© nothing more
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than another set of mere interest groups.-'-^

More than this group-view of the state was wrong
about the pluralist

interpretation, however.
the characterization.

McConnell and Lowi take issue on two points of

First, their examination of the internal dyiiamics

of groups suggests that the small group was far from
the essence of

democracy that was claimed for it.

And secondly, they argued, in follow-

ing Schattschneider's analysis of the "scope of conflict," that
the group
process is biased in favor of some groups and against others.

19

The common feature of the private association and the small unit of

government was its oligarchic character.
evident.

Several points can make this

For one thing, the case is not entirely clear that all individ-

uals are entirely free to join and leave an association as they will.
But even if they were, McConnell 's case suggests, the internal structure
is not likely to be such that it imposes no limits on the freedom of the

individual.
belief.

Membership usually involves an homogeneity of interest and

The internal systems of governance are not regulated by demo-

cratic principles or by a bill of individual rights, and, not only are
the private associations capable of in^osing a wide range of sanctions,

they are even able to "call down the action of public authority over which
they have established a strong degree of influence."
conformi.ty reigns in the small group.

The pressure for

Furthermore, the values that the

private association supports publicly are not always those associated

IS

The End of Liberalism , p. US,
19

The following account draws mainly on McConnell' s discussion in
"The Public Values of the Private Association," in Pennock and Chapman,
Atherton Press,
Nomos XI (New York:
eds.. Voluntary Associations:
Democracy ,
American
and
Power
Private
also
1969), "pp. ili7-l60. See
chap.
Disorder
3.
chap. Sy and Lowi's Politics of
,
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with liberty and are more likely opposed
to it; they tend to be the
values of order and stability. Too
frequently their orjy goal is the
achievement and protection of privilege.

In inter-group arrangements, some groups are
favored by access to
particular resources or relationsliips.

Others, completely unorganized,

stand in a noncompetitive position, and it is
euphemistic to speak of

them as "potential interest groups,"

For instance, farm migrant workers,

Negroes, and the urban poor are not included in the
celebrated pluralist
system.

With each group geared for achieving its own
particular partial

interests, group interaction tends to the realization of
narrow-range

economic interests rather than the values which are preeminently
public.
Thus, in the fragmented political system of virtually
autonomous small

groups the values of clean water and air, the conservation of areas
of

scenic beauty, and competent public education are unlikely to be emphasized.

The group process, in the end, trades the values of stability and

order for limitations on liberty, equality, and numerous other public
values.

McConnell's charge is then that "organization of political life by
small constituencies tends to enforce conformity, to discriminate in favor

of elites, and to eliminate public values from effective political con20

sideration."

The republican interpretation, therefore, maintains that

how the nation is organized is exceedingly iiqjortant.

The size of the

constituency matters:
Quite different results may be obtained with the same
distribution of interests depending on whether the
context they are placed in is centralized or decentralized. ^1

20

Private Power and American Democracy , p. 6*
21
Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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If the causes of faction cannot be removed, one must
address the effect
of faction.

Madison's solution of centralizing power in a national
con-

stituency would provide^the basis for an answer.
large political units."

It was "very simply,

Diversity of interests in the large consti-

tuency is what makes possible the achievement of the wider, more
diffuse
23

and abstract public values.
The argument rests on its peculiar conception of "interests," which
assumes that any aggregate of individuals will seek to achieve, in the
most economical way, its self-interest.

The argument is developed in

Mancur Olsen's T he Logic of Collective Action and assumes a mathematical
model.

There is a sense in which a functional interest in a small and

familiar setting is able to secure any and all of the social and political
forces necessary for its own dominance.

As the conditions are altered by

the increase in numbers of competing interests

— the

shift from a condition

of homogeneity to heterogeneity of interests, the tendency (which might
be represented as a "law of interests") is for the more general, abstract,
2U
The argument rests on a view, unand diffuse interests to prevail.

supported by the evidence of the American political process, that the

22

Madison's is regarded by McConnell as "the most illuminating
treatment of the problem we have." Ibid,, p. 103. An excellent logical
and theoretical critique of the Madisonian model is provided by George D,
Beam, Us ual Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), chap. h.
23

Private Power and American Democracy , pp. lOU-lO?.
2k

The principle is axiomatic for McConnell and Lowi. In responding
argument against Madison on this point, McConnell argues that
Dahl's
to
DaJril "passes over the great differences among the values served by
majorities drawn from constituencies of different sizes." Private Power
and American Democracy Note 18, p. 397. He concedes, however, that
there may be no way to demonstrate the claim that large constituencies
will lead to "better" majorities— at least, for determined skeptics.
,
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decisions reached in the large unit
can escape the forces that act on
the small ones, that "size" is the
crucial variable. The conception of
interests that ties McConnell and

W

to the large constituency finds,

then, at best, only superficial
correspondence with Rousseau's notion of

the General Will as

I

have characterized its conditions and
features.

For, what is important to Rousseau is the
effort to form good moral

character by all directly sharing in the processes
of deliberation; for

McConnell and Lowi how character is to be nurtured
is beside the point.

Tracing out the logic of their position, McConnell
and Lowi (and
Schattschneider) recommend in their poUtical strategy
attention to the

expansion of the political arena and to the distinct
separation of the
public order from the private.

The specific objective is to encourage

the important rule-making authority to be centralized in
the largest

political ujiit— namely the national level of government.

Especially

important would be the reassertion of the powers of Congress, albeit its
"localist" aspect, and the proper functions of the President.

At the

time of his writing, McConnell seemed to advocate this strengthening of

the President as a valid and useful trend:

majestic office is all the people.

"The constituency of this

The prestige of its occupant is so

great that when his power is husbanded and skillfully used he can make

innovations of policy in the interest of those who are outside the
25

pluralist scheme of rule."

With the escalation of the Vietnam War a

few years later Lowi expressed some reservations.

Also, the work of the

Supreme Court, as best exemplified in the 1935 Schechter rule that

Private Power and American Democracy , p. 351. And see his The
Modern Presidency (New York; St. Martin's Press, 196 ).

.
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abrogated Executive powers in regulation,
is regarded as fulfilling the

requirement of the rule of law.

McConnell would have us believe that
26
Its constituency is the whole nation.
Return to the original constitutional principles may necessitate a strengthening
of the unplanned for

party system, as the process by which to determine
the legitimate regime.
The state governiaents are viewed as important
loci of governmental powers

in some particular, functional areas.

But, as the federal arrangements

of the U. S. Constitution provide, there is and should
be no rule-making

authority for local units of government, cities, or towns.

27

Lowi's phrase "juridical democracy" is only another way of speaking

for the same shared political objectives.

His paradigm of "juridical

democracy" would call for the implementation of the following proposals:
(l) The restoration of the rxae of law, which would regard statutory law

as the essence of government;

(2) the

establishment of rule of law by

administrative formal:.ty; (3) the development of a truly independent and

integrated administrative class, a Senior Civil Service;

(U)

the restora-

tion of regional (state) government; (5) the replacement of subsidy-type
policies with "genuine" fiscal policies; and (6) to insure an organic
28

constitution, adoption of a tenure of statutes act.

Implementation of

juridical democracy must rest on the persuasiveness of the republicans'

appeal to "fit" men and women to seek public office and the exhortation
to Congressmen and women and other public officials to following a priori
rules

13

•

Ibid., p. 352.
27

Ibid., chap. 6, and End of Liberalism , p. 282.
28

End of Liberalism, pp. 297-310.

•
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The Constitutional Republican Account
of Participation

The constitutional republicans' dismissal
of the small unit as a
setting for citizen participation is involved
with their projection of
public virtue onto the large constituency.

The dismissal of the small

unit upon wlxich this projection rests,
cannot be viewed, however, as

logically and theoretically required.

I

shall try to show the particular

formulation of the problem of decentralization and
what participation comes
to mean for the interpretation of McConnell
and Lowi in order to suggest

some of the difficulties vath it.

Both McConnell 's and Lowi's attention is focused
on the meaning, for

the legitimacy of public policy, of the devolution
of public power:
To the local political unit and its subunits,

(1)

(2) to the quasi-public

units such as the regulatory agencies, and (2) to the private
association
such as the trade association and the trade union which are characterized

by their intimate connections to public officials and agencies.

Their

focus, then, is on the structure and ideology of "decentralization;" it
is not specifically or directly a theory of citizen participation.

Indeed, following the defeat of the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate,

Lowi argues the case for "abstentionisin,"

To the constitutional republicans the urge to decentralize can be

discovered in divergent sources.

One of the main forces, however, has

been the historical yet mythical association between the small agrarian
unit and democracy.

There is "a conception of the small geographic
29
community as the repository of social virtue,"
For McConnell, but Lowi

29

Private Power and American Democracy, p. 93
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can be seen to share the view as well, the
connection is more an idealized
one than a closely examined consideration:

The view of the small community as the natural
home of
freedom has been much more a direct perception
than a
general theory. If the community is autonomous,
it is
free; self-government itself is freedom— this
has been
the equation seen by small communities and new
nations
for most of history and asserted today as vigorously
as ever (and almost invariably without elaboration),
as though a self-evident truth. 30
The claims made on behalf of increased participation
in various local
settings, governmental or non- governmental, are from McConnell's
and

Lowi's standpoint, to be viewed as ideological or misconceived
or both.

Their targets are not, unfortunately, very clearly identified; but
they
do single out the positions of the liberal-pluralists, the New Left,
and
the Guild Socialists.

Perceiving these models as more approximate to

attitudes than well-reasoned theoretical conceptions, both McConnell and
Lowi fail to treat seriously some of the more important claims made for

participation by them.

This failure, for instance, leads them to liken

indiscriminately the Rousseauist claim to citizen participation with
other sorts of claims for' decentralization.
equated:

All of the following are

Pluralism, countervailing power, creative federalism, partner-

ship, maximum feasible participation, grassroots democracy, participatory
31
They are all equated, because they are all regarded as
democracy.

slogans.

For the real meaning of participation is taken to be "politics

behind closed doors," "politics in smoke-filled rooms."

Those would be

30

Ibid., pp. 72, 9h.
31
End of Liberalism , pp. 8^, 95, 293 J Private Power and American
Democracy , p. 122.

12h

the paradigmatic cases of participation
for McConnell and Lowi.

We can see from the foregoing that
this interpretation seeks to
circumscribe the role for participation in
various localized settings in
a democratic society: In local
government, in the neighborhood, in
the
town meeting, in trade associations, in
the
union, at the workplace.

The

republican interpretation rests on discrediting
local participation by
claiming to demonstrate the political effects
of decentralization:
some elements of the public get "shut out."

That

32
For, the goal is to shove

the whole process of the formulation, discussion,
and deliberation of

policy affecting the public to the one overriding
constituency— the
national government.

What role is left for the citizen is more con-

strained then that espoused by the pluralist or that
recommended by the
radical-liberal.

The role of the citizen would seem to be that of be-

coming involved in the party nominating and election processes which
have
as their function the establishment of a legitimate

or for the nation.

regime— for the state

The limits of citizen involvement in the McConnell-

Lowi scheme, however, I cannot find anywhere suggested.

It would seem,

probably, to be quite limited to the determination of representatives
if the programmatic function of the party is as circumscribed as it
33

appears to be for Lowi.

This view may have changed in recent years.

32

End of Liberalism , pp. 86-87.
33

From my reading of the following article I do not gather that
Lowi looks too favorably upon the programmatic-responsible party model
of many European systems and seems to find acceptable the contemporary
American party pattern. He concludes his essay: "The United States
possesses as many of the conditions of instability or of mobilization
as France and Germany do, but with the major difference that our
irresponsible parties have jaanaged to keep legitimac/ and policy
separated. This is a peculiar but important type of differentiation.
Given the contemporary world tendency for legitimacy to become intertwined with policies and for constitutions to fall over issues, it is
remarkable that American parties manage to maintain this particular kind

—
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Lowi seems to read the defeat of
the 1972 Democratic Presidential
candidate as confirmation of the impossibility
of citizen politics; what began
as an issue-campaign ended by merely
seeking, under the guile of the

pollsters, conquest.

Lowi's conclusion was that the m.ilitant
commitment

to conventional politics proved as useless
as earlier forms of protest

against the establishment.

Perhaps, he recommends, the only untried

route is "abstentionism" or actual participation
by refusing, on publicly

expressed principle, to participate.

Abstentionism would withhold from

the politicians much needed public consent.

A brief review of several selected cases may show in
closer detail
the structure of participation that McConnell and

in the decentralized setting.
that McConnell and

Lorn,

The four

I

Lo;vl

perceive occurring

have selected seem to indicate

have addressed themselves to a wide range of sit-

uations for which participation has been sought and given shape but
not
the widest possible range.
1.

Participation in the Urban Setting:

One of the most important

concerns to students of public policy must be the complex pathology of

America's metropolitan areas and the seeming inability of government
national, state or local

—to

deal with it in any satisfactory degree.

No Presidential explanation has grappled with the most crucial fact of

the problem

— that

in reacting to the urban area's problems government

of differentiation at all. The salient fact is that they do, "Party,
Policy, and Constitution in America," in Chambers and Burnham, eds,.
The American Party Systems - Stages of Political Development (New York:
Oxford, 1967), p. 27^
3h
Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation ,
December 18, 1972.

s
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imdertook to find solutions by political
subdivision.

From the 1930-

onward most metropolitan areas were
parceled so that the true socioeconomic entity of New York or Chicago,
which the older method of

annexation allowed, is not even sustained as
a legal fiction.

To the

point, Lowi notes Robert Wood's study of New
York's l,iiOO governments.
"Fear found a means, thro ugh government ,"
according to Lowi, "to divide

the individible unit into an incapacitated
marketplace of publics.
are now many publics, but there is no polity."

There

35

The stratification of

society was legally sanctioned by establishing the
independent constituencies of various socio-economic groups.

The political expediency of

subdivision, for festering social conflicts could be more easily
avoided
and suppressed in this way, made possible and achieved all too
frequently

abandonment of the city's gravest human problems, while its physical
structure was used by day but not maintained except in the barest ways.
The mayor, not even empowered to control his own tax base and budget,

under the interest-group process was caught up in the process of bargaining which was unguided by any principle or standard.

The mayor's

political base was so carved up in terms of bureaucratic fiefdoms that
Lowi suggests they are best characterized as "islands of functional

power," sanctioned and sustained by federal law and practice.

The

arrangement, obviously, negates any possibility of coordinated and

comprehensive, long-term programming that would adequately address the
city's needs.

Lowi and McConnell are so opposed to the results of these

enclaves of localized powers that they would abrogate citizenship at the
local level altogether (i.e., the election of local public officials).

35

End of Liberalism, p. 197.
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2.

Maximum Feasible Participation:

The War on Poverty program was

an expression of interest>group liberalism
par excellence.

power was the order of the day in this statute.

Delegation of

To the extent the statute

is end-oriented, its dj.rectives are better
viewed as sentiments than

specific standards.

It was process-oriented non-law.

are identified from the formulation of this program:

Several problems
(l) A system of

justice, under which poverty appears randomly but
apparently not, less

frequently cannot be achieved by programs that merely
indemnify the poor.
For, the cause of poverty is not poverty but the
injustices caused by

racism.

(2) The

dominant interests continue their dominance.

In New York

City where politics was originally fragmented, the participation-clause

furthered the structure of fragmentation; in Chicago, where power was

already controlled by a machine, it was further consolidated.
programs were paternalistic.

(3) The

(U) This was a paternalism, furthermore,

that demoralized, because it deprived "the disappointed something to

shoot against," it "took the heat off" the real moral issues.

(5) Official

recognition of some groups and representatives tended to mitigate the
emergence of others.

program in its totality of ineffectualness
36
encouraged a cynicism toward public objects.
3.

(6) The

Community Control of the Schools:

For Lowi as for many others,

public education is probably the most crucial opportunity by which the
structure of racism can be destroyed.

Yet, the public school has

succumbed to interest-group liberalism as well.

36
Ibid., pp. 233-2U9.

By the manner in which
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they are districted and controlled, in flagrant
disregard for any publicly
meaningful scheme, schools have become the proprietary
rights of various
contending groups-parents, PTA-s, the uni.ons,
professional educators, and
so forth, until finally the black separatists
too sought to establish

their claims.

For Lowi, the separatists have no more superior
claim,

because of their suffering, to establishing a private
system of education

than the other groups that press weak and illegal reasons
to fight off
integration through busing experjjaents.

Not community control of public

school education but "public" control is what is needed; schools are
not
37

the proper domain of cities.
h»

Participation in Trade Associations:

One of the well-touted

claims of interest-group liberals, according to Lowi, is their contention
that the trade association be treated as a form of interest group, that
it could be regarded as "merely a means of efficient representation of
38
certain economic interests."
This view could not be further from the

truth in the republican analysis; as suggested above, both McConnell and
Lowi are skeptical of the presumption for democratic procedures internally

and their service to democratic values in general.

And not only trade

associations but a multitude of others should be regarded in the same way.

Many of these, for instance, the government has established itself or
become dependent upon for information, regulation, and administrative
services.

Lowi suggests that this relationship leads to the favoring of

some groups over others:

"Decentralization through delegation of power

37

Ibid., pp. 275-281.
38
Politics of Disorder, chap. 3, p. 69.
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to lower levels aLnost always results in unequal access and group
domin-

ation of the public situation.

. . .

Formal recognition of groups and their

representatives for purposes of such participatory democracy convBrts
each group so honored into an official component of government.

Such

recognition converts what is already an oligarchic situation into an
39
involuntary situation,"
Lowi is lead to the conclusion that the situ-

ation is little different between a Chicago gang called the Blackstone
Rangers which forces teenagers to become members and the community
organizer who will say, "Join onr organization or you

vri.ll

have very

little say in community policy-making."
The central criticism of the McConnell-Lowi interpretation is the

inability of decentralization, in the forms that they review, to achieve
"justice," but the concept of distributive justice they recommend is not

very clear.

The four illustrations are tied together by a demonstration

of participation as a group process which gives more weight to some than

others in the formation of policy decisions and which does not encompass

all the persons affected by the decisions.
and compelling complaint.

And, this is an important

In all cases participation has become an

incantation, a halo word, a hortatory word^ the slogan is substituted
for programs firmly defined by legal and moral criteria and vigorously

executed by authorized use of power.

The shared point in these illu-

strations is that when public authority is widely and irregularly
dispersed, two purposes are in evidence:

The first, the hope to avoid

the problems of law and, secondly, the effort merely to ameliorate

conditions, not rout them out.

39

Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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McConnell and Lowi, therefore, are undoubtedly
correct, at least in
terms of their cases, as identifying some forms
of participation as cooptive.

Neither the radical-liberal, Bachrach, nor a
radical like Tom

Hayden or Herbert Marcuse, would disagree.

Hayden's article, "Welfare

Liberalism and Social Change," for instance, may more
dramatically and

closely portray the situation from the point of view of the
poor, but
the indictment remains the same:

The poverty program seeks to be a

substitute parent more than a meal ticket, an agency of socialization

more than of welfare; the definition of objectives is middle class;
control is by elites; the Southern black movement is more liberating

with real legal targets to fight than the liberal Negro machine of the
ho
North.
But Hayden is also aware of some other features that the constitu-

tional republican interpretation fails to take into account.

The point

about "cooptive" participation is that certain features are present

that may lend the appearance of participation but others, which would
give it a reality fitting the classical model, are not.

The key feature

is the pattern of authority relations between the participants; in the

cooptive situation it is a vertical one; the class-c model suggests only

under conditions of mutual respect and

autonoiiQr,

which requires not only

political equality but social equality as well, can the individual be
expected to act morally.

Thus, "citizen participation" as a bureaucratic

ideology is intended to increase the acceptability of the agency's action
to the influenced public.

As Krause shows with two examples, participation

Co—
Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman
and Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader (New York: Vintage, 1967),
pp.

I;? 6-^01.
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is directed at target groups.

When the proponent is the local
urban

renewal agency, the primary clientele
group is the irdddle and upper class
and the primary target of the ideology
is the poor neighborhood and its
residents.

In the community action program, the
clientele and the

target group are the same.

Where cooperation is obtained, or in the
case

of the urban renewal agency, the benefits
more frequently accrued to the

clientele group than the poor.

When the situation was conflict-ridden,

as in the case of the CAP agency, federal
offices put pressure on the

agency to "cool it," using the leverage from
appropriations.^"^
McConnell and Lowi fail to suggest any distinction
between such
features, while the radical case must, for those other
features may be

theoretically, if not politically, possible.

The radical-liberal and

the radical want to make them politically achievable.

McConnell' s and

Lowi's interpretation is helpful in showing the conditions of
a cooptive
or manipulative participation, but they overgeneralize from their cases
to suggest that participation in any local setting is not conducive to

the public interest and social justice.

Hi
Elliott A. Krause, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology:
'Citizen
Participation,'" Social Problems , 16 (1968) :136-llil. Krause's conclusion
is;
"Thus the citizen participation ideology, from the point of view
of the target group, is an irrelevant or empty phraseology. From the
functional point of view, it appears in most cases to be either detrimental to or ineffective for the target group, if they accept it or act
on it, in the present social context." p. liil.
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A Critical Assessment
The critique of the McConnell-Lovi interpretation
and their account

of participation would be facilitated if some of
the key features of their
model of politics, in which their concept of
participation may be seen to
be embedded, is suiriinarized.

The

folWng

points, I hope, will be found

suggestive:
1.

The lack of participation (as, for instance, measured even

minimally by voting turnout, roll-off, and drop-off) is not considered
a problem for the McConnell-Lovri. interpretation.

They do not ask, What

will encourage more people to engage intelligently in the electoral
processes?

Or even,

V/ho

participates?

Who does not participate?

Why?

For them, it is the call to participation, even when it would encourage

excluded groups to translate troubles into public issues, that is ques-

tioned and challenged,
2.

Their political model appears to accept public apathy and other

anomic featuires of a mass, technocratic society.

The concept of man

that McConnell and Lowi adopt is the least explicitly reasoned aspect

of their perspective.

If, as seems the case, they have assimilated the

view of man shared by Madison, Schumpeter, and Lippman, theirs is a

conception of "abstract individualism."

Lukes offers a helpful charac-

terization of this view:
According to this conception, individuals are pictured
abstractly as given, with given interests, wants, purposes,
needs, etc.; while society and the state are pictured as
sets of actual or possible social arrangements which respond more or less adequately to those individuals' requirements. Social and political rules and institutions
are, on this view, regarded collectively as an artifice,
a modifiable instrument, a means of fulfilling independently
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given individual objectives; the means
and the end are
distinct. The crucial point about this
conception is that
the relevant features of individuals
determining the ends
which social arrangements are held (actually
or ideally)
to fulfill, whether these features are
called instincts,
faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc.,
are assumed as
given, independently of a social context.
This givenness
of fixed and invariant human psychological
features leads
to an abstract conception of the individual
who is seen
as merely the bearer of those features, which
determine
his behaviour, and specify his interests,
needs and rights. ^2

This view of man, and the epistemology to which
it is connected, should
be regarded as a perspectival choice which
precludes examining the

possibility of participation in local settings, when reformed,
for
achieving the values they seek.
3.

"Politics" is defined narrowly as an activity engaged in by

officially elected representatives.
stitutional republican analysis,

I

There is a sense in which the confeel, envisions that society's cor-

porate associations can be "cleansed" of their "political" influence,
h,

McConnell and Lowi share with Hayek the view that the State

and the people are separate and distinct entities.

This is a view that

stands in opposition to the theory of sovereignty of Rousseau, which

rejects the unnatural bifurcation of an individual into two beings, a

man and a citizen.
5«

The State must stand somewhere above any of the corporate

associations in the society and regulate the terms in which those

associations operate.
6.

The State can reasonably be expected to assume a moral intent

when it acts.

C2

Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York:
p. 73.

Harper Torchbooks, 1973),

13U
7.

There is a role for the citizen.

Civic duty involves the

necessary involvement in the party processes to
nominate and select

worthy representatives in the federal system.

This version of citizen-

ship would seem to emphasize the side of obligation
to obey the civic
order, to fulfill such civic roles of sacrifice as
are demanded, for

instance, in time of war.
8.

Political education is the work of a central authority, the

State, and not of diverse social groups that are narrowly directed
by

their self-interests.

Lowi's image is not of "mass education" but of

a national educational system as the only possible system that could

achieve the universal values of justice that he is committed to; he
expresses it as "the gigantic task of reeducation toward the universa-

lization of the values concerning the human relations of Americans."
Can we accept the explanatory theory of McConnel and Lowi?

Con-

temporary republicanism begins by attacking the rationale by which the
pluralist ideologists claim the political process follows and which

McConnell and Lowi also take to be the reality of that process.

While

McConnell and Lowi are somewhat equivocal on this point, it would seem
to be pertinent to suggest that they reject a Marxist definition of

"ideology," as a justification for a practice which may in some important

ways distort the reality of the process.

Lowi sees interest-group liber-

alism more as faulty rationalization than as a smokescreen behind which
economic and political interests can collaborate.
I

think it is important to pose the question,, however, the extent

to which the ideology of the group process adequately represents the

113

Kettler's essay "Beyond Republicanism" has been very helpful to
me in drafting this swrimary. The quote is from Lowi's End of Liberalism ,p. 269.
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use of power in the American system.

Are McConnell and Lowi correct

that political and legitimate power is diffuse—
in other words, that
C.

Wright Mills is fundamentally wi-ong and not merely
in error in minor

ways?

I

want to argue the position that McConnell and
Lowi are only

half correct in their view of the distribution of
power.

The lines of

conflict may not be dravm around two integrated and
opposing classes,
but it is not very correct to say that the lines around
which interests
are formed are not coordinated at all.

If this is the case, it does not

make too much sense to draw the centralization-decentralization
dichotomy.
One way to suggest the nature of this argument is by reexamining
their selection of case studies.
the important cases of power?

To what extent do their cases mirror

Their examples are national farm, labor

and business policy; the problems of state and local government; vrelfare
policy; and to a lesser extent the conduct of foreign policy.

They fail

to examine two policy areas in which the central government, and mainly

the President, has increasingly expanded the use of its authority.

In

economic matters, the President has exercised executive powers to effect

the economy in crucial ways, which often puts the U. S. Government in a
favored position; these have been powers used to go off the gold standard;
to do deficit -spending; to control, through the Council of Economic

Advisors and Treasury Department, monetary flow; to compete with private
banks; and with the assistance of Congress to fail to develop a satis-

factory and equitable progressive tax structure.

And in the other area,

the filling of elite positions, the game of musical chairs between top

decision-makers of the Pentagon and the defense industry, as well as the

military's commanding share of the national budget, and its role in

—
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in propaganda, seem to me compelling
reasons to suggest that centralized
tendencies, in which political and economic
interests converge, not de-

centraUzing tendencies, give the determinate character
to the American
hk

political scene.

Within this framework, why cannot an insufficient,
decentralized
welfare program be seen as the minimal cost necessary
to buy off dissent

in order to continue the

g

eneral scheme of things?

McConnell and Lowi may be correct.

To this extent,

What is suggested by their cases is

that groups with particularist claims can be deferred to when
their claims
do not conflict with the broad governing principle, the established
and

secured consensus.

Such groups can even be useful in reproducing it.

McConnell and Lowi may even be correct that some economic associations
exert more political influence than the national government itself j such
seems to be the development of the multi-national corporation in the past

twenty years.

Finally, McConnell and Lowi' may be correct that participation

in the local setting will never, as a structure of power, break the lockhold these associations have.
But, there are also other forces of centralization in society to

which McConnell and Lowi never attribute significance.

These are the

forces involved in the creation and reproduction of power relations in
society.

The only target is the "small group," of which no analytic dis-

tinctions are made.

In sum, Lowi may have swallowed too much of the

liberal ideology in failing to characterize for himself the consequences
for the life of the individual, for the shape of the internal and external

IT
Here I am drawing on the work, generally, of John Kenneth Galbraith,
Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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relations of groups; for the chance of a principles
legal system-of

these system-wide forces for conformity, of these
other "socializing
forces."

In the same way, they neglect the political parties
as a

factor in the integration into a narrow political
consensus.
Is there evidence to confute the generalization McConnell
and Lowi

make that all groups, as a matter of sociological tendency,
lead to unjust, and, therefore, illegitimate political effects?

Again, their

cases do not examine those where the merits of participation are
upheld.

They select the weakest cases, overlooking the developed cases for neighborhood control, community control, workers'; councils, as well as other
similar experiments.

They suggest some of the groups (e.g., League of

Women Voters) are public-interest oriented, but these get lost in the
shuffle (both in reality and in their theory).

McConnell and Lowi con-

flate the "synthetic" group of industrial sociology with the town meeting

and the Quaker meeting, not reaD-izing that the conditions and the results

may be quite different.

There is no attention to the effect partici-

pation in small settings may have for the development of the human personality.

U5

Such proposals are worked out, for instance, in the writings of
Milton Kotler, Marilyn Gittell, and Andre Gorz among many others. Lowi's
heedless attitude is reflected, for instance, in this statement which fails
to credit the New Left, a cicumlocution which avoids identifying anyone,
with any coherent theoretical statements: "The renewed and intensified
cries for decentralization in the past decade this time by the sentimental left rather than the right provides further testimony to growing
distrust of duly constituted authorities. But they provide no constructive direction for new uses of authority or new structures of authority."
End of Liberalism , p. 268. We might also note, incidentally, Lowi's conflation of the right and left has parallels in Hayeks' conflation of
fascism and socialism. F. A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 19Uii), p. 113 and inter all.a .

—

—
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See Private Power and American Democracy, pp. 9$-96.
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The social organizations of a society, hov^ever,
are not abstract creations but mediating institutions between the society
and the individual,

and this fact is not taken into account in the analysis.

In this, they

are cultural formations, and as such they are transmutable.

and

Lowi.

McConnell

uncautiously and unnecessarily dismiss all participation in

local settings.

As Peter Bachrach contends:

"There is no denying the

force of McConnell' s thesis that small units conducive to popular parti-

cipation are also vulnerable to elite manipulation and domination.

How-

ever, this danger can be avoided, at least to a considerable degree, if

the membership of the small unit is not also horaop-eneous and congenial
to elite control."

In rushing (with Madison, who Beam argues had good reason to be
more concerned with political expediency than logical and conceptual
issues) to the judgment that only an indirect, representative process

will serve the interests of individual rights and liberties, McConnell and
Lowi hasten to sanctify the loss of the one element the opponents of the

Constitution were so fearful, and justifiably, of losing.

This was a

—

Ct

Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology
Beacon Press, 1972), chap. IV, "The Group." This point of
view proposed that, "If one really wants to do justice to the raediative
character of the social formation which is contained in the term group,
then one cannot proceed from a concept of group which is unequivocally
fixed for all time." p. 65. And, "The relation of the individual to
society itself underlies these social dynamics." p. 66. They term many
of the newly differentiated groups as "synthetic" wnen "they are themselves planned from above, as cushions between the anonymous collectives
and the individual. Such types as company or factory associations belong
to this type...." p. 68.
U8
Peter Bachrach, "Corporate Authority and Democratic Theory," in
David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York: Atherton,
(Boston:

1967), p. 269.
Bean, pp. 66-70. This theory is argued in Jackson Turner Main,
The Anti-Federalists - Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1961).
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loss which they sought to prevent through
struggle and, finally achieved

only as a partial concession in the Bill of Rights.

The claims for more

popular and local government failed, but they wanted
the right of self-

detemination in matters that directly affected their lives
(most
certainly, in economic matters) in the face of the
growth of a propertied,
elite class with aristocratic pretensions.

To

wliat

extent is the contemporary republican interpretation anymore

concerned with the securing of individual liberty for all than was
the
original doctrine?
compelling.

The grounds on which the argument rests is not very

As Lukes suggests for Hayek, there is a basis for suspicion:

"The prescription of economic individualism, while appealing to the
50
values of equality and liberty, in fact amounts to their denial."

If

the pluralists were providing rationales for an indirect democratic

process in advanced industrial society, the contemporary constitutional
republicans took the next step, a regressive one, to seal its fate.
The role left for the individual in the constitutional republican
order where public and private realms were separate and distinct was

clearly minimal.
as sociology.

McConnell's and Lowi's writings are poverty-stricken

The theory remains formidably silent on the activities of

the individual and his relationship to the society at large.

It lacks

50
Lukes, p. 15U. To this point, Hayek's claim on behalf of the Rule
If Law is revealing: "It cannot be denied that the Rule of Law produces
economic inequality all that can be claimed for xt is that this inequality is not designed to affect particular people in a particular
way." Road to Serfdom , p. 79.

—

lUo
the "sociological apperception," which
"reveals society as irreducibly

constitutive of or built into the individual in
crucial and profound
ways."

The role viz-a-viz the state is essentially
passive, resting

as it does on a theory of law which relegates
claims on behalf of human

needs, purposes, and aspirations to the dumpheep
of ideas in favor of an
^ P^^°^^ construct.

(But that the notion of an a priori is closer
to dated,

religious preconceptions would seem apparent to me.)

Thus, in the case

studies we find it is not desirable to have blacks, poor,
workers communicate their needs and grievances to others within society's
established

institutional arrangements.

The paradox of the theory is that it is

acceptable for these claims to be asserted in social movements.

52

The difficulties of the interpretation on these points is traceable
to the republicans' abstract conception of the individual, a conception

which

regard as generally inappropriate and unfruitful for a contemporary

I

53

democratic theory.

The notion of the dignity of man and the ideal

autonomy are missing from their account, for instance, Lowi, in persisting to equate (erroneously) participatory democracy or community control

with interest-group liberalism fails to perceive the very important
grievances, the conditions of non- freedom, the power lessness of sectors

51
Lukes, pp. 15 0-151.
52

See, Politics of Disorder , shap. 2,
53

Lukes provides two arguments for this conception's inadequacy:
"First, because it in fact forms the basis for a particular ideological
view of a certain sort of society and its social relations, and second,
because it represents a primitive and a- or pre-sociological view of
the nature of the individual." p. 152,

m
of the population.

As Dewey tried to put it in everyday
language, only

the wearer knows where the shoe pinches.

Decentralization has several arguments to its
advantage:

(l) It can

allow the expression of suppressed needs, wants,
and aspirations;

(2) it

can afford opportunities to develop a capacity for
defining these personal

troubles and translating them into public issues;
(3) it can develop the

human capacities and the self-respect that only comes
when an individual
acts as an agent in breaking out of his or her own
alienating condition.

This capacity, this sense of autonomy, cannot be derived
when others

claim to take on the task, especially when they may continue to be
part of the problem in other serious ways.

As Philip Green suggests,

the answer to conflicts in decentralized units, such as were exhibited
in

the New York School Strike of 1968, may be more decentralization, not

less.

The presumption of this view is that there are some merits to

encouraging social and cultural diversity in face of arguments for

majoritarianism of a large constituency or against the centralization
recommended by some collectivist-socialist interpretations,
is to the point:

Dewey again

The problem of democracy is more democracy.

The critique of groups proposed by the republican interpretation of
McConnell and Lowi, then is only partially appropriate; it dramatizes one
feature correctly, the conformist nature of many group arrangements.

—

Philip Green, "Decentralization, Community Control, and Revolution:
Reflection on Ocean Hill- Brownsville," in Green and Levinson, eds..
Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York:
"If initial efforts at decentralizaVintage, 1970), p. 270. He writes:
problems
of majority tyranny, then surely
the
fail
eliminate
all
tion
to
we desire not less decentralization, but more."

a
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But, it is insensitive to another possible
feature, the values it has for

promoting the development of the human personality
and the positive
effects this may have on the society.

Once we realize this problem in the republican interpretation—

problem which is ultimately characterized as its lack of
responsiveness
to human needs, wants, and aspirations, we are in a better
position to

appraise its strategy for change.

Agreeing that standards of justice,

principles governance, is an ideal to which a theory and practice
of
politics should aspire, will the contemporary constitutional republican

version approach it any better than the older one did?

There are several

reasons to suggest the ideal they aspire to cannot (and should not) be

achieved by the strategy they suggest.

Constitutional republicanism rests on a coercive principle, which

McConnell and Lowi admit to holding.

All governance may require coercion,

but a political theory that does not examine it requires a great amount
of faith on the part of its adherents.

would exact from us.

This is just the price Lowi

The scope and extent of coercion and whether the

price is too high is not questioned in this interpretation; yet, it is

an important one, if some of the coercion (for some segments of the

society at any rate) is unnecessary, as Marcuse's conception of "surplus
repression" hypothesizes.

That argument goes further than any other

to suggest that not only are groups conformist but the whole society is

repressive in ways that raise the issue of whether any social force can
be formed sufficient to countermand the existing structures of repression.

If any are, it will have to be directed at the very levels of human
consciousness; that is what any schema of social change must require.

Iii3

To yield to coercion at the apex of power but
not at its lower
levels raises the prospect of some form of elite.

Lowi concedes as

much, but the elite has to be more virtuous than
the common lot.

The

appeal runs on the judgments that another sort of
democrat, a Rousseauan,
for instance, would not want to chance-the problems
of responsiveness to

the public.

What will induce elected officials, under all the
pressures

of the present electoral proces?, to act more like
statesmen than the

cunning politicians they seem to be?
over their leaders?

Wiat power will the citizenry have

The important point is that there is no energy-

principle to give the constitution new life (even if we concede that the
two hundred year old document and its separation of powers, checks and

balance principle is still viable, that the basis of representation
secured by the party system is fair, and that a tenure of statutes act
makes sense, which

I

am reluctant to do).

And there are many social forces working against its instauration,
suggesting the theory as a strategy of change will never succeed in
practice.

Kettler shows the persuasive argument Marx lodged against

Hegel's model of the state, important features of which the republican

theory of state and law share.

The nub of Marx's criticism rested on

the insight of an irresolvable contradiction in the constitutional

republican theory.

According to Kettler, Marx argued

that the constitutional state portrayed by Hegel recognizes
genuine republican principles only when it is at war or in
crisis, and that the operating principles of that order
under normal conditions are the destructive principles of
greed and lust for power. 55

Central to understanding this criticism is the fallacious assumption that

^
"Beyond Republicanism," p. 60.
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the political state is and can be kept
separate from the economic domain,

and this is an anachronistic principle that
Lowi is as faithful to as
Hegel seemed to be.

Lowi writes, for instance:

"The juridical principle

can convert a consumer economy into a just society
without altering in any
56
way the virtue of consumption or the freedom to
consume."
Two arguments
must be asserted against this sort of statement, which,
depending on one's

viewpoint, could be seen as naive or as manipulative.

First, from the

ecologists', it is evident that resources are not unlimited
nor is the
earth's tolerance for wastes j while the society of the nineteenth
century

might have been able to afford a wanton attitude towards its resources,
the present scale of populations and consumption of energy may not

find nature so obliging.

A regulative principle here would be something

that the Lowi notion of "juridical democracy" does not seem to entail.

Secondly, the radical argument is that the capitalist and welfare-state

solutions badly distribute resources and wealth.

Confronting social

inequalities, both material and linguistic (derived from class position),

and the productive structures to which they are tied, that create class
divisiveness is essential and ancillary to the just and free society.

Men and women are social beings; they are historically constituted.

And,

old or new constitutional republican theory does not resolve the problems
of alienation arising in a commercial society, just as its contemporary
variant nowhere takes into account the massive pressures to conform

according to one's class and status position in the consumer society.
Kettler sets out the overriding contradiction Mars: perceived:

3^"
End of Liberalism, p. 312.

In the classical langiiage so important to Marx
and to the
republican tradition out of which he sprang, it may
be
said that he came to deny the possibility of
a political
sphere removed from and superceding the economic
relations—
those of the household between master and slave,
and those
generated by that all-pervasive economic preoccupation
which
Aristotle himself had called ciirematistik and considered
antithetical to the formation of a genuine polis. Marx's
constant reference to slavery should not be seen as
hyperbole: it expresses his conviction that the normal
operation
of economic life has everywhere required that some
men at
least meet the conditions which define a slave for Aristotle:
they are by their nature (i.e., their social destiny, for
Marx) not their own man, but another's; although men, they
are ai-ticles of property, which means that they are instruments intended for the purpose of action. They do not
project; they do not shape their lives j they are resources
in the plans of others. If the realm characterized by these
relationships dominates the formally political realm, then
the promises and strategies of the republican constitutional
tradition must be adjudged irrelevant, on the authority of
its founder, Aristotle .57

Against McConnell and Lowi--yet appreciating their importance for drawing
out some of the hypocrisy of induced or synthetic participation,

I

believe

it can be concluded that their strategy by no means promises the sought

for social change.

The contemporary variant updates the classical constitutional

republican interpretation in interesting ways, but it fails short of
being a root explanation of the crisis of authority in the American
system, because it is a narrowly political and legalistic approach to

problems which may be deeper and sociological.

Both fail to appreciate

the important connection between social equality and political equality,
and this is where they misconstrue the grounds of the radical case the
Those whose effort it is to promote participation in its classic

most.

sense are not seeking to encourage mere political activism but to develop

57

"Beyond Republicanism," p. 66
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a style of moral action, a

develop among equals.

fomation of

a moral consensus that can only

Participation in the formation of this law

mil

make it less alien and more likely to be
respected when it conflicts

directly with one's personal interests.

The view is expressed by R. P.

Wolfe in his critique of J . S. Mill's utilitarian
view of liberty:
Insofar as our enterprises are inherently social,
the
public-private, interference-noninterference mode]
of
human relations breaks dovrn. The central problem
ceases
to be the regulation of each person's infringement
on
the sphere of other person's actions, and becomes
instead the coordination of the several actions and
the choice of collective goals. 5°
But this is not totalitariarD.sm, should such a change
be advanced.

The dilemmas of the republican interpretation are a matter of
the

internal ordering of the perspective.

The focus on the rule of law,

whether expressed as the "public interest" or "juridical democracy" and
v/hich was patterned after the model of Madison, DeTocqueville,

and

Hayek, mitigated against any recognition of the distributive principle
at work in society and its effect of the quality of human life and,

thereby, on law.

This set in motion an interpretation that, given its

premises is logical, but if we call them into doubt, find the account of

participation is weakened at several points, as is its strategy for
social change.

In advanced industrial society the individual is not an abstraction
apart from the social fabric, but a particular, historically specific

human being.
forms of

Particularly, the individual is a member of many different

hiiraan

association.

The moral character that is formed in this

process of interaction between social arrangements and personality is

—w~

Robert Paul Wolfe, P overty of Liberalism (Boston:
1968), p. 50.

Beacon Press,

1U7

what must be called into view and critically
examined and, if necessary,
prescriptions made towards a reestablishment of human
relations along

other lines.

Denying the human being's most basic social
patterning to

talk, work, and Dive together-its political meaning
would hardly seem the

way to begin this instauration.

It would hardly seem desirable to deny

the rich mediatinr. functions that language, would seem
to hold out, and
yet that is just what McConnell.and Lowi must do by limiting
the settings

and features of democratic participation.

Without attention to the

supporting conditions for the cognitive and affective and moral growth
of
all members of society, only

a

few may enjoy those broader opportuni.ties

that a democracy can more abundantly afford.

li;8

Conclusion
The constitutional republicans in their
interpretation of the

American political and social system offer
a critical step forv;ard
towards the explication of a theory of
participation.

They have shown

us a facet in contemporary society to which
the liberal-pluralists

appear to be insensitive:

The set of conditions under which participa-

tion among political unequals is not and cannot be
realized.

By drawing

the contrasts between the promises of participation,
the realities under

the present organization of wealth, power, and prestige,
and the shabby

results for the public interest, McConnell and Lowi suggest
that parti-

cipation and decentralization to which it has been linked are hortatory
words in the lexicon of the liberal ideology.

Our thesis has been that

the constitutional republican interpretation is, therefore, useful
in

showing the distortions that may accrue to any important t erm in the

vocabulary of democracy.
But ju^t because the conditions to which a meaningful participation

is connected have not been widely satisfied, this is not a sufficient

reason to suggest, as McConnell and Lowi do, that the possibility for
meaningful participation, and participation that will have a positive
effect for the realization of universal values, is invalidated or is
unwarranted.

That the liberal-pluralist practice and ideology have

seemed to weaken the meaning and practice of participation in the fuller
classical sense does not necessitate it being done in altogether.

As

Arnold Kaufman in his case for participation in various settings has
suggested:

"...the effort to achieve a possible good (sometimes)

depends on our belief in the possibility of that achievement

— the

very

11»9

nerve of our effort to^achleve a good may
be out by premature admission

of its impossibility."

Our

next,

set of critics of the pluralist ideology,
the radical-

liberals, attempt to examine this side of the
question more closely.

The follovdng questions will help to guide our
inquiry:

Can a case be

made for participation in local settings as having
positive consequences
for the rule of law and principles governance?

participation is instrumental to freedom?

Can a case be made that

The radical-liberals offer a

positive response.

^
"Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," in Bias of Pluralism ,
p. 195.
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CHAPTER

V

THE RADICAL-LIBERAL INTERPRETATION:
THE THEORIES OF PETER BACHRACH AND ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN

Introduction

Contemporary political theorizing has been largely bereft of
humanistic influences.

But such concerns of Rousseau and Dewey, for

instance, were not entirely effaced and in the 1960's the classical

vision of man had a renaissance.

Efforts to revitalize the American

political process— through the civil rights, disarmament, and antiwar movements and the 1968 Presidential campaign—required an enriched

theory and strategies for change.

The emergent perspective was identi-

fied by C. Wright Mills and characterized as the "New Left."

Perhaps,

most symbolically, it was represented by the I962 "Port Huron Statement"

and its conception of human beings, human relationships and social
systems:

"The goal of man and society should be human independence:

A

concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life
that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven

by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status
values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which
has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which

easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly
faces problems which are troubling and unresolved; one with an intuitive

awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability
1

and willingness to learn."

Subsequent papers by such individuals as

_

My source here is Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals A Report with Documents (New York: Vintage, 1966) and Cnristopher Lasch,
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Tom Hayden, Richard Flacks, and Staughton

Lyrid and

work out the analyses that would guide action.

many others began to

Much of the impetus for

this recrudescence came from the humanistic traditions of
Rousseau and

Marx and the American pragmatism of Dewey and others.
By the end of the 1960's, the lines for distinguishing theoretical

orientations among the new humanist critics of pluralist ideology had
more clearly formed around certain issues.

Most crucial was the issue

of whether social change was possible by working within the established

political structure.

Events of 1968 seemed to provide sufficient reason

for the formation of judgments on the matter.

While

I

have no desire to

reduce to a few categories the many well-articulated and distinguishable

arguments on the issue,

I do

want to demarcate the position of one of

the more moderating, non-socialist and non-militant perspectives to

emerge on this crucial issue of social and political change.

That is the perspective of the radical-liberal.

Dewey's phrase,

"radical-liberal," had been reinvoked, chiefly by Arnold Kaufman in his

book by that title, to suggest that the liberal or good society is "one

in which each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, and
spirit, as well as the opportunities to carve out a career in conformity
2

to that person's own nature and reasoned choice."

To be a radical-

liberal meant to hold a deep-rooted commitment to the values of a liberal
society.

The Agony of the American Left (New York: Vintage, 1969), chap. 5 and
Postscript. For anotner point of view, there is William L. O'Neill,
Coming Apart - An Iniormal History of America in the 1960's (New York:
Quadrangle, 1971). The quote is from "The Port Huron Statement"
excerpted in Jacobs and Landau, pp. 15i;-l55.
2

Arnold S. Kaufman, The Radical Liberal - The New Politics:
Clarion, 1970, 196b), p 6.
and Practice (New York:

Theory
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Radical-liberals began with a critique of the
American pluralist
interpretation, emphasizing its failure to
hold true to classical

liberal-democratic theory in practice.

It had jettisoned its faith

and support for the person, for self -development
when it needed it
,
most.

Radical-liberals thus shared the common purpose of
bringing alive

participation, to foster enlightened participation
in a broad-ranging set

of social, political, and economic institutions.

This account differed

from Dahl's, for instance, in that the concern was
not with getting

people what they have already been encouraged to want but
in trying
to find ways of creating conditions such that individuals
would be

able to act reasonably and with some sense of autonomy.
tially, however, a reformist-liberal position.

It was essen-

Its expressive forms

included the Presidential can^^aign strategies and political platforms
of Eugene McCarthy in 1968 and of George McGovern in 1972.

The basic

economic structure that undergirded class relations was not conspicuously
threatened.
I have

selected for my consideration here two exponents of radical-

liberal thought who might be regarded as complementary, Peter Bachrach
and Arnold Kaufman.

They are not widely familiar outside the political

science profession and perhaps not too widely known within it, but

I

feel that they are the best representatives of this Dewey-ian position

presently available.

The meaningfulness of this interpretation derives

not from the fact of popularity or familiarity then, but from the fact

that it offers a warranted alternative to pressures for a narrowing con-

ception of participation and avoids some of the more drastic requirements

of some Marxist interpretations.
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The work of Peter Bachrach is useful and
suggestive for its incep-

tion of a rather original critique of American
plural-elite theory.

The

questions Bachrach posed, with Baratz, and the
argument they made in two
critical essays on decision-making have become central
to the debate in
the methodology of community power and pose a
significant challenge

directly to the assumptions Dahl, for instance, makes.

3

In The Theory

ol_Demo cratic Elitism - A Critiq ue Bachrach cogently points out the
mj_scasting of democratic theory from Schumpter to Dahl in its
derivation
h
from early elite theory.
Unfortunately, the perspective Bachrach is

attemption to construct has not been held consistently, and in his study
of power in Baltimore (co-authored with Baratz), Power and Povert
y, he

incompletely and unsuccessfully makes the case for increased citizen
5

participation.

Bachrach'

s

work is, then, not without some theoretical

problems, and the crucial one is its failure to hold consistently to the

original conception of participation.

It is hoped that by examining

Bachrach 's account it can be shown where the case for expanded and en-

riched participation requires further attention and elaboration.

3

See, for instance, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two
Faces of Power," American Political Science Review , 56 (December 1962):9U7
9^2; and "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," American
Political Science Review, 57 (Jione 1963 ) :6Ul-65l.

Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique
(Boston: Little, Brown, 196?}.

Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty:
and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Theory

Kaufman's witing represents a mindful orientation
toward integrating
problems of philosophy, theory, and practice.

I

believe this work offers

a more closely argued case for participation in
terms of a self-development

model than Baclnrach's and is, as well, a judiciously considered
assessment
of the prospects for participation.

Given his goal. The Radical Liberal

and essays in Dissent are determined efforts at working out a feasible

strategy for change within the constraints of the American party system
6

and its structure of power.

Generally, Kaufman proposes a realignment

of the party system through a national coalition-building program; the

Democratic Party would provide the political base.

His case is such that

a coalition, representative of groups from moderate to left, could be

united around a synthesis of individual goals and collective need, and
this would radically transform social arrangements and political priori-

Such a transformation would be directed toward establishing the

ties.

life conditions necessary for the dignity of all.

Together, Bachrach and Kaufman offer a provocative and fairly-well

delineated model of power and possibility in the United States.

It is

one which asserts the positive goal of participation, not simply because

participation may offer clearly better decisions.

It may not even do

It is offered because a democracy of participation is that practice

that.

that most realizes the dignity and capacities of all individuals in
society.

Therefore, the conditions by which this practice can be best

furthered out to be promoted actively.

1

Kaufman published diversely; I will make reference to these mainly:
Where Shall Liberals Go?", Dissent , 13 (September"A Call to Radicalism:
Politics Is More Important," Dissent ,
"Opposition
October 1966) :53'5-62ii;
New
for a New Politics:
"Strategies
15 (January-February 1968):21-25;
1969):
(January-February
I6
Dissent
,
Party or New Democratic Coalition,"
13-13; and "A Political Strategy for Radical Uberals," Dissent , I8
(July-August 1971)082-393.
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The radical-liberal's interpretation is most
forcefully challenged
from the left.

What about the evidence that social forces
are so strong

that they conspire against the possibility of
some class of individuals

participating meaningfully in the present state of affairs?

The radical-

liberals do, perhaps, realert us to the original
meaning of participation
in classical democratic theory.

But to what extent do they adequately

explore the distinction between .the conditions necessary
for the encour-

agement of participation as self -development and those which
now prevail
and which are largely coercive?

Do they misjudge the possibilities?

Are

the radical-liberals prepared to meet the more radical challenge,
in

short, which suggests that the structural and cognitive restraints to

meaningful participation run deeper than any of the pluralist critics
suggest?
The argument is a formidable challenge to the case for expanded

participation.

The constitutional republicans and the radical-liberals

make clear objections to the pluralist case, so that we are now aware of
the need to strengthen the individual's autonomy and dignity against

farous social pressures.

m.ulti-

What grounds can we suggest that the Bachrach-

Kaufman case makes such a model of citizen participation realizable?

I

want to suggest that the confrontation of the radical-liberal and radical
perspectives will point us in the direction for working out a balanced
and steadied conception of an enriched participation for an advanced in-

dustrial society such as our own.
So, I will turn now to examine the account of participation for the

radical-liberals.

I

will first give some attention to the roots of their

perspective and then set out their respective accounts of participation.
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Finally, I will take up some objections and seek
to offer an assessment

of this account.

My final concluding chapter will try to develop
those

considerations necessary for bringing the radical-Uberal and
radical
cases into balance.
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The Radical- Liberal Perspective

Central to the inadequacy of the approach
liberal-pluralist s like
Dahl took to the analysis of the American
political process,

I

suggested

in an earlier chapter, was the presumption of a
widely-shared consensus
as to the political norms and practices in the
society.

This presumption

has the serious problem of directing attention away
from the sources and

pressures that cause personal discontent, and such discontent
is viewed
more likely as pathological than indicative of failures in
the social

structure.
Central to the radical-liberal perspective is the presumption that
7

at the root of politics is conflict.

The conflict perspective of the

radical-liberal is American generically and not essentially Marxist.
drafting of this model in a classic form may be attributed to
Schattaschneider.

E.

The

E.

The concept of a "mobilization of bias," Schattschneider

term, is fundamental to Bachrach's developing interpretation and can also
be seen to lie behind the considerations of Kaufman, so that

gin by sketching Schattschneider

'

s

I

want to be-

conflict model of the American polity

briefly,

Schattschneider' s study, The Semi -Sovereign People , was, as he says,

an attempt to work out a theory about the relation between organization

and conflict, the relation between political organization and democracy,
8

and the organizational alternatives open to the American people.

Basic

7

For characteristic presumptions of the conflict perspective see
William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity , 6 (Fall
1973): 16-17.
8

Schattschneider, The Semi -Sovereign People - A Realist's View
of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rmehart and Winston, I960);
and also Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19U2).
E.

E.

"
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to our understanding of politics is the
contagiousness of conflict.

Since a conflict always consists of two
parties-the individuals who are

actively engaged in a dispute and the audience
that is attracted to the
scene, central to the determination of the
outcome is the scope of its

contagion.

Strategy becomes important to the outcome, and the
role of

the bystanders is the strategic target.

the political literature is

"

The basic struggle revealed by

between the conflicting tendencies towa rd

the privatization and socialization of conflic t ,

Examination of the political pressure system and the party system
in the United States reveals that the scope of conflict has been
fairly-

well set since the realignment of 1932 and that these systems both operate

with a class bias.

Schattschneider

'

s

examination of the pressure system

requires a distinction between "public" interests and "special" interests,
a distinction interest-group theorists fail to make.

It is a distinction

that the constitutional republicans made and which radical-liberals must
make, as

I

shall try to show later.

a mobilization of bias

— that

Organized groups by definition have

is, the interests it favors

it is possible to consider it as also possessing scope .

American politics is small.
point he makes:

— and

as a result,

That scope in

Schattschneider has often been quoted on the

"The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly

chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent.

Probably about ninety per10

cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system."

The scope has been limited in the party system, as well.

Generally,

one-third of the electorate do not participate in national elections and

9

Semi -Sovereign People , p. 7 and chap. 1.
10
Ibid., p. 35.
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even fewer participate in state
elections; still fewer on the average in

local ones.

The reason, for Schattschneider -s
explanation, was not so

much acceptance of the system as recognition
that the lower class was
excluded from the process:

"Nonvoting is related to the contradiction,

imbedded in the political system, between (l) the
movement to universalize
suffrage and (2) the attempt to make the vote
neamingless.
tinued:

He con-

"It has been assumed that only legal barriers
inhibited the

disenfranchised.

We know better now.

The exclusion of people by extra-

legal processes, by social processes, by the way the
political system is

organized and structure may be far more effective tiian the law."
All divisions in the community are maintained at a cost:

"The

existence of a large body of dissociated people is part of the price we

pay for the dominance of the cleavage between government and business.
This cleavage had tended to freeze the stakes of politics at a point that
13

has never involved the whole community."

The costs were the inability

for some to have their needs and wants translated into public policy; the

cost was, ultimately, one of constitutional legitimacy.

The study of politics, according to Schattschneider, then ought to
be the study of the structures which go toward sustaining the existing

bias and scope of conflict.

Organization is the mobilization of bias.

Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.
And, "Anyone who finds out how to involve the forty million in American
lii

politics will run the country for a generation."

11
Ibid.., p.

103.

12

Ibid., p. 111.
13

Ibid., pp. 109-110.
Hi

Ibid., p. 103.

160
The work of Schattschneider does not take us
very far towards an

enriched concept of participation.

Schattschneider himself views repre-

sentation as a basic version of participation.

In his definition of

democracy he maintains a conception very close to
Schumpeter »s; it is
"a competitive political system in which competing
leaders and orgaaiza-

tions define the alternatives of public policy in such
a way that the

public can participate in the decision-making process."
of Dahl's concept is thus manJ.fest here,

The problem

too— i.e., Schattschneider

not concerned with the effects of participation.

is

His weakness is that

he lim.its pai'ticipation to demands, what people already want, and remains

unconcerned with development of the fullest capacities of the human being.
Significantly, then, his theory is unassimilated to a theory of human

development.

And that

v;as

the task that Bachrach seemed to set out to

do, but it was better fulfilled, as we shall see, in the work of Kaufman.

lb

Ibid., p. 15.
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Bachrach's Account of Participation

Bachrach took up the t ask outlined by Schatt
Schneider, to give

attention to the mobilization of bias in the
political system; he began

with a critical examination of the underlying
assumptions and methodology
of the community power analyses.

The formulation was expressed as both

a critique of the "power elite" approach (e.g.,
Hunder's) and of the

pluralists (e.g., Dahl«s and Polsby's).

In "The Two Faces of Power"

Bachrach and Baratz argued that the pluralist objections to
the elitist
16
arg-ujnent

were "effectively exposed."

of an "ordered system of power."

Mainly, they rejected any notion

Against the other side, they maintained

that the pluralist confinement to only "safe" and always "important" or
"key" issues in the study of who has power meant the researchers over-

looked "the chance that some person or association could limit decision-

making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing cominunity
values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there
17

are in the community serious but latent power conflicts."

Study of

decision-making calls first for the study of the organization of bias,
for study of not only the visible but the invisible face of power.

Only

after that is done can the analysis of participation in decision-making
in concrete issues begin.

Objection to this presumably "subjective" domain for political inquiry
was anticipated, and so a paper developing the innovative concept of

16

—

PYom "Two Faces of Power" reprinted in Bias of Pluralism (New York:
Atherton, 1969), pp. 52-53.
17

Ibid., p. 55.

—
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nondecision-making proposed in the first article
followed.

"Nondecision-

making" was the method used to sustain
the mobilization of bias.

It was

"a set of predominant values, beliefs, and
constitutional procedures

("rules of the game") that operate systematically
and consistently to
18
the benefit of certain persons and groups
at the expense of others."

This is their definition as developed later in
Power and Poverty

:

A nondecision...is a decision that results in
suppression
or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge
to the
values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more
nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which
demands forchange in the existing allocation of benefits
and privileges in the community can be suffocated before
they are even voicedj or kept covert; or killed before
they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena;
or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the
decision-implementing stage of the policy process. 19
Examples of nondecision-making are provided in the case of Senator Joseph

McCarthy and his supporters, when in the early 1950's their exploitation
of ant i -communist sentiments effectively blocked access to the decision-

making arena demands for social reform, and in the case of Baltimore when
the value of equal opportunity for blacks had been used in a way to isolate
20
advocates of Black Power.'
Other cases are offered in Power and Poverty
as well, but these are suggestive,

"Nondecision-making" was a provocative and controversial concept for
21
most political scientists.
iMainly the difficulty of operationalizing

IB

Power and Poverty , p. U3.
19

Ibid., p. hh»
20
"Communications," American Political Science Review , 62 (December
See John H. Schaar's essay, "Equality of Opportunity,
:1268-1269.
1968)
for
an excellent examination of the conservative implications
and Beyond"
of the "equal opportunity" slogan. In Pennock and Chapman, eds.. Equality:
Nomos IX (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 228-2U9.
21
It was criticized by Richard Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique
of Community Power," American P olitica l Science Review , 62 (June 1968):U5l-

,
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it for empirical research provided
the chief objection.
22
however, been applied in at least one
study.

The concept has

Perhaps nondecision-making (and non-issues)
is more appropriately

viewed not as an empirical concept but as
a heuristic one, one which
enables us to focus on structures of forces
not readily observed.

For

instance, nondecision-making (in the form, "not
to decide is to decide")

suggests that nonparticipation cannot be explained
completely at any rate

by apathy or by satisfaction witn the ongoing system.

The concept, I

suggest, was unexplicitly an Magellan or dialectical
concept and ought to
be regarded in this light.

Thus, nondecision-making only has meaning

against an ideal which a decision does not obtain, against some
criteria

by which a practice may be compared.

The ideal is only implicit in

Bachrach's theory and, therefore, the concept remains a^ibiguous.

in his concept, nevertheless, is a standard or ideal.

Implicit

An essential part

of its meaning is the status of the distribution of benefits (and burdens)
23

to different persons and groups in a political system or subsystem.

This was the intuition of Schattschneider as well.

Toward the conclusion

of Semi -Sovereign People Schattschneider very sketchily demarcated an

and an exchange of views is to be found in the sam.e Review , 62
(December 1968) :1268-1269. An expanded argument is developed in the same
Review , 65 (December 1971), between Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions
and the Study of Local Politics," pp. 1063-1080, and Frederick W. Frey,
"Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power," pp. 10811101 j Wolfinger offers a rejoinder, pp. 1102-llOU.
22
Matthew A, Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution - A Study
of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971).
i;60j

23

See, for instance. Power and Poverty , p. 106, where the distributive
Some conception of equality, such as Schaar, 0£. cit
principle is apparent.
suggests might more adequately provide the normative principle.

.
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alternative to the utilitarian ethics that undergirded
pluralist politics.

Very suggestively, he had hinted that possible
a "wholly new calculus"
should be considered for the conduct of public policy
in the new interna224

tional world.

Unfortunately, Bachrach did not draw on this insight to

develop his approach in a more explicit way.

Bachrach and Earatz sub-

sequently tried to argue that the focus for study of nondecision-niaking

should be on "latent and covert grievances of differential groups
in the
community." which weakened the criteria, and contended that problems
of
false consciousness were problems for the philosopher.

This was, as

Balbus points out, probably an unnecessary concession for tneir interpretation.

The detectable shift from the model of Schattschneider to

tiie

radical-

liberal perspective and emphasis on development of the personality is

observable in Bachrach 's The Theory of Democratic El iti sm
Mainly, in

Serai -Sovereign

-

A Critique .

People the attention is on organizational

structure, for explaining the bias of the pressure group and party

processes.

Bachrach 's analysis here begins to subject to critical

examination the ideological revision of classical elite theorists by the

"2II

Schattschneider suggested the need
Se mi -Sover eig n People , p. 111.
to shift from a politics of distribution (the who gets what, when, and
how of politics) to tlie politics of apportionment of bui'dens. He wrote,
"Today our view of politics is greatly modified by the fact that the
United States is involved in a titanic struggle for sm^vival. Burdens
that were inconceivable a few years ago seem to have become a permanent
part of the public function. The primacy of foreign po licy calls for a
new kind of politics involving a wholly new calculus. The government
now needs above everything else the steady support of the public, and the
support cannot be had without a new scale of public involvement in public
life." p. 112.
25

See Powe r and Pover ty, p. h9; and Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept
Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," Politics an d Society ,
Interest
of
1 (February 1971) 151-177.

m

:
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contemporary democratic theorists.

Bachrach shows the separation of

liberalism and democracy and reveals the
transformation that took place
in democratic thinking since .Schumpeter
s attempt, in I9J42, to minimize
'

the role of the common man in the political
process.

The impetus for

theorists to limit confidence in the ordinary
man and woman, according to
Bachrach, is associated with the rise of the
totalitarian movements,

fascism and communism, and later with the rise of
McCarthyism in the
United States.

This assuiaption seemed to be easily buttressed
by public

opinion research (e.g., Stouffer's and Lipset's), which
indicated the
mass' lack of knowledge of democratic values.
to reject

tlriis

It is Bachrach's intention

tendency to put the guardianship of democracy in the hands

of elites and to emasculate the person as contrary to the classical
vision

of the purposes of democracy.

have summsTized below the main lines of argument Bachrach builds

I

to defeat the elitist theory.

He has directed his attention to some of

the chief points the democratic elitists use to construct their positive
case for a narrowed conception of democracy and participation.

Bachrach's

response will be indicated.
A chief line of argument, as we saw in the discussion of Dahl,

1,

was the effort to transform democracy from a substantive meaning to a

procedural meaning.

This argument had its principal source in Schumpeter 's

Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

and

I

.

Bachrach is here concerned to argue,

believe correctly, that the fundamental disadvantage of this approach

is that it gives the political theorist no basis for judging whether the
26
system is becoming more democratic or more elitist in nature.

Another facet of the democratic elite argument, especially as

2.

~26

—

Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. 21-25.
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reflected in the work of Bernard Berelson and
his colleagues, has been
the concern to discover how social stability
can be secured rather than

studying what happens to various individuaDs under
the system.

Thus,

political passivity of the great majority of the
people is not regarded
as an element of democratic malfunctioning, but
on the contrary, as a

necessary condition for allowing the creative functioning
of the elite.
What is^wrong with this is that it assumes the body
politic is an end in
itself.
3.

Related to view (2.), Bachrach suggests,

that an apparently thriving democratic system is

degree of freedom to all its citizens.

is

the implicit notion

boiJiid

to provide a wide

Just because a system supplies

stability, it is mistaken to imp]y that it also adequately provides for
the growth and well-being of individuals.

(J

think t^ds becomes clearer

as an argument when Bachrach discusses manipulation; Bachrach 's argument

allows, but does not say, that elite consensus can, in Kaufman's phrasing
26

"winnow and shape" demands.)
ii.

Other democratic elite theorists, Plamenatz among them, assume

the pressur'e system offers opportunities for countervailing power to a

wide range of groups in the society.

As we have already seen,

Schattschneider 's analysis, which Bachrach calls upon here, refutes this
29

assumption easily and persuasively,
5.

Kornhauser, along with other social pluralists, holds a faith

in the automatic control of social voluntary associations for separating

27

Ibid., pp. 32-35.
28

Ibid., pp.

3ii-33'.

29
Ibid., pp. 35-39.
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mass and elites.

Bachrach suggests this faith is insufficient,
partly

because it does not explain how masses can be made
to join more organi30
zations without being mobilized behind charismatic-type
leaders.
The necessity and feasibility of reaching a
"consensus of elites"

6.

on fundamental procedures is the chief concern of
Truman, Berle, and Mills,

Bachrach says.

And, he suggests that the requirements may be considerably

greater than Trumn, for instance, anticipates.

But mainly, Bachrach

's

point is to raise the question, What will keep the self-conscious
elites

within constitutional bounds?

None of the elite theorists provide a con31

vincing answer to the skeptic.
Finally, Bachrach drav;s, importantly, attention to the concept

7.

of "politics" that the democratic elitists work vrLth.

It is a concept

that is unwisely, for the interests of political science, limited to

governmental structures.

"Politics" must be broadly defined to recognize

the impact that agencies other than governmental ones have for the al].oca-

tion of values.

There seems to be sufficient warrant, for instance, to

suggest heads of corporations are political elites; the only chief dis-

tinction is their lack of accountability.

Bachrach suggests that Dahl's

definition recognizes the public impact of corporations but that his
political analysis fails to give practical effect to the point, and this
32

affects his analysis for participation.
The democratic revisionists also lodged a negative argument against
an ideal of democracy.

We can recall Dahl's dismissal of ideals as

breeding cynicism and his call to "realism."

30

Ibid., pp.

ii2-l46.

31
Ibid., pp. 50-62.
32

Ibid., pp. 85-91.

Bachrach 's contention was
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that the essence of classical theory was its ideal,
the chief function
of democracy being what it did to promote self-development.

Bachrach

was clearly not entrapped by the mystique of logical
positivism and

contended that ideals operated as "a valuable

guj.de

and spur to a more

human society."
The problem then is this:

What participation can be expected and

fostered, practically, under the conditions of advanced industrial

society?

This is Bachrach' s consideration, and it sounds pretty much

like Dahl's, excepting Bachrach 's expressed concern that participation

allow self-development.

Like Dahl, Bachrach felt classical theory fell

short, in underscoring the importance of widespread participation in

political decision-making, by offering no realistic guidelines as to how
33

its prescription is to be filled in large urban societies.

Also,

Bachrach will take into account the apparent necessity for some decisions
to be made by technical and professional officials at the central level

33

Ibid., p. 99. It is relevant to note here the large qualification
Bachrach builds into iiis case when he fairly conclusively agrees with the
democratic elite theorists argument: "The main thrust of the elitist
argument is incontestable. However, although participation in key
political decisions on the national level must remain extremely limited,
is there any sound reason, within the context of democratic theory, why
participation in political decisions by the constituencies of "private"
bureaucratic institutions of power could not be widely extended on
those issues which primarily affect their lives within these institutions?" p. 95. Dewey's argument was that participation locally would
enable the individual to see broader issues more intelligently, in more
coherent ways by the experience of participation, and, therefore, it
could reasonably be expected that voting decisions on wider issues would
be more considered and judicious. Bachrach is not responsive to the
force of this argument.
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of government.

Bachrach's solution to his problem of participation is

the encouraKement of varied forms of participation in the
local setting:

The crucial issue of democracy is not the; composition of
the elite..., Iniitead the issue is whether democracycan diffuse power sufficiently throup;hout society to
inculcate among people of all walJcs of life a justifiable
feelinp; that they have the power to participate in
decisions which affect themselves and the common life of
the community, especially the immediate community in
whi.ch they v/ork and spend most of their waking hours and
energy. Of course, "key governmental decisions" must be
made by a few, but this is no reason why we should settle
for a criterion for democracy which provides no guidelines to combat a rapid concentration of power outside
this narrow sphere of decision-making,^'^
The cliief features of Bachrach's case for par'ticipati.on can be

suggested as follows:
1.
oi'

Hi.s

theory of a democracy of participation embodies

"interest-in-the-proct-ss"

concept.

— tiiat

a concept

is, it entails, a self-development

Baohrach is concerned with the effects of participation ior

individuals.

That it is valued and works, ho points out, is the

evidence of psychology.

His references

ai'e

Erie Fromm, and A. H. Maslow among others.

to the wor'ks of Kurt Lf;win,
He contends that it was

this feature that was central to the idea of democracy in the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, as it was maintained as the buttress to the

corruptibility of political, economi.c, and social institutions.
It embodies a concept of "interest-in-end-results

2.

.

"

Bachrach's

claim here is that the society which is participatory will more likely
be the stabilized society by strengthening the mental capacities of all
36
conduct.
indi.viduals and, therefore, have a positive efftct in shaping

•

—

3ir~
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., pp. 98-99.

36
Ibid., pp.

106.
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This, to me, is a strong
argument that is overlooked by
the democratic
elite theorists.
3.

It is a "decentralized" notion
of participation-that is, it

recommends expanding participation to
subsystems in the society.

Where

it once occurrec in places like
the New England town meeting,
participa-

tion would now develop in places like
the corporation, the factory, the
office, the enterprise, the trade union,
the ch-orch, the school, and so

forth-places close to the everyday life of the
majority of individuals.^"^
On this point, Dahl in merJhe_Reyo]^^
some agreement with Bachrach.

has shifted to a position of

(In aside, it should be pointed out
that

Bachrach does not suggest what sort of relationship
would prevail between

centralized corporations and centralized government,

aiid

this is a

domin

of inquiry that an adequate social theory cannot
ignore.)
ii.

Participation will involve people in "those issues wldch
primarily

affect their lives."

In making it possible for people to become involved

in issues that they can relate to, the indifference of the
lower class
that Dahl's theory concedes to can be overcome.

Bachrach expresses his

thoughts in this passage:
For many individuals political issues and elections appear
either trivial or remote and beyond the reach of their
influence. Of a different magnitude are issues which
directly affect them in their place of work, issues which
are comparatively trivial, yet are overlaid vrLth tensions
and emotions that often infuriate and try men's souls.
It is here despite the legitimizing effects of bureaucratic forms that the ugliness of man's domination of
man is fully revealed, and it is here, consequently, tnat
democracy must become established and put to use. I am
not suggesting that the average worker, for example, if
given the opportunity to share in the making of factory
decisions, would be magically transformed,
the fasrdon

—

—

m

37

Ibid., p. 96.
38
Ibid., p. 95'.

—

)
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of Rousseau's coimnon man, from an unimaginative,
oarochial
selfish human being to a broadminded, intelligent',
public-'
spirited citizen. I am saying that political education
is
most e ffect ive _on_a _ley_el wh ich challen ^ es theTKdUidu,^
l2.-££iS?ll£_^oPiiat3^el^ in_the_ solution^'of concfete~^bIems
affectin g himself and his immediate co.7irauni ty.
(Emphasis
added.
This is a particularly characteristic arguraent of the
radical-liberal

perspective,
Bachrach does not explore the problems that would arise in

5.

reorganizing the internal structure of the workplace, for instance, or,
more broadly, the political problems that would arise from a public

policy proposal for this objective.

Bachrach suffices with reference

to the British experiences in nationalizing industry and believes they
ho
indicate the possibility of such reorganization.
Bachrach, further, recognizes "that participation vjill not
hi
necessarily in all cases lead to salutary results,"
He has most clearly
6.

in mind the possibility of instances of manipulation and pressures toward

conformity, instances that would subvert the meaningfulness of the partic-

ipatory form.

This possibility does not undermine the value of partici-

pation but does call for, he contends, careful consideration and empirical

research on two questions:

(l)

Under what concrete conditions will man's

capacities be developed and under what conditions will development be

frustrated?

(2) How

will democratic theory provide the developmental

conditions?

39

Ibid., p. 103.
i;0

Ibid., p. 96,
i;l

Ibid., p. 101, the note,
h2

Ibid,, p. 101. Tentatively, he suggests "that beneficial results
from participation can best be assured if two conditions are present:
capable
(1) That the participants are roughly equal in the power they are
interests
diverse
of exerting in the decision-making process, (b) that
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One argument, I beUeve,
Bachraoh r^.aes is the feature
of decentralized participation which
Dewey compelUngly argued and
which I
have previo^ly noted. That
is, that in participating
in areas close
to one-s life experience a
transfer effect can be expected
in terms of
one's ability to see wider
problems in more ordered, comprehensive,
and
complex ways. Central to Rousseau's,
Green's, and Dewey's concept of
self Is the notion of interests
that the participating individual
developsthat the person more reflectively
deliberates about his own interests
in
terms of the interests of the whole
society.

Power_a£d_Poyert2 retreated from the concept
of developmental

participation set out in

Tl,e

Theory of Democ rali^JVH^.

An essay in

1971, however, "Interest, Participation and Democratic
Theory," suggested

a reconsideration of the conception that
emerged in Power and Povertv
~
^2
and some of his reservations about it.
I shall try to suggest the

—

—

forms of participation that Pow er and P overtjr
defined, point out particu-

larly the problem of cooptive participation that the
authors took note of,
and then indicate his subsequent revisions expressed
in the 1971 paper.

Power and Poverty is a case study of participation in
Baltimore,
Maryland, for the years 1965 to 1968, particularly as it formed
under
the impact of the federal War on Poverty program.

Part

I

of the study

derives a model for political analysis from the concept of nondecisionmaking.

This model assumes dichotomous groupings in a community:

are represented vathin the participating group.
sufficient, however.

These are probably in-

Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory,"
prepared for delivery to American Society for Political and Legal
Philosophy, December 1971, New York City.
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Persons and groups co^itted to
existing values and (2) persons
and
groups seeking a reallocation
of values.
Both groups are a ss^^ed to
have variable sources of power
to draw upon; these were
classified as:
Resources
(1)
(status, assets, members, organization,
ideology, interest),
(2) priority (time preference, costs),
(3) strategy (decisions and non(1)

decisions), (U) interaction (alliance,
cooperation, conflict).

Part II

reviewed the status of blacks in
Baltimore to 1965 and, then, evaluated
the political changes in their
status as a result of events and
organi-

zational efforts (by governmental agencies
and by moderating and militant
black leaders, and by the poor black
population at large. Some conclusions
should be indicated briefly; first, importance
was given to the role of

federal programs and funding for bringing blacks
into sharing in policymaking; the "mobilization of bias" was shifted
out of nondecision-making
arenas into the open decision-making arenas;
and an important part of the

program was the "doctrine of legitimacy" that the
"maximum feasible
participation" clause provided the poor.

Problems, nevertheless,

remained in Baltimore, and were expressed in the forms of racism,
internal
divisions among blacks, and cutbacks in federal programming with the

beginning of the Nixon Administration.
The interesting aspect of the study for our purposes is the foms of

participation that that work identifies.

The authors suggest at least

three typical meanings for citizen participation, according to conven-

tional federal legislative and administrative usage:
democracy,

(1) Grass roots

(2) collaboration (the implication here is that the poor take

an active part in decisions about the types and characteristics of the

inr
Power and Poverty , pp. 100-102,

nh
services made), and (3) involvement
in the delivery of services
for the
poor.
The authors of the background
paper that provide tMs definition
suggest that how widely the concept
should be construed "will hinge
upon
the goals that citizen participation
is intended to achieve.^^
Participation becomes, according to this
account, a form of political action.
Its

function is to reallocate values, and
it is distinguished by being action
of ordinary individuals, not of
-officials or elites.
Its sco£e would be
more than merely a few citizens employed
in delivery of services or
sitting as representatives on a policy-making
board.

It might also in-

clude voting, petitioning for a redress of
grievances, demonstrating, and

participation in the formulation and implementation
of policies v/ithin

political groups and organizations.
The term "participation" has in the paradigm
cases suggested here
lost its self-developmental criteria and becomes so
loose that practically

any form of political behavior can be entailed by it.

The explanation,

I

believe, must be seen as part of the lack of clarity in the
basic decision-

making/nondecision-making model Bachrach and Earatz employ.

In viewing

political action in terms of its position for "allocating values," the
central problem of "interests" is lost and with it the notion that an

individual participates not around demands, as presupposed wants or
preferences, but becomes more reflective about them.

Bachrach is follow-

ing Dahl here, for participation in this model pertains to involvement

on behalf of the existing structure of interests.

hS

See Appendix E, by Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz, and Margaret
Levi, "The Political Significance of Citizen Participation, " Power and
Poverty , pp. 201-202.
hi
Ibid., p. 20U.
hi
Ibid., pp. 203-20I4.
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A« examination of the concept
of "intere=ta"

^11

help to rrte the

point.

Balbus in his article "The
Concept of Interest in Pluralist
and
Marian Analysis" shows the ambiguity
that results because Bachrach
and
Barat. fail to consider "interests"
as having an "objective"
(or socially,
constituted) aspect as well as a
"subjective" aspect. Balbus points
out
that the Bachrach-Baratz model is
i»anently Marxist in that it "assumes
for heuristic purposes that society
may be defined in terms of a

domination-subjection relationship and that this
domination-subjection
relationship is the motor of change."

But Balbus goes on to show that

even though the Mai^ist-type concept of
"interests" is imbedded in the
model, it^is only suggested "briefly" and
"perhaps without fully realiz-

ing it."

He suggests that the criterion for
class membership (i.e.,

those seeking "reallocation of values" and
"those committed to existing
values") is far too vague to provide the basis
for a satisfactory class
analysis.

The compelling argument is that any adequate
social theory

must recognize both sorts of "interests," subjective and
objective.
Balbus, drawing on Flathman's The Public Interest

,

provides the following

explanation:
...although everyone agrees that subjective interests will
in part determine a man's behavior, and that a focus on
subjective interests is therefore essential for behavioral
political theory, a sole focus on subjective interests
ignores the social fact which our ordinary language recognizes that "it is precisely the presence of 'objective
interests' which prompts the emergence of subjective
awareness, i.e., than an individual's subjective interests

TB
Balbus',

op. cit ., p. 17ii.

Ibid., pp. 17U-175.
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^

detennined by the way in which
his
''''''''
Objective
coSlSrnr' To%T''r.'^
conaixions.
To rely solely on subjective
interest
to Ignore the prior and
decisive problem of the
"conversxon;. of objective
interest to subjective
interests, i.e., the development
of consciousness a
phenomeggn which any adeq^te
political theory cinnot

lifflt

As Professor Connolly presents
the case:

"Any view which anchors interest

exclusively in felt bei^vioral
tendencies runs the risk of
celebrating
uncritically those inclinations
cultivated by dominant socialization
processes while deflecting conceptual
attention from possible gratifying
modes of existence bypassed by those
same processes."^' It is to
neglect
the chance of discovering
unarticulated but simering "troubles"
beneath
the surface of public policy
discussion, and it is, as Kaufman and
Karcuse suggests, therefore, necessary
to identify processes which
"winnow and shape" wants.
In "Interest, Participation, and Democratic
Theory" Bachrach acknowl-

edges the benefit of this critique and
suggests a revised conception of

participation.

The emphasis is on that aspect of participation
that offers

"an essential means for the individual to discover
hds wants through the

interviewing discovery of himself as a social human
being."

52
He defines

democratic participation as "the process inwhicn persons
formulate,
discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them
and directly

affect their lives.

It is a process that is more or less continuous,

conducted on a face to face basis in which participants have roughly
an

50
Ibid., p. 153.

51

William E. Connolly, "On Interests In Politics," Politics and
Society, Summer 1972, p. U71.
"Interests...," op. cit ., pp. 2-3.
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equal say in all stages, fro™
formulation of issues to the
deterndnation
Of policies."
But he reiterates his earlier
beHef that there is no
escaping the fact that democratic
participation can only function on
a
«ide scale within a majoritarian
representative framework. He now
regards as nonexai^ples of participation:
Demonstrations, sit-ins, confrontations, pressure group bargaining,
voting, speecnmaking, campaigning,
and such sindlar activities, for
none of these allow the opportunity
for
the individuals to engage in the
decision-making processes on a regular
and face-to-face basis.

Before concluding this section,

I

want to note Bachrach's attention

to the perverted form of participation
that McConnell and Lowi so clearly

identified:

Cooptive participation.

Bachrach defined participation as

"cooptive" in nature when the activities of
non-elites in decision-making

and policy-implementation are channeled toward the
preconceived goals of
higher authorities."

In the case of the community action programs
and

the effort to alleviate poverty and expand political
roles in Baltimore,

cooptation was recognized as a major tactic of the established
groups.

Kaufman sketches an analysis of the structure of cooptive
participation,
and so I will consider it more critically at a later point.
The major difficulty for Bachrach in developing his approach to the

study of participation and nonparticipation in the community,

I

suggest,

is that it is limited to the attention of structural or organizational

tactics and material rewards and benefits.

It fails to draw upon the

significant argument of the Critique which emphasized the importance of

53

Ibid., p.

3.

Sh

Power and Poverty, pp. 206-207.
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what happened to the mental
capacities of the individuals for the

functioning of a democracy, and this
requires attention to the formation
of a sense of "interests" by the
participant that recognizes and reconciles both the social "good" and individual
need.

As Balbus suggests,

the concept of nondecisi on-making must
be expanded to include processes

by which wants are structurally determined
or else Bachrach and Baratz have
taken us no further than the pluralists.
In Bachrach'

s

account of participation, as it appears in the
nondecision-

making approach to the analysis of power, the concept
is too enlarged.

Its

paradigm cases are unlimited, encompassing it would
appear, most fonns of
political action for change.

The argujnent for an enriched conception of

participation as it is set out in Power and Poverty , misfires
because of
conceptual difficulties in Bachr-ach's theoretical framework.

My main

emphasis has been to suggest the problems with the concept of
"interest."
The inadequate treatment of nondecision-making is in large measure
a

function of the inadequate treatment of "interest" which underlies it,
for interest there means individual preferences, random and unstructured.

The emphasis on the subjective aspect of interests and not also its

objective aspect

vri.ll

necessarily have the effect of coopting efforts

at political change in the direction of established procedures, rules,

norms, and practices, and, if these undermine the development of all

individuals' capacities for growth, then a participation of self-

development is not generally realizable.

I

believe the inadequacy here

must be attributed to problems of epistemology, the attempt to satisfy

empirical criteria of the liberal-pluralist perspective while at the
same time also staking out a place for normative standards.

One aim

can not be reconciled, in the way Bachrach sought to do it, with the other.
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There is, we discover, a need to
treat "objective" interests
and
hov^the^_are_shaped, because this is
what will distinguish a developmental form of participation from
all other non-developmental
forms.
The liberal-pluralists (e.g., Dahl,
Verba and Nie, Wolfinger, and

Merelman) fail to recognize the role
of ideology in shaping the
nature
of par-ticipation. This feature Schatt
Schneider s mode], could not bring
•

out, and Eachrach was unsuccessful
in making it coherent in his own

connections between nondecision-making and
Kaufraan,

s clf -development

.

Arnold

by making use of Karcuse's approach,
makes explicit the

force of procesces for "winnowing and shaping"
peoples' wants in con-

temporary industrial society so that certain
justifiable claims are
never even thought of as matters for public
policy discussion.
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Kaufman's Account of Participation

Characteristic of the radical-liberal
approach is its effort to
bring into balance significant
insights of both liberalism and
socialism.
An important part of Kaufman's
attention, philosophically, has been
to
make points of convergence between J.
S. Mill and Marx, Madison
and
Rousseau, apparent and to resolve some
outstanding conflicts.

Kaufman's

interpretation proves to be a defense for
a particular version of liberal

democracy that is rooted in a theory of
fundamental human rights and

wMch

is tied to a theory of political
obligation not very dissimilar

to T, H, Green's.

The point raised in the discussion of Bachrach's
interpretation was

the importance, to an adequate theory of
participation, of the concept

of "interests."

Mainly noticed was Eachrach's failure to incorporate

a concept of "objective" interests into his framework
in an explicit way

with the result that the socialization processes could not
be critically
examined for the way they shaped individual preferences in any
policy
deliberation.

I suggested that

Kaufmn's work provides a more successful

consideration of this problem, and he does so with a theory of fundamental

human rights from which his justification of
derived.

a

participatory democracy is

So, I would like to begin by sketching the main lines of this

argument and then note his rebuttals to objections to participation on
grounds of human nature.

Finally, I will outline the general features

of his account of participation and indicate the special presumptions he
holds with regard to the participatory style for advanced industrial
society.

Kaufman's approach is the method of contrast and comparison

— of

seeing

how far liberalism might be pressed to meet the staridards of social justice
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that both liberalism, in certain of its
exponents, and Marxism enjoin.

He shared important elements of the pragmatic
perspective of Mead, James,
and Dewey.

These vxould include:

A confidance in the essential intelligence

of the human being, an emphasis on the social character
of the individual,
the assumption of the need to make theory context -relevant,
the objective

of seeking guides to conduct, the significance of experience
(will and
effort) for putting these guides into practice and for testing them,
and
a belief

m

the self-critical community of inquirers.

An important

feature of the pragmatic perspective, as Bernstein has drawn it in his

study Praxis and Ac tion, is its rejection of dogmatism and truth systems,
that no position or point of view has an exclusive hold on the truth, for
the view of inquiry is as a self-corrective process rather than of know56
ledge having a basic fixed foundation.
Kaufman's case for an expanded

and enriched conception of participation seems to be closely associated

with this conviction.

Kaufman was strongly critical of ma.ny contemporary forms of liberalism
in order to make clear what a morally adequate version of liberalism must
be.

He thus found it helpful to follow the lines of arguments of lib-

eralism's best critics.

In his essay "Democracy and the Paradox of V/ant-

Satisfaction" he began by considering some typical leftist criticisms of

liberalism's practices in the United States and Britain.

These include

Some of Kaufman's assumptions are set forth in his early article
on "The Nature and Function of Political Theory," Journal of Pliilosophy ,
51 (January 1951;) :5~22, and are also briefly discussed in Richard
Rodewald and Richard Wasserstrom' s article, "The Political Philosophy
of Arnold S. Kaufman," in "Arnold Kaufman Memori.al Issue," Social Theory
and Practice, 2 (Spring 1972).
56
Richard J. Bernstein, Praocis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Phdladelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1971), chap. III.
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the contentions that democracy
in advanced industrial
societies "far from
promoting liberty and^justice for
all, absolutely impedes the
struggle
for social Justice."
This criticism can be identified,
for example,
with Herbert Karcuse. The
com^^laint, reformulated, provides
a paradox:
"...democracy satisfied humn wants both
too little and too much."

Kaufman's claim is that the criticisms
joined in this paradox are
"compatible and valid." How is this
so?
A society-indeed, a democratic
society-has many devices whereby
it can give specific character to
peoples' objective interests.

The

analysis is carried out in terms of
concepts of wants, needs, and rights.

Society has two angles of approach to obtain
its given character.

It

works at the level of awareness of needs and
at the level of will.
"Tokenism," for instance, is the structure
which presupposes awareness of the justice of unmet political demands.

^)

8

Payoffs, just sufficient

to insure stability, are arranged through the use
of power.

It is made

feasible for one side, by fears of the loss of an
already meager command

of economic resources, the sense of defenselessness,
and the legitimizing
consequences of the democratic process itself.

Kaufman's claim is that

tokenism is an essential and not an adventitious vice of the political
system.

Democracy also undermines the will to struggle for justice through
60

the process of "cooptation. "

Ft

Cooptation, as a process by which one

—

Arnold S. Kaufman, "Democracy and the Paradox of Want-Satisfaction,"
Personalist , S2 (Spring 1971) 186-215.
FB
"Democracy. . ," pp. 188-200.
59
Ibid., pp. 188-192.
60
Ibid., pp. 200-205.
:

.

—

.
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person is induced through benefits
to identify with the values
and
programs of another, is the method
that relies on draining off
the
energies that would otherwise flow
from a more developed
self-concept
Kaufman sketches a common pattern of
cooptation under which a very
poor person joins with others to
secure what he, along with others,

regard as their right.

In view of the monumental effort
of the struggle

these gains become a source of symbolic
satisfaction to this personj the

elation of others with less personal
investment perhaps fades.

Kaufman

suggests that the chief feature here is that
the individual is not
broken, but adjusted.

Psychic dissonance is resolved by deep
internal

psychological mechanisms:

"As he slips deeper into the role of
political

realist, he becomes increasingly sensitive to
the charge that by advo-

cating full satisfaction of the right to a decent
vage he is being

irrational, ungrateful

,

an extremist .

Dissonance is resolved when all

semblence of sommitment to high ideals disappears."
wants have been changed in

a

61

The individual's

direction away from justice.

Democracy sustains the paradox of want-satisfaction also by the way
it enables the comfortable social conscience to form, and this is
the

critical argument.

Kaufman's thought is that:

"...the political process,

through the very efficiency by whj.ch it satisfies some demands, may help
shape and curtail peoples' wants so that many other just demands are
62

never made."

He contends, briefly, that needs that seek satisfaction

have "corresponding wants."

But the society also foists wants of its

5i

"Democracy...," p. 203. Important to the functioning of this
process, Kaufman suggests, are two patterns of argument the half-skew,
which unfairly devotes equal attention to the wrongs of those on both
sides of an issue, and the full-skew which carries the tendency one
step further and criticizes only the adversary, p. 20U.

—

62

Ibid., p. 205.
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own upon individuals, and
these are what Marcuse,
who. Kaufman is here
following, has identified as
..false" needs.
Satisfaction of these
diverts attention away fro™
the for^^tion of real
needs and corresponding
wants. Thus. .....peoples,
want patterns are shaped
and winnowed in ways
that Make the™ confor™ to the
functional prerequisites of
the existing
social structure...
Policy preference, fall i„ the
pernussible n.nge
Without most people ever being
aware of it. The paradig™
of the person
is under these conditions,
that of the
..slave.'

or .'happy pig...

Kaxd-nan suggests that if the
social structure is just, the
con-

sensus reached is "to that extent
morally sound.....Bat the fact that
the
social outcome has been achieved...
he writes. ..without much awareness

of deUberation-without fuller
play of human intelligence-makes the
process to that extent defective."

But the process must be character-

ized as "morally pernicious" to the
extent that the social structui^e is

hierarchical:

"Whether intentionally or, much more
likely, self-deceptively,

the processes by which patterns of wants
are shaped and winnowed not only
serve important interests of upper-groups,
but to a significant extent

destroy the prospects for a good life for almost
all people in the
society."

The significant point is that this repressive
process

supplants one set of human needs with another diversionary
set of wants,

and needs so fimdamental in requiring satisfaction that
they are also

appropriately identified as "rights" get lost in the picture.

Kaufman

identifies, then, on behalf of a strengthened version of liberalism,
some of the distorting processes that give shape to "objective"
interests
that permeate a specific society.

33~
"Democracy...," p. 206.
61;

Ibid., p. 207.
65

Idem.
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Kaufman's concern in rendering
accounts of these three processes
is
to show the lossage of ideals
democracy was supposed to serve
and which
were fundamental to democratic
practice..

There is neither a will nor
an

obligation on behalf of claims of
social Justicej social justice
is more
likely threatened not by any acts
against it but by acts of omission.
To
the extent that these fundamental
ideals are not acted upon, policy-

preferences lose their justification.

For, at their basis is the require-

ment that policy-preferences arise in
a free marketplace of ideas and
that they arise among members who generally
have sound moral views.

This

was an essential feature of Mill's theory.

This arg-oment, critical of the processes
that shape wants and will

in contemporary democracies, belongs to a theory
of human rights which
Kaufman develops in his essays, "Wants, Needs and
Liberalism," and "A
"^^
Sketch of a Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human
Rights.

In the first

essay he sets out a case for a theory of human rights
which draws upon a

convergence in

Mil

and Marx.

To summarize:

by Kaufman's interpretation of On Liberty

,

Mill was implicitly committed

to a theory of human needs j Mill

was a theory of human rights grounded in a conception of vital interests.

Mara was implicitly committed to a theory of human rights as well, despite
his dislike for moral

t ermj.nology.

That is, for instance, the only way

his formulation "from each according to his abilities, to each according
to his needs" might be understood— in terms of some normative concept

of social justice.

The interpretation sketched emphasizes the point that

Mill is closer to Marx than Bentham in his theory of needs j for later

5S
Arnold S. Kaufman, "V/ants, Needs and Liberalism," Inquiry ,
Hi (I97l):191-212j and "A Sketch of a Liberal Theory of J\mdamental
Human Rights," Monist, $2 (October 1968) 595-615.
:
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liberalism no longer sanctioned
just
any wants bnt
J CO dny
but became more
reflective
a.d considered about then,.
KilLs notion of autono™, or
individuality
involved also the consideration
that autono™, was so tasic
to interests
xn living the good life
that it was not enough for
this right to be
guaranteed; individuals fro™
earliest childhood should
be trained to
^'ant these rights.
What remained in conflict
between Mill and Mane was their
views of
the role of reason for bringing
about the Just society. While
Mill saw
reason as having a vital
function at every stage in the
development of a
person's distinctively human
powers, he lacked the imderstanding
of the
institutional causes of those social
evils which he so keenly
identified.
Marx, on the other hand, had
a fine comprehension of the
enormous extent
to w^iich social, and especially,
industrial institutions shape and
limit
individuals, prospects for the good
life.
But he seemed to suppose that
class awareness was all that was
sufficient to enable a person to become
as unalienated as social development
permitted. This is what Kaufman

identified elsewhere as the Principle of
the Sufficiency of Unalienated
Labor; he interpreted Marx to be saying
that the requisite forms of

political control would emerge naturally once
the problem of alienation
67

of labor had been solved.

The problem of Marx's analysis was that it

lead to a faith in the healing power of a
revolutionary consciousness.
Kaufman views this as "a source of much current
political self-indulgence
68

as well as of other forms of political unreason."

He concludes that

the line of argument Marcuse takes in the concept of
"autonomy" presciently

Arnold S. Kaufman, "On Alienation," Inquiry
68

"Wants...," p. 202.

,

8

(1965)

:li;l4-lii8.
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recorxUes the two issues Mill
and Max. pose.

Kauf„.„.s arg^ent here is
sketchy at best, for he does
not attempt to explore
Marcuse's analysis
even in broad terms. He simply
indicates that Marcuse represents
a

"broad and pervasive tendency
a^ong more thoughtful contemporary
Marxists,"
which include Markovic, Stonjanovic,
and Kolakowski among others.
Wl,at
is implied is that an autonomous
person will best be able to
conduct his

life as a moral agent-that is,
to be self-reflective about his
action in
relation to others and his community.

There was an important objection to
the idea of autonomy that Marcuse
proposed, for certain Marxist's claimed
that it moved away from the

commmial existence is one of the great
issues of our time.

His surmise

was that "only autonomous individuals are
creatively competent to resolve

these tensions in ways that promote a
morally sensible fit between communal

and individualistic ideals."

This seemed to be Rousseau's expectation

and aspiration as well.
His "Sketch of A Liberal Theory of Fundamental
Human Rights" provides
the justification for participation as a right derived
from the presump-

tive right of "respect for persons." Its ulterior purpose
was to promote
a "conception of human rights that requires more strenuous
political in-

volvement than most (individuals) are presently prepared even to
con70

template."

person.

It was not enough to be merely a "privately virtuous"

The point is that a liberal theory of rights implies obligation,

and Kaufman was concerned that people "see what they are obliged to do."
The object of his concern was especially the affluent middle class, for.
"59

"Wants..., pp. 203-20U.
70
"A Sketch...," p. 596.
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as distinct fro. a personal
morality, political .orallty
is "...typically
relevant to more remote and
impersonal consequences of our
actiona-to
Obligations towards those who,
though usually out of sight,
should not be
out of mind."

The

^tter comes down

to the problem of how to
develop autonomous

persons in a society that has
institutionalized practices running
at
cross-purposes. Marx's explanation
in terms of the Principle
of the

Sufficiency of Unalienated Labor is
doubted in favor of a more multifaceted strategy. As I interpret
him, Kaufman's reasomng is
that the
development of one's deliberative powers
is not only or mainly linked
to conditions of work.
(But he is also rejecting the
militant implications, as well as faith in working-class
consciousness.) Kaufman's
argument for encouraging a deliberative
participation in many settings
seems to rest on a recognition of the
individuals' general practice of

relating to many other aspects of life, aside
from work.

(Noticeably,

Kaufman is also rejecting the recommendation of
Marcuse of "The Great
Refusal," which he describes as curiously irrational
and absurd.)

We can gain a direct view of Kaufman's account in
his I960 essay,
"Human Nature^and Participatory Democracy," and his
overview written ten
years later.

disputed.

At the outset, major lines of the elite argument are

These are arguments that augment Bachrach»s nicely because

of their selected focus on views of human nature and will be
noted

briefly:

Lippman, for instance, is representative of those who argue

1.

71
Ibid., p. 603.
72

Published together in Bias of Pluralism , pp. 178-212.
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that while human weaknesses are
statistically inevitable, any
particular
person's weaknesses are largely remedial.
The major institutional device he recommends for reforming
the social ills that he diagnoses
is

that of transforming educational
practices.

Kaufman claims that this

is a typical liberal resort which
imposes an intolerable expectation on

the schools in view of the fact that
they are inextricably coimected to

the social^ills they are supposed to remedy.

It remains an insufficient

solution.
2.

The psychological argument, and to which
the religious one

(e.g., Niebuhr's) is connected, presupposes
that

trusted.

huirian

beings cannot be

Kaufman suggests that the empirical literature is not
unified

on this clarim, and that Freud himself was tentative
on the matter.

While there are divergent interpretations of Freud's
claims— say, between

Klein and Fromm— the theories have substantially the same
implications:
"These implications, while they support the case for a form of
democratic

organization which protects and stabilizes, in no way rule out the case
for a democracy of participation, though they surely weaken some of the

power for good v;hich some may be inclined to attribute to it."
3.

Then there are arguments that human beings are constitutionally

lacking in intelligence.

Kaufman supplies five arguments; siiffice it to

say, he is contending that the intelligence quotient implies little

about political responsibility and virtue.

Nor is such a claim alert

to the relationship between environment and intelligence and that,

indeed, participation ma.y be an "important if not indispensable" condi-

tion for individuals to develop fully their capacities.

73

"Human Nature...," pp. 179-180.
Ibid., pp. 180-185, for quote, pp. l83-l8ii.
75

Ibid., pp. 185-186.
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Finally, the most extreme view would
be that human beings are
essentially irrational; Schumpeter, who
many important analyses follow,
l4.

is indicative.

Schumpeter 's case, it is contended,
fails to draw the

important distinction between the varied
functions of democratic formswhat can be done to individuals as well
as what can be done for them. He
fails to recognize the

fuJ.l

significance of his own admission, that
"only

when men acquire direct responsibility for
a certain range of decisions
that social imagination breaks through its
parochial barriers and en-

visions larger possibilities."

Drawing upon those essays and on some of his
other writings,

I

want

to suggest now the characteristic featu.res of
Kaufman's case for a par-

ticipatory democracy.
1.

He has suggested as a starting point for empirical
work a

definition of participation as embracing "actual preliminary
deliberation
(conversations, debate, discussion) and that in the final decision
each
77

participant has a roughly equal formal say."
2.

His theory involves bringing into balance a politics of counter-

vailing power (the Madisonian system) and a politics of participation
78

(the Rousseauan model).

Democracy's forms have several functions, and

in this view Kaufman's radical-liberal approach represents a modification
of a straight Rousseauan theory of participatory democracy.
3.

Participation should be encouraged in settings which directly

affect one's life, for this is what will allow as he expresses it,
"the social imagination to break through."

It is not enough, as

Ibid., pp. 186-190, for quote, p. 189.
77

Ibid., p. 192.
78

Radical Liberal , pp. 60-67.
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Schu..peter supposed for participation,
that a person's sphere of
activity

be confined to the home.

Possible settings would include
the workplace.

But more significant and strongly
stressed is a fuller style of
electoral

participation that would include the
development of a "new politicsthrough coalition-building around
issues/^ Also important was partici-

pation in community associations and
local political movements.

As

well, Kaufman expressed concern. for
political education and the importance
ol

of keeping the universities free.
k.

The principle of participation may have
to be modified for any

of a number of reasons.

participation.

So Kaufman is not recommending unqualified

He is, for instance, willing to subscribe
to a "decentra-

lized" view of participation, with Bachrach, but
not without some additional

qualifications.

For instance, it is possible that a decentralized
parti-

cipation can become tyrannical, as McConnell and Lowi
emphasized.

He

suggested that the principle of participation m^y have to be
modified for
any number of the following reasons:

The dangers of municipal tyranny,

the effort to make expanded participation more defensible, and the
82

existence of unequally distributed wealth and revenues.
5.

He maintained that the participatory society would allow both

the superior and the subordinate to benefit, and hoped that this would

provide one of the arguments for opening up administrative practices.
83

He was not convinced that this was a likely prospect however.

79

Ibid., chap.

80
Ibid., chap. 6.
81

Ibid., chap. 7.
82

"...Ten Years Later," p. 206.
83

"On Alieaation," pp. 153 -15U.
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The participatory society
6.
does not require a life of
frantic
activism, such as Dahl tried to
suggest of the radical case.
It does
i^ly a life brought into a balance shaped
by particular social circumstances.
For the comfortable liberal it
implied further reflection
and commitment to action. A
'.politics of radical pressure"
was required
to overcome a habit of role-playing
and adoption of the official
point
of view.
7.

From preceding discussion of his theory
of fundamental human

rights, it should become clear that
Kaufman has also contributed an

additional element to the contemporary case
and which was central to
the classical meaning.

Participation now becomes "informed action."

That is one of its requirements.

People should be enabled to see that

the reason they participate is to achieve and
protect conditions of

autonomy and relations of "respect for persons."

Only in this way might

considerations of policy and selections of delegates emerge
as freely

and unstructured as necessary constraints allowed,
8.

A "Paradox of Participation" must be allov/ed.

The notion re-

flects on the problems of political activism in the 1960's.
it in this way:

He phrased

"Participation must begin by being unsuccessful if it

is to fulfill its principal functions.

For, by hypothesis, participation

is typically an essential condition of making men competent and responsible.
But individuals who are incompetent and irresponsible will not make good

decisions.

They will be neither effective nor wise.

Therefore, before

participatory decisions can become sound, they will be unsound

—

'm

"A Sketch,,.," pp. 603 -60U.
85

"Human Nature...," p. 206,

— necessarily."

•

193
This is a more cautious,
pragmatic consideration that
avoids defeatist
Views, and it ta.es into
account what radical theories
of participation
railed to acknowledge - that
even within participating
arrangements there
is a place for leadership
and representation.

Lastly, Kaufman advocates the
application of the practical maxim
of William James to guide
conduct. The maxim holds,
Kaufman suggests,
"making the effort to achieve
a possible good depends on
our belief il
the possibility of that achievement."
For, he contends, "the very
nerve
of our effort to^achieve a good
may be cut by premature admission
of its
impossibility...
The maxim thus makes possible
a politics of persistent
9.

moral effort, a politics which Kaufman
terms "radical pressure."
The radical liberal perspective,
which is grounded in a commitment
to authentic human ideals, has enabled
Kaufman to suggest an enriched

conception of participation appropriate to
the conditions of advanced

industrial society.

It is true some accommodations have been
made in this

conception that are not found perhaps in the theory
of Rousseau.

Kaufman

has brought together and framed a synthesis of
the Rousseauan model of a

participatory society with the requisites of a
representative political
process for a large and highly populated country, the
Madisonian model.
But the concern is not chiefly for the most effective,
or most economical,

or most efficient decision process as it is with Dahl and
other liberal-

pluralists.

Kaufman's case rests on the assessment of the value of

development of the self, autonomy, against the case for denying it, and
he conclusively argues in favor of the value of self -development in
the

long run.

—

~E6

"Human Nature...," pp. 206-211.
87

"Human Nature...," p. 19U.
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Conclusion

A summary and assessment to this
point is in order.
The examination of the ideas
of Bachrach and Kaufman, who
frame the
radical liberal perspective, has
provided the contemporary justification
for an enriched concept of
participation in advanced industrial
society.
The emphasis has returned once
again to the recognition of the
classical

democratic value of self-development, the
person is now seen as possessing cognitive and affective capacities
for moral conduct.
The conditions
requisite for promoting this development then
come into focus.

And also

brought into focus are the social forces,
snd particularly the forces

acting on human consciousness, limiting this
development.

nificantly relies on Marcuse's argument to make
this point.

Kaufman sigBut is not

clear that Kaufman has entirely escaped the problem
which was identified

in my discussion of Bachrach's interpretation— that
is, the problem of
how objective interests are formed.

One important criticism of Kaufman's

interpretation has been that he has not fully escaped the problem of
the

way needs (want-satisfactions) are defined by dominant social interests;
he does not work completely with a self-realization model of the
individual.

Perhaps thds, if it is a limitation, can be overcome, if we note

Kaufman's relationship to the analysis of Marcuse.

It is interesting ttet

he turns to Marcuse 's account and emphasis on the "winnowing and shaping"

processes of society, but he also rejects as inadequate and unserious

Marcuse 's strategy for change, the notion of the Great Refusal, and views

any moral theory of the individual as lacking.

It is clear that Kaufman

finds unsatisfactory the more militant recommendations for change.

This

—

m

Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman on Alienation," Inquiry ,
10:208-210.
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is the substance of the
criticism of Christopher Lasch,
for instance.''

.

He responds to the revolutionary
view of some Marxists as simply
"selfindulgent." In terms of the
Marcusean argument that reform from
within
becomes "cooptive," Kaufman and
Bachrach both respond that a structure
of
"cooptation" still allows the subordinate
individual or group leverage.

Particularly, the situation of frustration
may provoke deeper analysis
and a more adequate understanding of
the social forces affecting certain
groups.
Cooptation may lead to cjTiicism, but it
may also have some

positive consequences for increasing
self-awareness.

Aside from this

point, Kaufman believes that any advance
that can be achieved in social
90
welfare warrants the risk, even of cooptation.

One other interpretation, finally, needs to be
addressed before
the fuller case for an expanded pai^ticipation
in advanced industrial

society can be set out.

The next chapter will be an examination of the

philosophy of Marcuse and will begin to construct a theory
of repressive
participation as a contrast model to the dominant concept of
participation.
The focus on Marcuse 's theory of repressive society will
allow us the

possibility of identifying a key factor for structuring advanced industrial society

— language

development.

^9
Christopher Lasch, The A>on y of the American Left , pp. 190-191;
90

Radical Liberal , p. 387.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE RADICAL INTJiKPRETATION:

HERBERT MARCUSE'S THEORY OF
REPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION
Introduction
^

Of tho political and social theorists
under consideration in this
study, the one with the most radical
analysis and the most revol.utionary

implications is that of Herbert I^arcuse.

Unlike the previously reviewed

theorists Marcuse's writings constitute
a highly developed and compleoc

philosophdc corpus.
years.

His work spans, formidably, now a
period of forty

This corpus contai.ns more fully developed
and proficient analysis

than many of Marcuse's critics seem to be aware
of or are willing to make
the effort to understand.

Some of his most frequently cited pieces (e.g.,

^I-^IL^ll^I'J^JP^^n)

are the least well articulated at the Philo-

sophic leve], and, therefore, do not give us a strong
point of reference.
Thus, to fail to examine his longer works and some
earlier essays in

Negations misses the importance,

I

believe, of Marcuse's contribution to

an insightful and productive, albeit provocative,
interpretation of

contemporary social and political life.
Chief influences on I'fercuse's work are Hegel,

^^arx,

and Freud.

In

many ways his writings are an apparent synthesis of major elements in
each of these thinkers' work juxtaposed to social realities as he observed
them, a selective synthesis.

For his analysis of the structure of

dominant interests in the United States, Marcuse is indebted to C. Wright
Mills and he acknowledges the contribution to a lesser extent of Vance

Packard and

P'red

Cook.

Also influential in other ways are several German

.
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writers who are generally unfamiliar
to students in the United
States.
Particularly important are the views
on language taken by Kark Kraus
and the theory of institutions of
Arnold Gehlen. The work of Kraus,
who
figures in l^gensteii^J^^^
and George Orwell on distorted
language
is of major ird^luence on the
direction of analysis in

Onejimensi^

Given this melange of influences on
Marcuse, it is mistaken to read
Marcuse as a Marxist in any purist sense.
Surely, he does not offer a

political philosophy according to the
conventional treatment of problems
of state, authority, and legality and the
appropriateness of particular
forms.

Yet, he is not the darling of strict
Marxists either.

The cliief

feature of his work is its claimed "critical"
character, a critical

examination of social forms as they are interrelated
in advanced industrial
society.

His interpretation lies with the early Marx,
which has exponents

in a growing number of interpreters of that period (e.g.,
Meszaros,
Oilman, Petrovik),

In the "critical model" many see limitations for constructing and
making credible in a non-utopian sense a new social arrangement.

Perhaps

it is so that the structure of society Marcuse envisions is not specified
as some particular form of socialism; yet, he does offer what he sees as

suitable guidelines or criteria.

He indicates tools for analysis and
2

criteria for deciding courses of action.

1

If one reflects on the fatalism common to these important influences, including Freud, it is not surprising to find the extent to
which Ifercuse's own negativist position is a reflection of that. Undergirding each of these theorists is a frustration vd.th the failure of
events to turn out as they hoped, the sense of human pov/erlessness
against the larger inhuman forges. This is a position that is, however,
usefully ameliorated and transcended by the radical-liberals who bring
the cautious optimism of William James* "will to believe" to the
existential experience.
2

This is achieved in "the power of negation" (as the negation of
negation) and in the positive principles of nature and aesthetics.
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The particular significance of
Marcuse's work,

.

I

believe, can bo

best indicated throueh a distinction
between the focus of Marx and the
focus of Marcuse whereas Marx
raised to historical coenizar.ce the
relationship between raaterial forces
(specifically, the capitalist mode

of production) and the quality of
existence (alienation), Marcuse draws
to our attention a connection between
the form of existence and how we

comprehend it mentally and instinctually and
what this means for praxis,
putting thought into action.

This is the question of the character
and

function of philosophy, science, culture, and
ideology-the symbolic
forces for the integration of society and the
essential components of a

technological society.

Marcuse reveals these not as mere superstructure

according to (some) Marxist interpretation or as apologists
would have
us believe as neutral forces, but in their forms
under capitalist struc-

ture, more coercive and repressive than necesssiry, tald.ng
over more

subtle forms.

Philosophy, science, cultiu-e, and ideology form a

problem, the problem of "technological rationalj.ty," of immense importance
if change toward a more humane and rational society is to be considered

possible at ell.

That future society depends on the capacity of critique,

joined at a very instinctual level (critique revealing false needs, thus,

making possj.ble the reconstruction of the individual in terms of real
needs), to overcome overwhelming resistance by the dominanting force of

"technological rationality."
"Critical theory" has the purpose of niaking manifest this important

connection between human existence and the forms by which it is

Kai Nielsen, for instance, is satisfied that Marcuse offers criteria on
which to base moral action in his essay "On the Choice Between Reform
and Revolution," pp. 17-3'1, esp. pp. ii8-h9, in Held, Nielsen, and
Parsons, eds,, Phi loso ph y and Po litical A ction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19727T
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comprehended and acted upon.

In this understanding, the
sophistical

question of whether Marcuso is a
pre- or post-Marxist is laid
to rest/
Marcuse-s review of German idealism's
treatment of the problem of the

dialectic of the urdversal and the
particular in Countej^'.eyomio.i.and

Revolt makes this clear:
But it is only the Marxian conception
which, while
preserving the critical, transcendent
element of
Idealism, uncovers the piaterial,
historical ground
for the reconciliation of human
freedom and natural
necessity; subjective and objective
freedom. This
union presupposes liberation; the
revolutionary
praxis which is to abolish the institutions
of
capitalism and to replace them by socialist
institutions and relationships,

Marcuse, distinguishing his own position,
continues:
But in the transition, the emancipation of
the senses
must accompany the emancipation of consciousness,
thus
involving the totality of hujnan existence. The
individuals themselves must change in their very
instincts
and sensibilities if they are to build, in
association,
a qualitatively different society.^

My effort in the following pages is simply one of trying
to present
the work of Marcuse in a comprehensive (even if reductivist)
form

according to his declared and apparent purposes so that his efforts
take
on the significance that his more abstract statements sometimes
obscure.
The effort will be geared to, first, delineating his critical method

vMch

is generally unfamiliar to American social scientists and is the

reason for much misunderstanding of what he is trying to say.

I

will

then tui'n to an examination of his theory of repressive society, what

3

Alasdain Maclntyre, Herbert Marcuse; An Exposition and a Polemic
(New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 19.
h
Herbert Marcuse, Count err'e volution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1972), pp. 73-7ii.
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its features are and how it came
about, in order to prepare
the foundation for a construction of a theory
of repressive participation.
If
.

much of what passes in the American
poHtical process for participation
is really repressive, what is the
prospect for true, meaningful parti-

cipation?

We will, then, need to consider
next Marcuse's answer in the

"Great Refusal," which recognizes the
tendency of even progressive move-

ments to turn into their opposite to the
degree to which they accept the
rules of the game.

Only under another socio-economc condition,
one

which resembles very much a modernized
Rousseauan world, can true participation occur as a pattern of social action among
self -developed and
free human beings.
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Marcuse's Critical Theory
What is "critical theorv''"'
oaeory.

Wh^t
u.t
wfiat is its philosophic
basis?

How

does it distinguish itself?

Those identified vdth the
Institute for Social Research
in
Frankfurt, founded in 1923, refer
to their framework as
"the critical
theory of society.- The approach,
it appears, has been n,orc
successfully developed in the European
than the American setting. l>,uch
important writing rez^ins to be
translated from the Ger«n, and
a systematic survey of the work of the
school is not here available
to my
knowledge,
"Critical" refers specifically to the
critique of political

economy which conotitutes the core of
Marx's efforts.^

The thrust of

the approach follows from the concept of
historical change and the
relationship of historically changing social
structures to conceptions
about them.

An emphasis on this point, however, directs
the critical

school away from Marxists who claim to be more
true to Marx (e.g.,
Maclntyre) in terms of accepting the role of labor
(material necessity)

in the conception of revolution.

This proposition also separates the

Martin Jay, The Dialectic al IjnaFjjTatjjan - A History of The
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research
1923-1950
(Boston:
Little Brown, 1973). This study is the first to become
available.
6

William Leiss, "The Critical Theory of Society; Present Situation
and Futui-e Tasks" in Paul Breines, ed., Critical Interruptions - New
Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse (New York:
Herder and Herder '
1970), p. 76.
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school fro. "traditional theory"
which has failed to transcend
its early
reason for adopting the scientific
(positivist and relativist) and
objectivist status in its theory of
knowledge. Traditional theory,

philosophically, according to the critical
school, separates its
knowledge from guiding purposes through
its method of study. "Failure"
to make this analytic separation
on the part of the critical
school is

neither arbitrary nor extraneous but
necessary, according to the argument, in terms of the purpose of
philosophy. Theory should not only be
able to delineate the existing pattern
of social relations but reveal
the present historical possibilities,
either for the direction of a

transition^to a more humane society or in the
direction of increased
barbarism.
be rejected.

To do this the "scientific" character of
theory is not to
But scientific theory must be enlightened
with critical/

normative views-that is, with a purposeful goal
whose content must be
spelled out.

The vocabulary of "freedom and happiness" and
human needs,

biological and aesthetic, have served this function in
Marcuse's writings.
Critique of empiricism, liberalism, and pluralism must
flow from this
view.

According to an analysis by Albrecht Wellmer in The Critical

Theory of Society

,

this "mediating" approach transcends the social and

ideological limitations of behaviorist social science and the intersubjective approach of the position articulated by Peter Winch in The
Idea of A Social Science (the study of subjectively intended contexts

7

Ibid., p. 79.
8

See, for instance. Negations - Essays in Critical Theory (trans.
Jeremy J. Shapiro) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), chap. 3j and One
Dimensional Ma n - Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society
(Boston:
Beacon Press, 196ii), chaps, h and 5.
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9

of meaning).

These latter approaches are
useless

fr™

the perspective

of ideology-critique for changing
society and bringing about
the emancipation of men; for they are unable
to deal vrith the tension between
the "is" and the "ought."
What, then, are the sources for
an understanding of real
possibilities
according to the critical school's
account? The answer lies in the
school'

characteristic view of history and consciousness.

The error of idealism

is that it separates the realm of
ideas from condxtions in which they

develop, necessitating abandonment of
the human condition in its

struggle for justice, freedom, and happiness
to another, unreal world.

Marcuse observes:
To the extent that philosophy has nevertheless
made its
peace with man's determination of economic
conditions,
It has allied itself with repression. That
is the bad
materialism that underlies the edifice of idealism:
The
consolation that in the material world everything is
in
order as it is.... The other premise of this
materialism
is that the mind is not to make its demands in this
world,
but is to orient itself toward another realm that
does not
conflict with the material world.^*^

Or,

In idealism the individual protests the world by making
both himself and the world free and rational in the
realm of thought. This philosophy is in an essential
sense individualistic.
The critical school claims to be materialist, as opposed to idealist, in

the sense that concrete historical experience embodies what is possible,
what is connected to social experience.

Another passage indicates what

9

Allbrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (trans. John Curmning)
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 31-3i4.
10
Herbert Marcuse, "Ph.ilosophy and Critical Theory" in Negat ions,
p. 153.
11
Ibid., p. Ii40.
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Marcuse means here:
To be sure, even the highest
philosophical categories are

withTh^rosr
general fact that the struggle of
ge~1ac\'\\aTtf
man vd.th nature has not
been midertaken by mankind as a
free subject burinsLad
instead
has taken place only in class society.
'^^"^^

Wellmor's study calls this recogrJ.tion
of thought as historicallycontained, bearing within it a notion
of the good life, the "draft
meaning of history."
Marcuse's 1937 essay, "Philosophy
and Critical
Theory," places emphasis upon the need
to rediscover the past, the
links that the future has in the past.
To bo sure, there is another dimension
of fantasy or imagination,

and also intuition and reflection.

Fantasy has its place in being

instrumental to obtaining the futm-e.

But to be useful fantasy must be

connected with historical experience otherw:.se,
it will be boundless
j
In

and dangerous.

In OneJDijnens^ion^

Marcuse specifies the requirements of this

kind of social theory so dependent on an initial
set of abstractions

more closely:

In order to identify and define the possibilities of an
optimal development, the critical theory must abstract
12

Ibid., p. U48.
13

Critical Theo ry of Society pp. i|0-Ul. He writes: "Critical
theory is derivable from a notion of the 'good life' already available
to it as part of the socio-historical situation it subjects to analysis;
which, as the notion of an acknowledgement of each individual as a person
by every other individual, and as the idea of a non-coercive communal
human life of dialogue, is a draft meaning of history already fragmentarily embodied in a society's traditions and institutions: A draft
meani.ng v/hich it applies critically in opposing a society and its
dominant forms of self -understanding."
,

11;

"Philosophy and Critical Theory," pp. l$h-l$^.
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from the actual organization
and utilization of societv's

'"-'^ organxlt^y
ut^i^r'sucr
""T"'' which
Such abstraction
refuses to accent the

utuazation.

given universe of facts as the
final context o? vaSdation
such "transcending" analysis of
the facts in tL Sht o?
their arrested and denied
possibilities, pertains to the
very structure of social theory.
It is'opposed to aU
vigorously listorical characte^ o^t'hft^ ^"'r
"Possibilities" must be uithin
"""^'
^he reach ofT^lT
^^^^^^^^ ''^^
<^^^inable
TollTlf;^^^^^^^^
In short, what is socially possible
must be linked to historical
trends,
and that is the role of theory and the
constructive conceptualizations
of economic and political categories.

lL^^±iAhepj>ss^

The question of possibility, the

is imbedded as a fundamental
consideration in the

very dialectical logic of this approach.
The correctness of critical theory is only
proved in practice and
^-iiO£i.£riori; theory has only hypothetical status until
tested.

And

time changes its applicability and appropriateness—
hence, Marcuse's

reassessment of certain ideas presented in the 1930' s and
19^0' s is
l6

unabashed.

Similarly, in the Essay on Liberation there is no need
for

apology for modifying the pessimism about the potentialities for
change
during the mid-1960' s.

This is a flexibility in Marcuse's position that

conventional political scientists see as a weakness in his system (because
of the assumption of regularities of behavior in their workj only uniformities can yield the laws of generalizability that they are seeking).

T5r—
One Dimensional Man , p. xi.
16
See Leiss, pp. 87-88 j and Ma.rcuse in "Forward," Negations, p. xv.
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The Theory of Repressive
Society

The starting point for Marcuse's
theory is the same as that
for
Marx: The conception of man
that is to be realized. Both
are concerned
vith the problem of what becomes
of man under varied social
arrangements.
Our evidence for this concern in
Marcuse appears as early as his
1932
essay on Marx's Econom ic and Philosophi^
That essay

Manus^^

emphasized the philosophic basis from
which Marx's critique of bourgeois

political economy and his theory for
revolutionary change proceeded.

It

is a conception of man's being that
must finally be arrived at when we
ask, what is the ultimate subject of
any ethical politics?

Plato and

Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx, Thoreau, Gandhi,
Solzhenitsyn, Camus, the

Berrigans-diverse figures such as these all give
testimony to the
naturalistic-hujnanist cause:

Furthering in practical form the conception

of man as a universal free being, the feature
of which seems to be the
struggle against the forces that limit his existence.

V/hat

come is the question of Kant, of Hegel, of Marx,
of Marcuse.

man can beIt is the

only significant drama, according to Schiller— the
conflict between what

man is and

v;hat

he ought to be.

17

"The Foundation of Historical Materialism" in Studies in C ritical
Phi.losophy (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1973), pp. l-ii8. This essay aTTe'i^J^
to overcome several misinterpretations of Marx's definition of man (man
as a sensuous being, and therefore a suffering being:
The process of
the objectification of this being, and man as a passionate being).
Marcuse vnritey: "In developing this concept Marx and Feurerbach vjere
in fact coming to grips with one of the crucial problems of 'classical
German philosophy.
But in Marx it is this concept of sensuousness
(as objectification) which leads to the decisive turn from classical
German philosophy to the theory of revolution, for he inserts the
basic traits of practical and social existence into his definiti on of
man's essential being. As objectivity, man's sensuousness is essentially practical objectification, and because it is practical it is
essentially a social objectification." p. 21. Here is the opportunity
for the synthesis of treud, and the accent Marcuse provides.
'
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In Short, we must begin with
the contrast model of man
as a potentiality in order to understand the
features of Marcuse's theory
of
repressive politics.

For, this is a theory which
asserts advanced

industrial society to have material,
intellectual, and psychological
features that are repressive of
those potentialities. The
theory must
first account for such potentialities
and indicate the specific
features
whi.ch diminish or prohibit the
emergence of those potentialities
in more

than the exceptional case.

Only after this can an effort
towards a

theory of repressive participation be
undertaken.
In "The Foundation of Historical
Materialism" Marcuse shows the

central and original meaning of the
position Marx derives from Kant,
Hegel, and Feurerbach concerning "species
being"-i.e., a being which
has the species as its object.

I

want to sketch his account here briefly.

Man was distinguished from animals because he
could give shape to his
existence; he could "produce himself."
free being.

In this, he is a universal and

Man has the capacity to make the species of every
being his

object, and, therefore, could grasp the possibilities
contained in every
being.

He is a urdversal being because he could appropriate
nature for

his needs, making it his own nature, his human nature.

Labor was the

specifically human life activity in the process of man's own obiecti18

fication, his own self-realization.

And, work and praxis were the

particularly human modes of self-affirmation.

Alienated labor— the

estrangement of man from himself, from nature, and from others—was a

18

Marcuse sees the discussion of "self-actualization" and "autonomy"
by post-Freudian re'd.sionists as ossified sociology, for it fails to
comprehend this relationship between man's condition and his being.

,

,
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denial of n^n's humanity, his
reduction to an anin.1 or .ore
appropriately,
to a cog in a machine, by
a particular perverse for.
of objectivication
(i.e., reification, estrangement).
This is what needed to be
superseded.
It is veil to note here
that Marcuse has consistently
held on to this
early Marxian model of sensuous
man and the process of
objectivication.'^
But he did amend it in certain
crucial ways, to the irritation
of certain
latter-day Marxists such as Alasdair
Maclntyre.
For instance, Freud seemed appropriate
and suitable for synthesis to
this early conception, for what Freud
offered in his analysis of the ego

was another-and more developed-explanation
of the instinctive side of
man.

Marcuse writes:

"Freud had discovered the mechanisms
of social and

political control in the depth dimensions of
instinctual drives and satisfactions."

Instincts were, from this original stardpoinb,
viewed as

life determimng forces subject to historical
modification and illusion
(as distorted communication) and had an important
role in this process.

21
In other words, psychoanalysis operated from a
dynami.c theory of mind.
It was a side that very much coincided with the
tasks marked out by Marx's

concept of the process of objectification.

Marcuse develops the

19

For the development of this discussion see the essay cited
above, pp. lk-27
20
In "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," in Plve Lectures - Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia (Boston:
Beacon Press7~r970)
According to Marcuse, the individual once seen by Freud no longer exists.
p. hU,
21

This feature is well brought out in Richard Wollheim's study of
Freud. Wollheim writes of the initial insight that triggered Freud's
lifetime career in the following way:
"(Charcot) started him off on a new
career, and he endowed him with two gifts, wh.ich, transformed over the
years by experience and by the ingenuity of P'reud's mind, became the
foundations of psychoanalysis. One was a form of therapy, which set out
to remove the symptoms of mental disorder through the use of words, and
the other was a diagnosis, according to which the symptoms of the disorder
were traceable to the influence of ideas." In Sigmund Freud (New York:
Viking Press, 1971), p. xi.

,
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significance of Freud in this
way:
His- psychology does
not focus on the concrete .nH .
t
.
""^^'^^
personality as it exists in its
private and Ihi?
^^'^^^"^^ oonc'e'aS'r^t^t'tt'^n^e™^
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Of course, Freudian psychology
has rested on the specific
emphasis
of the internal instinctual
(sexual) conflicts of the child.
The individual's superego and libidinal states
took

shape in the struggle of the

ego against the father-figui-e.

The effect of this struggle was
what

gave shape to the instinctual basis
of behavior, but Marcuse's modifi-

cation of Freud's theory lead to the
rejection of the inevitability or

necessity of domination by a primal father-figure.

Marcuse's account

reduced the universalized analysis of Freud
to a characteristically

historical-cultural one.

And he expanded the number of opportunities

which could effect the ego.

Briefly, the father-displaced by the gener-

alized, abstract and depersonalized edjninistered
structures of twentieth

century society-had lost his paternal significance.

The result was a

weakened ego structure and a superego that was heavily
conformist.

Man

was the subject of unnecessary repressive domination—
unnecessary to the
extent to which he was not allowed the conditions for realizing
his full

humanity, conditions which would allow the ego, in struggle, to become
strong and autonomous (i.e., self-determining)

22

Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization - A Philosophic Inquiry
Into Freud (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. 52.
But Freud was not unconcerned with the "healthy" personality^ see Paul Roazen, Freud; Political
and Social T houg ht (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 273-2B9^;
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What these altered conditions were,
and how they differed from
earlier ones, renins to be made
clear. What we must now note
is that,
for Mane and for Marcuse (as well
as for Meadian social
psychologists who
help to illu:ninate the radical-liberal
position) the analysis rests on
the (insightful) observation that
man is not autonomous from his
fellow

man and society in any complete sense.
such social relations.

This being so,

He is very much a reflection of
roan

cannot be free "on his own."^^

Man needs help to be free-that is, to be
free of his class problems.
needs his culture, his institutions, his
language ("Man needs

-a

He

totality
^

2ii

of human manifestations of life.'").

This requi.res the further recog-

nition of man as a "social" being, a view that is
denied in the bourgeois
society which celebrates individualism.

It is for Marcuse, as it is

for Lukacs and other critical theorists, this
particular society whdch

makes man solitary and for which solitariness is the
typical human ex-

perience—in other words, a social phenomenon.

The problem is the analyz-

ing of this inter-relationship, this intersection, between
specific
social institutions and what man is and what he can become.
is particularly attuned to this broad task.

The dialectic

Toward this end, the analysis

of language, in the sense that there is a political economy of language
(what the ordering of concepts is and how it is achieved), must also

have some significant play.

23

Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in Wolff, Moore and
Marcuse, A Critique of Pui-e Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 862li

"The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. cit ., p. 23; Marcuse
is quoting Marx here.
25
See, for instance, the argument of Steven Lukes, Individualism (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).
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Obviously, the view outlined so
far (of what man is and can
be; the
role of instincts and their
modification; the relationship of
man to his
society) is quite another position
than that offered by the theorists
of
what has sometimes been called "the
oversocialized conception of manor of other views of man.-for example,
the Hobbesian view or the views
of man dramatized in Orv^ell's Anirr^
and lonesco's The Rhin oceros/^

Western bourgeois political economy

ca^t

(indeed, must not) regard

alienation and estrangement as a sociological
fact and starting point.
It has not selected man as a starting
point; at best the question of

man's being is an afterthought.

Marcuse is critical for this reason:

Bourgeois political economy has to be basically
transformed in the critique for this very reason:
It never
gets to see man and his history and is thus
j.n the
profoundest sense not a "science of people" but of
nonpeople and of an "inhuman world of objects and
coiamodities."27
Its starting point is somewhere else (e.g., the concern
with how to

achieve a "stable" society) and man takes his value from
the world of
exchange.

Because of the necessity for the mystification of this

essential premise (the theory of value at the core of bourgeois economy),
bourgeois philosophy requires its non-subversive "analytic" categories and
modes.

(Perhaps these are useful under limited conditions, but they are

never transcended and formulated into a more comprehensive construct.)
It is not strange, then, that from the bourgeois perspective, the

lack of control over events is expected and explained by the "apparent

over-powering forces beyond man's control" the concealed notion of
28

inevitability.

In a certain sense that is very so.

Man cannot be

2^
Cf. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Empirical Political Theory and the Image of
Man," Polity , 2 (Summer 1970) :hii3-ii78.
27
"The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. ci t., p. 9.

Cited by

Mai'curiC,

"The Foundations of Historical Materialism," p. 18,
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Viewed as a controlling agent,
a responsible agent in
his ov. history^
it is logically impossible
(mu^tisjou^^ Utopian). This point
can
be brought out if we recall
some previously noted theorists
in thi.-S
study.
For instance, McConnell and
Lo.^ cannot appreciate the
value of
what happens to man's autonomy in
the socio-political structure.
Socialization theorists using a systems
fraraework accept and promote
the

established integration processes.

No encouragement is ever offered,

except in the purely rhetorical sense
perhaps, for one to rise above
one's mere existence this can certainly
^
be said of most human relations
and management experts.

As Marcuse expresses it, the
problem of aliena-

tion allows the objectification of existence
to turn into reification.

Explaim.ng away the larger problems of man's
existence, and focusing
only on the limited and technologically
manageable ones, which seems to
be the tendency of conventional social science,
are two important ways

to escape the larger and universal meanings of
human existence.

Not a

very sweeping role is demanded for pliilosophy.
I

have tried to suggest the senses in

vMch

potentiality is important to Marcuse 's theory.

a concept of man's

We might now ask, in

what way is advanced industrial society "repressive?"

A brief review of

Marcuse 's application of the concept of repression from Freud's meta-

psychology is in order.

This concept referred to the necessary and

inevitable process of controlling the internally conflicting impulses of
He comes back to this point in his criticism of Charles Reich's Gre ening
of America in which it is asserted that "nobody is in control." "Berkeley
Journal of Sociol ogy, 16 (1971), "The Movement in a New Era of Repression,"
p.

6.
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the individual for the development
and progress of civilization/^

.

Marcuse accepted the fact, in line
with Freud, that some aspects
of life
must necessarily be repressive.
Indeed, this necessary
repression-

sublimation-was the mark of a civilized
person.
pression and was defined in Er_os_anlCivi

This was "basic" re,3 "the modification

of instincts necessary for the
perpetuation of the huraan race in civili7.ation5

these are the restrictions which mark
the development of man

from the human animal to homo sapiens."

What Marcuse uniquely asserted

in opposition to both the pessimistic
Freud and Freud's optimistic re-

visionists (who accepted the environment as
a given) was unnecessary

repression

wMch

was forraed historically-i.e.

,

surplus repression.

like Marx's concept of surplus value, surplus
repression was a

concept meant to indjxate magnitude-the magnitude
of repression imposed
on man by social institutions

j

it is "the quantitative sublimation of

individual needs and wants basic to 'pertain social forms
but not for
31

human existence and association."

It is that portion which is the

result of social conditions sustained in the specific interest
of class
29
Wollheim's account of Freud suggests this was not a position
rigidly adhered to by Freud, p. 26I. See also, Peter Madison, Freud's
22I!gfilLi^L^Iggsio''^ and Defense (Minneapolis: University of Mil^Hesota
Press, lyblTand Peter Madison, "Freud's Repression Concept," International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 37 (1956) :75-86.
30
Eros , p. 82.
31
Ibid., p. 81.

.
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domination.

The specific conditions of
advanced industrial society in-

troduce additional controls (over
and above, or rather underneath
the
social conflicts) new strains and
stresses in the individual^ and
these
stresses and strains are part of the
normal function3.ng of the society.^^

Specifically, surplus repression takes
two forms:

(l) As tendencies or

forces that serve the requirements of the
established apparatus of

production, distribution, and consumption,
and (2) as systematic manip-

ulation and control of the psyche.

Instances of suitdIus repression which

Marcuse provides are the modifications and
deflections of instinctual
energies necessitated by the perpetuation of the
monogamic-patriarchal
family, or by a hierarchical division of labor,
or by public control
33
over the individual's private existence.
Social repression in our

society, if I read Marcuse correctly, is almost always
linguistic re-

pression and this can take infinite forms.

How does this repressive process occin-?

Central to Marcuse

's

con-

version of Freudian meta-psychology is his account of the Oedipus
story
for explaining the functioning of the superego as a moral structure.

His account depicts the occurrence of an historical shift from the

primal father as the object of authority to another stage in which
there is a father-substitute in the generalized, abstract and deper-

sonalized institutions of administered society.

In the domination-

rebellion-domination cycle that Freud postulates, Marcuse 's interpretation
suggests that the second domination is simply not a repeat of the first
domination, but takes on a progressive historical cnaracter:

32

Negations , p. 2^1,
33

Fros, p.

3^4
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From the primal father via the
brother clan to the system
of institutional authority
characteristic of mature
domj.nation becomes increasingly
rational,
Pf]^iif^'°''^
fully developed performance principle,
subordination
appears as implemented through the
social division of
labor Itself (although physical and
persona] force remains an indispensable instrumentality).
Society emerges
as a lasting and expanding system
of useful performances:
the hierarchy of functions and
relations assumes the form
of objective reason: Lav/ and order
are identical with
the life of society itself. In the
same process, repression too is depersonalized: Constraint
and regimentation of pleasure now become a function
(and "natural"
result) of the social division of labor.
To be sure
the_ father, as paterfamilias , still
performs the basic
regimentation of instincts which prepares the
child for
the surplus-repression on the part of society
during his
adult life. But the father performs this
function as the
representative of the family's position in the social
division of labor rather than as the "possessor" of
the
mother. Subsequently, the individual's instincts
are
controlled through the social utilization of his labor
power. -^^

The sequence has an extremely pathological feature,
because the reifica-

tion of the father-figure also transforms the character of guilt.
time guilt's object was a concrete and manageable figure.

At one

Guilt in ad-

vanced industrial society would have to turn against the very object which
also brings the benefits and pleasures that sustain the individual.

The

paradox is internal and self-contained, and the individual no longer
possesses a sphere of private non-conformity.

There is no longer mental

space for developing himself against his sense of guilt, and for living

with a conscience of his own.

Any recognition of this process is con-

trolled at the level of consciousness by society's institutions:

Civilization has to defend itself against the spector of
a world which could be free. If society carjiot use its
growing productivity for reducing repression (because such

Ibid., p. 81

216

usage would upset the hierarchy
of the status m.n^
productivity .ust be turned agLnst
the indi'X.is.
ecomes itself an instrument of
universal control 35

In this line of analysis, there
is some real significance,
for
Marcuse, and for the purposes of
ou.- argument, to the
loss of such

traditional institutions as the famly,
religion, and s^ll enterprises
(not that these institutions are
iHo_facto good), whj.ch are progressively absorbed into large-scale
impersonal groupings. Here is the
loss
of the conditions for the formation
of the superego. Without these
conditions the superego is lost to a
social (mass-created and atomized)
ego
for the lot of the population.

Now, under the rule of economic,
political,

and cultural monopolies, the formation of
the mature superego seems to
skip the stage of individualization:
The generic atom becomes directly
a social atom.

The repressive organization of the
instincts seems to

be collective, and the ego seems to be
prematurely socialized by a

whole system of extrafamilial agents and agencies.

As early as the pre-

school level, gangs, radio, and television set
the tyrannical pattern for

both conformity and rebellion.

Deviations from the patterns are punished

not so much within the family as outside and against the
family.

The

experts of the mass media transmit the required values they
offer the
j

perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream and
romance.
These are the fantasy forms that characterize class identification.

With

this form of indoctrination, the family can no longer compete; in other
36
words, "the substance of the family too is cashed in by the society."

Ibid., p. 85.

36
Ibid., p. 38. The quote is from As pects of Sociology by the
P'rankfurt Institute for Social Research "(Boston:
Beacon Pre'ss, 1972),
chap. IX, "The Family," p. 137.
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and, it is for this reason that
Marcuse is derisive of the liberal

notion that the present structure
enables the development of
autonomous,
.whole and valued beings.

According to Marcuse

's

writings and this review of the
theory of the

unconscious, there are, then social forces
leading the individual psyche
to act repressively^ i.e., to put into
the unconscious through the agency
of the now-socialized superego instinctual
and healthy desires that

might otherwise disrupt the prevailing and
ongoing sets of interests of
dominant institutions.

The family, the school, and religion
become, for

instance, important transmitting agencies.

In this sense, then, the

process of r-epressicn is both social and political
as well as individual.

How the mechanism functions is considered a matter
of conjecture at this
timej but that there is repression, "that people
forget things and that
37
there is an ascertainable motive for forgetting them," is
indubitable.

There may be some senses in which these repressive forces
can be

meaningfully distinguished.

First, the materially repressive forces of

the economic structui-e may be indicated; specifically, the
capitalist

economic structiu-e is ijiiplicated.

The American productive-consumptive

society's progress depends, for its very logic, upon a growth in destructiveness.

As Pilisuk and Hayden put it:

concept is more nearly
38
that American society is a military-industrial comples."
Within this
"Ovor

37
J. 0, V/isdom,

Encyclopedia of

"Psychoanalytic Theories of the Unconscious,"
8:l89-19U.

Pl-iiloso phy,

3B

Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military-Industrial
Complex which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in
Pluralistic Systems," in Bias of Pluralism, p. 152.
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ruling economy, labor is not self-selected
and does not satisfy individual
needs or faculties.

The alienation of labor from what
is productive and

satisfying is hidden by the veil of affluence;
this is the illusory

meaning of a "higher" social status.

39

By the very nature of this struc-

ture, only politically insignificant minorities
suffer the conditions of

poverty; this is^what has been denoted by Claus
Offe as "the permanent

welfare class."
Secondly, the intellectually repressive features of
this historical

stage of society are best captured in the dominant ideology
which Marcuse

refers to as "technological rationality."

The society camouflages its

irrationality—at a conscious level— through a specific form of "rationality"

wMch

celebrates a commodity fetishism, and in its "affirmative" character

postulates an eternal idea of happiness in place of real gratification.
At higher levels, this rationality is also intended to set the limits

within which means-ends decisions are made.

Habermas has continued this

analysis fruitfully in his essay "Technology and Science as 'Ideology.'"
Thirdly, the psychologically repressive features of this society,
perhaps distinct only in ambiguous ways from intellectually repressive

39
This theme is developed further in Marcuse 's essay "Aggressiveness
in Advanced Industrial Society," in Negations , pp. 2U8-268,
iiO

Claus Offe, "Advanced Capitalism and the V/elfare State," Politics
and Society ,
(Summer 1972 ) :h79-U88. In numbers this group may not be"
so significant; depending on the definition and the source, the number
in this class ranges from one-fifth to two-fifth's of the American
population.
hi
Marcuse 's essay is "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in
Ne gations , pp. 88-133
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features, embrace forces addressed at the
unconscious level of instincts,

especially sexual ones.

Simply put, sexual and other instinctual
drives

are exchanged or converted for some other
more socially-desirable form

of behavior-for example, more labor power.

As the nature of capitalism's

dynand.cs changed, for instance, the dynamics
of the sexually-repressive

process changed from an overtly repressive puritanism
to the more oblique
one embodied in hedonism and which Marcuse terms
"repressive desublimation,"
for in the ^modern coniraercial world consumerist and
sexual liberation are

combined.

According to Marcuse, "repressive desublimation" has the

appearance of freedom, but its essential quality is one of perpetuating
the "divided self" (in Laing's terminology) or a false individualism,

which is Slater's theme in The Pu rsuit of Lonelin ess.

There are other

non-symbolic forces affecting the psychic economy— lack of any real free
time.

The time for solitude and reflection, is one of them.

According

to V. J. McGill in The Idea of Happiness , contemplation seems to be a

clear omssion in Bentham's construction of the pleasure principle.
If we recall our Rousseauan paradigm, this was a condition essential to
the development of the reflective process; it

v;as

a condition vital to

the examination of one's authenticity.

In combination, these repressive forces constitute the warp and weft
of the heavy imposition official and unofficial social agencies place on
the whole sensing being of the mass of individuals in the present historical

—

ir2

An interesting passage is provided by Walter A, Weiskopf , Alienation
and Economics- (New York: Delta, 1971), pp. llU-115.
Weiskopf, pp. 71-79, discusses this interpretation.
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period of advanced industrial society.

Sorae

do escape it as we shall

see.

The important significance of the
concept of repression to a theory
of society can be better brought
out now.
Marcuse, in his account,
is contending that social needs h,ave
become individual needs at the very

level of instincts.

More precisely, the way the instincts
express them-

selves has been set in certain ways.

There is, in the Freudian termi-

nology, the usurpation of the Pleasure
Principle by the historically-

specific reality principle, the Performnce
Principle.

Advanced industrial

society has successfully mitigated the
recognition of the purpose and the
price that must be paid for this exchange.

In this account Marcuse is

implicitly suggesting the inadequacy of Marxist
theory.
study of Marcuse suggests:

As Robinson's

"Marxism had proved inadequate not because it

was overly abstract and revolutionary, but precisely
because it was not

revolutionary enough.

The social criticism of the future, Marcuse felt,
"^^
would have to be both more negative and more Utopian than even
Marxism.

Marcuse'

s

critique is distinctive just because of his insistent effort to

unravel the dynamics of this split between indi\rLdual and social needs at

their interface-~the level of consciousness and consciousness-modification.
And this is what is seen by Habermas, for instance, as perceptive about
the synthesis of Mara and Freud, even though— as it becomes apparent—

Marcuse may not have been completely successful in the synthesis himself.
Haberaas writes:
Marx had developed the idea of the self -constitution of the
human species in natural history in two dimensions: As a

Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left (New York:
1969), p. 179.

Harper Colophon,
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2roc^ess_of_sen;-pr^^
anrt

stored

which is iinpelled

forw;,rri

w

the forces of production and
as a selfwhich is impelled forward by
thi'
critical-revolutionary activity of classes
and which is
stored in experiences of reflection.
On the other hand
the status of
critique, was supposed to reconstruct
^he sel fTn
'P'^'"^^
^'^ materialist
coLeot
Th. synthesis of man
and nature remained ref
categorical framework of instrumental
.
action. Thisj£amew^^
productive knowirx

fomatl^^^

SfJ?:

M|l.but_noti^^

productive activity suited for reconstruction
of power
and Ideology. In contrast, Freud has
acquired in metapsychology a framework for distorted
comraunicative action
tnat allows the conceptualization of
the origins of institutions and the role and function of
illusions, that is
of power and ideology. Freud's theory
can represent a
structure that Marx did not fathom. ^5
The end product of this repressive process
that Marcuse has dra^m is
a figure who is inescapably the conformist,
the role-player, the sub-

servient.

These are men and women who vail play the
game within an

authoritarian and hierarchical structure of servitude.

There is a tragic

dimension here, because these individuals sense the
necessity to conform
in order to survive within the institutions they find
themselves.

Their

identity has failed to crystallize through no fault of their own.
Marcuse 's case, and that of the radical position more clearly, involves the dialectical claim, that, in more than the exceptional case,
there are possibilities for human development, principled action, and
creative expression— despite the human condition's tragic dimension.

115

Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston:
Beacon
Press, 1971), chap. 12, "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: Nietzsche's
Reduction of Cognitive Interests," pp. 281-282. Habermas makes the point
that, "Marx was not able to see that power and ideology are distorted
communication, because he made the assumption that men distinguish themselves from animals when they began to produce their means of subsistance,
p. 282.

222

The Marcusean argument, which
is, for this reason, very
.uch W3.thin the
Rcussea^ian tradition, underscores
and projects the native but
vague
possibilities in natural man for growth
and autonomy when assisted
by
certain features of a social setting
that provides conditions of
equality,
mutual respect, solitude, and
conversation.

Marcuse brings into his work, however,
some of the weaknesses in
Freud's conceptual baggage-namely,
his static, analytic theory of
the
mind, a simplistic and mechanistic
model. This problem is readily
amended
by a more flexible concept which has
been proposed by some of Freud's suc-

cessors who have postulated an Hypothesis
of Degrees of Repression, "that

forgotten ideas are unconscious in differing
degrees, because as one
idea becomes more acceptable to consciousness
than it was, the idea next
to it is less removed from the threshold of
consciousness."^^

This hy-

pothesis as to degree is viewed as an essential
prenvise for psychoanalysis
to be practiced and to succeed at all.

On the positive side, the point cannot be overemphasized
that
Marcuse's amended theory offers a more comraanding analysis
than that
offered by the socialization theorists.

Contemporary socialization

theorists, such as David Easton and Edv/ard S. Greenburg, perceived surely

correctly part of the human situation, the socializability of man as a
creature of s:yTnbolism.
is true to

hi.s

But they failed to ask. What can man become that

very nature and more than merely the reflection of the

needs of the established institutional arrangements?

in terms of the best possibilities?

What can man become

If an individual is given a chance

to become a "social" being in the more meaningful and sufficient sense.

Wisdom, p. 190,
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will he?

The question is unanswered.

These theorists' inability,
as

well, to deal with the other side of
power, of conflict and confrontation and anti-social behavior, suggests
another shortcoming. Must not a
worthwhile social theory provide some
account as to whether the society
is evol^•ing in a generative rather than
degenerative form?

Again, the

answer is not to be found, because they
assume what must be proved.

As

I shall later suggest, a proper and
full account must examine the function

of language in establishing class differentials
in the society.

Marcuse,

in his theory of repressive society, has lead
us to a definition of tasks
yet to be undertaken.

To summarize, Freud's work had allowed the
possibility of exploring
the barriers, as well as supports, for making men
and women more free to
be genuine masters of themselves.

Culture, in its positive and negative

forms, had direct bearing on the defense mechanisms individuals
employed
for overcoming, or failing to overcome, aggressive tendencies.

As Roazen

points out of Freud's work, "Culture is not conceived only as a necessary
evil providj-ng a variety of compensations, but also a useful buttress in

providing its members with a needed sense of direction."
Such, then, is the Marcusean viewpoint which, in accord with our

Rousseauan model, recognizes, "All art is right which simply enlarges,
but none is right if it distorts us."

The manifest result of Marcuse

's

work in One Dimensional Man and essays of that period was to show that

hi

Roazen, p. 209.
hQ

Quote from E, H. Wright as cited by Peter Gay in his: Introduction
to Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington and
London: Indiana University Press, 196? [195^ J), p. 20,
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the .ass culture of technocratic
society had little to offer
for fostering
the developraent of self -defining,
relatively free and expressive
hu:nan

beings and in one essay there was
the critical thesis that
t^eud's concept
of man had been made obsolete by
the gro^rth of certain
pathological social

tendencies.

But that pessimism need not lead
to the view that possibil-

ities for change have become frozen
or petrified.

There are conceptual

problems in Marcuse's analysis which can
bo overcome through a synthesis
of his ideas, as amended and developed
by Andre Gorz, particularly, and
the model set out by the radical-liberals.

Before suggesting that syn-

thesis, I will turn next to developing
a Marcusean theory of repressive

participation.
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Toward a Theory of Repressive
Participation
Politics in advanced industrial society
is repressive~-that has
been the main thread of Marcuse's
argmnent so far. Let us now attempt

"

to set out the concept of repression
in terms of a theory of partici-

pation and clarify it.

Repressive politics is a structure of power
and a form of political

language that employs a broad spectrum of
techirlques to maintain a narrow

consensus that will support the infrastructui-e,
which is the productive,
distributive, and consumptive system that defines
the dominant class
interests.

The chief mark of a repressive style of
politics is its

effect on consciousness-specifically, the effect
is to diminish, or

force into the unconscious, the range of options
that are available to
the domi.nated class and make them appear to be the
full range.

The techniques of a repressive style of politics are
familiar to the
readers of the literature.

There may be the slights of ignoring minority

claims or demands for such apparently inconsequential things as
a streetlight or a housing code; frustrated human experience becomes channeled
50
into either apathy or violent confrontation.
More carefully organized

grievances from an outgroup stand the chance of being "swalled up" in

C9

For instance: Tom Hayden, Rebellion and Repression (New York:
Meridian, 1969); Issac D. Balbus, The Dialectics of Legal Repression
Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1973); Alan ^olfe, The 5eamy Side of Democracy Repression in America (New York: David McKay, 1973).

-

The example is from Michael Parent!, "Power and Pluralism: A
View from the Botton," Journal of Politics , 32 (August 1970) :501-530.
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the elastic liMts of a
"tolerant" system, assigning a
problem to a
special study committee predictably
assures that some will forget
the
original issue. There is also the
ideological effort waged by
political
elites to manipulate people's
motivations and consciousness through
the
socialization processes so that they
accept the ruling ideology and

distrust and refuse to be moved by
competing ones; the profit incentive,
for instance, has become just such
a sacred cow.
Or, social reality can
be made to appear confusing and
uncontrollable j one's reconstruction of

reality is eschewed when information is not
preferred, or made difficult
to obtain, or manipulated, or censored,
or scrambled altogether.

This

was the widely misunderstood point of Marcuse's
essay "Repressive
Tolerance:"

All points of \dew can be heard: The Com-nunist
and the
Fascist, the Left and the Right, the white and
the Negro,
the crusadors of armament and for disarmament.
Moreover,
endlessly dragging debates over the media, the stuDid
opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent
one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed,
and
propaganda rides along with education, truth with falsehood. This pure toleration of sense and nonsense is
justified by the democratic argument that nobody, neither
group nor individual, is in possession of the truth and
capable of defining what is right and wrong, good and
bad. Therefore, all contesting opinions must be submitted to "the people" for its deliberation and choice.

m

The process is all the more successful when the ideology is able
to have itself reproduced on a massive scale by the educational, adver-

tising, news and entertainment media.

State violence, the use of final

coercive power through limiting legislation, partial judiciaries, and a

highly centralized and bureaucratizcd police system (against the backdrop of a public lassitude toward the violation of basic human rights)

IT—
"Repressive Tolerance," p.

9ii.
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is, however, the ultimate
means of controlling the

Umits

of political

action.

Marcuse shows what he is concerned
about in a speech at the
University of Califorma at Berkeley
on February
3, 197I, entitled

"The Movement in a New Era of
Repression:

An Assessment:"

We are far from a fascist form
of government, but some
01 the possible preconditions are emerging.
Thev are well
known and I will just give you a list:'
The counts' used
more and more as political tribunals;
the reduction of
education and welfare in the richest
country in the world:
anti-democratic legislation, such as preventive
detention
ana the no-knock lawsj economic sanctions
if you ai^e
politically and otherwise suspect j the
intimidation and
sell-censoi-ship of the mass media.... ^2

Marcuse -s charge has been that the prevailing,
narrow, consensus in
which political discourse and non-discourse
occurs is socio-historically
produced.

The process by which it has developed has
shaped the range of

available options, and the insights that might alter
important and key

political decisions have been limited, modified, denied,
or effectively
neturalized.
^r_es_sed.

Th e mechanism by which we mi^ht unl ock ourselves
is re -

The completion of the passage cited above from "Repressive

Tolerance" conveys the point:
...the democratic argmnent implies a necessary condition,
namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating
and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must
have access to authentic information, and that, on this
basis, their evaluation must be the r esult of autonomous
thought.
In the contemporary period, the democratic argument for
abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself. The liberating force
of democracy v;as the chance it gave to effective dissent, on
the individual as well as social scale, its openness to
qualitatively different forms of government, of culture.

J2
In Berkeley Journal of Sociology , I6 (1971) :8.
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education, work-of the hitman existence
in general. The
toleration of free d iscussion and the
equal ri.htof
opposites was to define and clarify
the different foms
of dissent: Their direction,
content, prospect.
But

2ii^J2the^c_oncjn^^^^^

political

gL^^jg--J^^ec^er^t
lormal^^
in_gPg:g^^.

p3^r

could friiireniir-Fe7~T^ the
"

assembly .b3

'

*

Our ability and confidence in ourselves
as sensing creatures-searching
for the effective concepts, the valid
concepts by which to live, has been

frustrated.

Without constructive, compatibly-ordered
concepts, people

cannot organize their energies effectively,
either as individuals or as

socially-constituted groups.

When the society prevents the insights as

to what is needed conceptually, the individual's
energies can be dis-

functional to himself and, hence, to the long-term
interests of the
society.

This is, for example, the plight of the Iks of East
Africa in

Colin M. Turnbull's account, The Mountain People

,

as it is for the victims

of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock .

Marcuse has applied the term "repression" to many aspects of society.

Liberal tolerance is thus, "repressive tolerance."

The society's tacit

sanctioning of previously tabooed practice is "repressive desbulimation."

These forms of tolerance and desublimation are "repressive," for they
have the effect of weakening and further obliterating from the senses
the alienation suffered, and they become, instead, instruments of a

system simultaneously of social disintegration and social cohesion.
The term "repressive participation" is not found in Marcuse

's

writings

but was coined by George Kateb in raising some critical comments on a

53

"Repressive Tolerance," p. 9$.

Emphasis added.
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paper by David Braybrooke.

Kateb asked:

"In organization and institu-

rional life, what is the relation between
increased participation and the
power of the established leadership or
authority? How much real power
is usually given?

May participating under many circumstances,
provide

the best cover for manipulation by authority,
in the style recommended by

Elton Mayo?

Is there such a thing, then, as

-repressive participation?'"^^

The possibility provides an altogether different
perspective on partici-

pation than heretofore considered.

According to the Marcusean variant of radical thought,
there would
be some anal^^-tic fruitfulness to characterizing
certain political forms

such as voting, which is enjoined for a majority of the
population in
liberal democratic society, as repressive. Marcuse, writing in
"Repressive
Tolerance" would point us in this direction:
...The exercise of political rights (such as voting, letterwriting to the press, to Senators, etc., protest demonstrations with a priori renunciation of counterviolence ) in a
society of total administration serves to strengthen this
adjTiinistration by testifying to the existence of democratic
liberties vjhich, in reality, have changed their content and
lost their effectiveness .^5

This is participation that has the effect of diminishing rather than

contributing to the growth of the human personality and, more generally,
the consequence of perpetuating the prevailing class divisions.

The in-

dividual in important ways in engaging in voting may be acting irration-

ally as his actions may become an instrument of his own domination.

For,

The question is posed and not further explored in a paper by
George Kateb to appear in the forthcoming volume Participation in Politics :
Nomos XVI (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975).

"Repressive Tolerance," p. 8U»
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as Wolfe has observed:

"The ultimate goal of ideological
repression is

to help people support their own
repression."

Toward a definition of "repressive
participation"

following one:

''Re^lgssiA^aj^Uci pat^

will propose the

I

suRgests the no tion nfjo^p

Rgrfogiance of some political (state) function, such
as v niA

rormj^o_otji^^

niodes of

2LJ^_£^^h_22R^~term interest s

^Hi^Yil^^L, roup

,

political behavior

,

r.^ _nr^_r^.

at thn_Pvp^;n^

(needs, wants, purp oses, pleasures) of

s ocie ty (of

human ity and nature, in g^ener al) mider

1BI^1S]£1_2LI.^^.9J.^^^ and inte rnal processes of restrai nt, constraint^ and
b

sijpresslon."

(

There are several implications in this formulation
that

must be pointed out:
1.

Here, it should be noted that the problem of the flattening
of

human consciousness is not located in human nature but in the
nature of

Wolfe, p. 133.
S7

Part of this definition is based on Marcuse's own definition of
repression in Eros and Civi lization, p. 7. Alain Touraine in The PostIndustrial Society— Toinorrov/' s Social History: Classes, Conflicts, and
Culture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, 1971) proposes
a comparable concept in his formulation of "dependent participation."
Its emphasis is on alienation, which, I feel, misses the dynandcs of the
conscious and unconscious. Touraine 's definition of "dependent participation" is suggested in the following passage: "A man is alienated when
his only relationship to the social and cultural directions of his society
is the one the ruling class accords him as compatible with the maintenance
of its own dominance. Alienation means canceling out social conflict by
creating dependent participation. The activities of the alienated man
make no sense unless they are seen as the counterpart to the interests
of those who alienate him. Offering the workers, for example, participation in the organization of an industry without their having authority
over its economic decisions leads to alienation, unless they consider
such participation a strategic move in their conflict with the managers
of industry. Ours is a society of alienation, not because it reduces
people to misery or because it imposes police restriction, but because
it seduces, manipulates, and enforces conformism."
pp. 8-9.

231

the setting, which is a manipulated
and limited one.

There is a signi-

ficant difference in saying-as for instance,
Stouffer does and others
who share his perspective-that the average
voter does not have a high
level of competence and, in fact, the claim
that they cannot develop this

competence.

This latter claim is not what those studies
attempted to

prove, ^and it thus remains unproven.

Some studies do seem to support

oui^

claim.
2.

This tentative definition assumes that some
interests are more

defensible than other ones, and thus it involves a rejection
of the mixed
pluralist claim that asserts that all interests and all
classes of

individuals are able and should compete relatively eqi^ally in the
political
arena.

amounts to the rejection of utilitarian ethics.

TJ-as

59

Ultimately,

this is a rejection of nihilism with respect to values.
3.

There is also a grey area:

Does the definition recognize—at

least, dimly—individual acquiescence or compliance in his own domination?

Should it?

I

suggest that the Hypothesis of Degrees of Repression allows

some limits within v^hich human responsibility can be attributed.

Other-

wise, responsibility for an individual's action could never be claimed
or liabeled.

Compliance suggests, at a very superficial level of insight,

that the individual is willing to maice a recognizable tradeoff between

For example, Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes:

A

Study of Manual Workers," American Political Science Review , 58 (December
1961): 951-962.
59
A nicely-framed argument on this is provided by Alasdair Maclntyre
in "Against Utilitarianism" in Leslie Brown, ed.. Aims of Education (New
York: Teachers College Press, 1970), pp. 1-23.
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future and present consequences.

The individual may or may
not, however,

feel ..free" to make this tradeoff
(but they ought to be obliged
to "see"'
the wider range of choices before
them).
Marcuse's work on repressive
society would indicate such a role for
compliance. For instance, in his
brief critique of Charles Reich's Greening
of Amer ica Marcuse wrote:

"Persons are directly responsible for the
decisions that are made to
bomb in Vietnam; and it is these
positions that must be identified and

attacked."

Or, in

&:os_and_CiA^^

he remarks:

"Repression dis-

appears in the grand objective order of things
which rewards more or less

adequately the complpng individuals and, in
doing so, reproduces more or
61

less adequately society as a whole."

The point about repressive participation is
that it is a style of

political activity that becomes unmeaningful to the self
as a process of
cognitive and affective growth.

ized by a

doriiinant

Repressive participation is character-

class controlling the behavior of a dominated class

through control of the very mental processes that would enable the

individual's freedom.

The individual is shut-off from perceiving the

limited self that he/she is, and is becoming.

The style of polj.tical

discourse is closed, the participant-citizen under these conditions has
as atrophied mind no longer capable of grasping the contradictions and

50

Herbert Marcuse, "Charles Reich as Revolutionary Ostrich," in Phiilip
Nibile, ed,. T he Con III Controversy (New York; Pocketbooks, 1971),
"
pp. 15-17.
61
Eros and Civilizatio n, p. 12 also in Negations , p. 132: "In
affirmative culture, renunciation is linked to the external vitiation of
the individual, to liis compliance with a bad order."
,

j
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alternatives.

Critical faculties for articulating real
interests have

been deadened and the wise handling of
public issues smothered.

In the

one dimension, as Marcuse expresses it,
the Happy Consciousness comes
to

prevail.

Tho repressive participants may be more readily
identified, in some

measure, by distinguishing them from various
segments of the class-

structured society.
I

The following schema may be helpful initially,
and

intend to develop and consider it further in the
next chapter.

schema includes identification of:

members of the population.

The

(l) The oppressed and dissident

They are clearly disti.ngui.shed from tho re-

pressed, because members of this group recognize their oppression.

They

well recognize their exclusion from the ongoing political process,
the
rhetoric to the contrary.

This category usually includes the self-

conscious minorities, as well as the truly independent intellectual and

artistic elements.

(2)

Another

are the politically weightless.

gi'oup,

identified as the disconnected,

They are outside of the political system

by virtue of some economi.c and/or sociological characteristi

c

— e.g.

,

their

unemployabili ty by virtue of being unskilled or technically obsolete,

their age, their geographic mobility.

In other words, they do not matter

62

to the economic structure.

working and middle classes

(3) A

— the

sizable sector remains:

The employed

blue- and white-collar wage-earners, the

rentiers and small property owners mortgaged for a lifetime.

These are

the potential objects of an ideologically repressive system,

(h) Follow-

ing the original supposition of this study, there exists a small group of

62

Some of these groups are discussed in Penn Kimball, The Pi sconnected
Columbia University Press, 1972). Also, see the work of Claus

(New York:
Offe.
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individuals vdth inordinately more directing
influence and power on the

pattern of human
class.

behav:i.or

than any other group; this is the promoter

This elite, or combination of elites, defines
the

inain

contours

of the prevailing ideology at any historical time.
V/hile this elj.te or ruling class shapes the
prevailing consensus

"to fulfill the needs of those who rule," those in
the middle level of

power are usefully and correctly,

I

believe, identified by Wolfe's analysis

as serving the function of "transmission belts."

These are the ones who

fill out the contours of the ideological schema to be
reproduced.

The

growing role of the public relations industry, and its auxiliary
in the

information storage and retrieval system of the computer-centered industry,
bespeaks its significance to our economy and language structure.

This

public relations industry has now entered every important phase of ad-

vanced industrial society— most particularly, the national and multinational corporations and the government at all levels.

Perhaps the

most notable and questionable example of the use of public relations tech-

nology is provided by the

U.

S. Department of Defense's effort to promote

and sell its version of military policy.
and political structure is its lav/yer class
to dr-aw on contemporary cases.

Also integral to the economic

— the

John Dean's and Hugh Sloan's

This is, in general, the class that sur-

vives by being adroit and fluent as symbol manipulators, directing its

efforts to whatever the assigned goal.

"

53

Wolfe, p. 65; and chap. 3, "WTio Benefits from Repression?", pp. 60Also pertinent is C. Wright Mills' essay, "Man in the Middle: The
Designer," in his Power, Politics and People (New York: Ballantine Books,
n.d.), pp. 37U-306.
6h
One account is provided by J. William Fulbright's The Pentagon
Propaganda Ma.chine (New York: Vintage, 1971).
89.
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At the lowest range are the office workers,
petty technicians, and
assemblyline operators, and laborers of various
kinds.
The fractured
nature of the work tasks of this segment
makes its members seriously
limited in its ability to perceive and
comprehend the interconnections
and implications of a complex and
comprehensive social process.

Class

differentials in educational opportimities and
limited opportumty at

meaningful dialogue compound the problem.
The critical interpretation suggests that this
segment— the working
class, but more especially what is called the affluent
working class—

cannot allow itself to comprehend its social situation,
its alienation.

Affluence and a manipulated consumptive orientation have made
doubtful
the expectation Marx had, for instance, of the working class
becoming

conscious of its own alienation and struggling to throw it off.

The work

of Marcuse, Haberrnas, Touraine, and Gorz cast this Marxist proposition
into doubt.

Their claim is that the ideology of advanced industrial

society, technological rationality, prevents the concepts through which

people can feel and communicate this alienation.

Some careers are not

likely to be liberating ones, while individuals in others are not in a

position to critique the sets of interests that dominate.
For purposes of illustration, we may note that administrators and

65

This has been termed "the embourgeoisement thesis," and an important
sample survey of affluent i!.nglish workers was made to study the validity
of the proposition.
The researchers claim that little such embourgeoisement can be discovered. John H. Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker in
the Class Structure (England: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a
critique see,- James W. Rinehart, "Affluence and the Embourgeoisement of
the Working Class: A Critical Look," Social Problems, Fall 1971.
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managers, bankers and investors, accountants,
marketing experts, designers, lawyers, engineers, and technicians
of various kinds, as well as

many in education and research, are all
impelled to not question their
roles because they are the immediate beneficiaries
of a war economy that
must manufacture napa]jn, nuclear weaponry,
anti-ballistic missiles,

billion dollar submarines, and more and more
sopliisticated air- and
space-craft, and sell $8.5 billion annually in military
equipment to

foreign nations to keep its economy precariously afloat.

We can note

even the spinoff effect for florist shops from the
termi.nation of the

Vietnam War, so deeply

ar-e

the interests vested in the society.

The

interests that these various occupation groups are immersed in, then,
make it highly unlikely for them to want to question the overall
dynamics
of the system of which they are a part.

As Marcuse's theory maintains,

ideological structure has worked so well institutional needs have, in
fact, become individual needs.

As Touraine says it:

"What dorainates our

type of society is not the internal contradictions of the various social
66
systems and the needs of individuals."
The selling of the candidate for public office, in the manner of
selli.ng

everytMng else, has radically changed the nature of the American
67

party system in the past century.

Part of the process of the deperson-

alization of politics which was initiated by the Progressives' nonpartisan

^
Touraine, p. 6l.
67

The changed nature of the party system is the interpretation of
William Dean -Burnham in Critical Elections and the Mainsp rings of American
Politics (New York: Norton, 1970). Also see the work of Samuel Hays.
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efforts was extended in the more
thorough isolation of the candidate
and
elected officials from one another and
from their constituencies by mass
media techniques. As the process
proceeded, key features of citizenship
were dropped along the way, and voting
and party identification becaiae

an emptied ritual.

Most participants in the American
political scene

in recent years would have no recall of
the forms of participation that
occurred at the apex of the political party
in the nineteenth century,

acknowledging the limitation of the franchise
at thet time.

Voting has

been devalued and ritualized as other more leisure
activities have become

highly prized.

Some people may vaguely sense that there is not
much

significance to the voting decision and respond out of
civic duty or

social pressure.

Others fail to respond at all.

As Andrew Hacker brings

out, many corporate employees, belonging to the new
propertyless middle

class, are in no position to be active in politics; they have
neither the

interest nor the inclination to identify themselves vdth politics.
I believe it

can be successfully shown that the students of voting

behavior helped to give credence to the increasingly impoverished role
for citizensMp.

Marcuse's work provides two specific accounts of the

deflation of the meaning of participation in contemporary society.
Marcuse's treatment suggests that the definition of participation that
this school assumes, in fact, purveys a single meaning and any other

meanings escape them, because their interests foreclose any other possibility.

The studies Marcuse examines are now old ones but they are

classics; the one on political activity was conducted by Roper and

^
Andrew Hacker, "Polities' and the Corporation" in Hacker, ed..
The Corporation Ta k e-Over (Garden City: Anchor, 156h), pp. 23)3-25U.
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Woodward, the other is a study in industrial
sociology, the famous West ern

Electric or Hawthorne experiments.

Both still have their followers, and

contemporary counterparts to these studies are
available.

For example,

the professionally-acclaimed study by Verba
and Nie, Participation in

ATn^ica_-_Pon

follows the same

narrow definition of Roper and Woodward.

The analysis and conclusions

in the "human relations" study are followed by
the mainstream of public
admi.nistration.

So it is not too remote for our purposes to review
the arguments

Marcuse sought to make about these selected studies.

The direction of

his critique is guided by his conception of the term
"concept," as open

textured,

Ms.rcuse provides a cui^sory definition of "concept" as desig-

nation "the mental representation of something that is understood,
comprehended, known as the result of a process of reflection."

69

Marcuse

views concepts as abstract and general, "Because the concept comprehends

more and other than a pai'ticular thing

— some

universal condition or re-

lation which is essential to the particular thing, which determines the
70

form in which it appears as a concrete object of experience...."

Con-

cepts have "excess" meaning, they have a transitive nature by virtue of

this trait.

They do not merely denote one particular, concrete thing.

But this is just the what the empirical researchers, in the unwitting

separation of methodological from philosophical concerns, do.

In their

operational concepts and indices, they have created "reduced concepts,"
These, then, come to govern realityj they lead to a false sense of

"59

One Dimensional Man , p, 10^.
70
Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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concreteness, and, thereby, ac^iieve
a political function.

For Marcuse,

"the therapeutic and operational
concept becomes false to the extent
to

which it insulates and atomizes the
facts, stabilizes them within the
repressive^whole, and accepts the terms of
the whole as the terms of the
analysis."

The Woodward and Roper studies were a
series carried out over a

period of five years by the Public Relations
Department of the Standard
Oil Company of New^Jersey "to find out how
the company stands with the

American public."

In order to distinguish people who are
relatively

active in relation to political issues from
those who are relatively inactive, the researchers developed a procedure by
which to formulate an

operational index of "political activity:"'
The procedure followed was to write a large number of
questions, the answers to which would presumably throw
light on an individual's political behavior and then
try these questions out in personal interviews with a
test national sample of American adults. Some of the
questions are found not to work well in doorstep
interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to
yield results so closely intercorrelated that one
question could in effect stand for several others.
One of the problems here is one that all survey studies exhibit— asking

respondents what they do (and that within a fairly closed structure of
the interview schedule), not observing what they do.

This introduces a

bias based on the respondent's need to protect and develop a flattering

71
Ibid., pp. 107-108.
72
From: Julian Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of
American Citizens, American Political Science Review , Ui. (December 1950)
872-885.
73

Ibid., p. 872.
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self-image as he perceives is expected of him,
indeed, the attempt to
respond may become "a neurotic situation for the
person answering.

"'^^

Political activity, according to this derivation
nevertheless,
means:

(1) Voting at the polls,

(3) personally

(2) supporting possible pressure groups,

comunicating directly with legislators,

(I4)

participating

in political party activi.ty, (5) engaging in
habitual dissemination of
75

political opinions.

For Karcuse, these might be taken as the para-

digmatic cases of repressive participation, because they
so unreflectively

and uncritically accept the established parameters of conflict
(i.e., the
issuer to be debated) and drop so much else that may have bearing
on the

facts of political activity (e.g., the tendencies for a two-party system
to move toward a mid-point of consensus on many important issues; the

role of big publicity media in shaping opinionj the differing weights
various political interest groups have in the system; the significance
of influential contacts had between members of various elites).

With

this empirical formulation, Marcuse, suggests, many of "the determining,
76

constitutive facts remain outside the reach of the operational concept."

While the Woodward and Roper studies suggest the staging of a meaning
for political activity, the Western Electric studies illustrate the case

in which an unwarranted meaning is concluded from the set of facts.

(To

some extent the way the facts are arranged certainly help to do this.)

7I;

From, Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation
(December 18, 1972).
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argument critical of the reduced meaning of political activity
is illustrated as well in Marcuse 's conunents on Marvick and Janowitz's
paper, "Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent," pp. Ilii-ll8.
76
One Dimensional Man, p. 119.
Tlie

2kl
From the same facts another meaning is
readily arrived at when the point
of view taken is different. Marcuse,
for eocample, looks at the analysis
of worker complaints about working conditions
and wages. The researchers

took the general form of the complaints and
translated them into concrete

and particular referents.

For instance, the statement, "wages
are too

low," can be seen, as Marcuse views it, as
a statement that in its gen-

eralized form is meant to transcend a single
individual's experience and

indicate a relation relative to ojbects of the same
class; but for the

empirical researcher assigned to treating these complaints,
complaints

which cannot be treated as a class because the remedies
would be so
radical, these complaints must be regarded in particularized
forms,
as an individual's unique grievance.

The solution mi.ght be to provide

a loan for a worker, for instance, Marcuse writes:

"The general form

was dissolved into statements identifying the particular operations and

conditions from which the complaint was derived and the complaint was

taken care of by changing these particular operations and conditions."

77

Hampden-Turner makes the same point when he reviews the researchers'

study of the women in the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment.

This was

sometimes called "a bad experiment" by those who found their research

framework cast into doubt j human, subjective factors had been extran-

eously introduced.

It was discovered that workers' production increased

not because of any of the altered conditions of the environment but be-

cause in the process of setting up the experiment the women had become

involved in the decision-making process.

Two women were enabled to

77

One Dimensional Man, p.

109',

for this discussion, see pp. 108-llU.
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select four others to work with
them, and the foreman had been
removed.
According to the account:

With the foreman removed the girls
became so "cheeky"
that even the academics became miffed.
Evil^tually
two ringleaders were returned to
the shop floor. But
later in the experiment there was no
longer any question of discipline. The "independent
variables" were
discredited. It was the girls who had
the power now.
Ihey knew why they were working more
effectively and
the researchers were asking them for
the reasons.
We have no bosses here'" cried the
girls, sounding
not unlike the Wobblics, and they were
correct.
The
researchers, eager to discover any scrap of
evidence
that would expla.in the climbing productivity,
hung on
the girls' words, and immediately relented
when the
girls derfi,anded veto power over any feature
of the
experiment they did not like.^^
Aside from tins participatory role, the young women
had sensed their

importance now as co-experimentors they were no longer
;
merely workers.
Nearly every conclusion the researchers came to, was
voiced by the young
women and was not expressed in their "variables."

But when the findings

came to be institutionalized, the workers had lost control.

outcome

v/as

The eventual

to set up a counseling program involving figures of a "motherly"

sort, and this program was finally phased out.
I want to

turn now to the development of a model of repressive parti-

cipation, guided by the insights and theory of repression that Marcuse

provides.

Then,

I

plan to show its utility by applying it to a number of

controversial areas.

For instance, can we make some assessments as to the

character of participation in elections?

The suggestions that can be

drawn from the model will, undoubtedly, prove controversial, but the
benefit from undertaking this examination is that it will force theorists

from other perspectives to state more explicitly how they reach their

7B

The account is given in Charles Hampden-Turner, Ra dical Man - The
Process of Psycho-SocJ.al Development (Gai'den City, New York: Anchor,
1971), pp. 215-222, quote p. 218.
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assessments according to specific, justifiable
criteria.
The

follo^,ri.ng

paradigm of repressive participation,
which draws

from our foregoing discussion, is
constructed.

Participation becomes

repressive to the extent that:
1.

Fewer and fewer persons affected by public
decisions are involved

in the significant decision-making;
2.

the political and social importance of the
issues becomes more

and more limited and the issues themselves are more
and more particularized, vague, confused, or mediated by some limited
and instrumental point

of viewj
3.

the methods for arriving at informed, humane, and
just decisions

are mitigated through the control and access of necessary
information and

the shaping of the conceptual processes of the participants;
h.

an exchange of intersubjectively-achieved meanings between

affected members is limited;
5.

conformity to dominants cues is obtained through a system of

penalties and rewards so that the act of participation is not performed
for intrinsic and autonomous reasons.

Moreover, the contradictory sit-

uation of participants, when power relations are suspended in one issue
area for one period of time but not on others, must be perceived and recognized.

There must be the recognition that the basic relationship of

subordinate to authority will persist in other areas for some time and
have consequence for the forms of action taken;
6.

policies and decisions arrived at are not, in fact, carried out

and fulfilled.

From these features,

v;e

are enabled to examine instances of parti-

cipatory activity in terms of the degree to which they may fit or relate

2hk

to this paradigm.

Not every feature would be present
in every instance

for us to be able to speak of "repressive
participation."

The limiting case in which repressive
participation would be at its
extreme woiad probably occur under the
totalitarian structure. The role
of members of the Soviet Russian
political system would seem to indicate
most of these aspects.

Voting, which is the only apparently
political

act open to non- Communist Party members has
,
the most ritua.lized features
.

on several counts:

(l) Only elite party members take part in
the noirdna-

tion of candidates; (2) candidates seem to be party
members, receiving

nominations for their exemplary performance;
(3) the ballot lists only
one candidate for an office but, on occasion, a
candidate can be rejected

by scratcl:iing his name off; this act could call attention
to oneself, but

apparently one percent of the population is non-coaformist in this
way;
(J4)

all voters are expected (through a system of penalties and rewards)

to cast their ballot; one would have to be "artful" not to;
(5) information
is controlled by the party agencies and press;

(6) a generalized,

random

state of terror reinforced conformity under the Stalinist period, while

persecution of minorities and dissidents achieved the same coercive tone
in the post-Stalinist years.

The chief consequence for the members of

Russian society is the inabiQjLty to discuss freely personal troubles that
might be handled socially and politically, and the need to find ways to

remain inconspicuous or most exemplary to the commissar becomes crucial.
The situation is little different in the "total institution," which
80
Goffman defines in terms of what becomes of their inmates.
These are
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This section draws on the article by Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet
Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Fdssing One Percent," American
Political Science Review, 62 (September 1968) :8lh-826.
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Erving Goffman, -A sylu ms Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other InmaTes (T^w York: Anchor, I96I).
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places like prisons, asylums, and army
training camps, where few rights
are upheld for their inmates.

To one extent or another, all features
of

the paradigm would fit, with perhaps the
exception of (U) which may be

limited to the capacities and ingenuity of the
inmates.

There is

apparently in these places a higher emphasis on a system
of rewards and
penalties which satisfy basic physical and psychological
needs, needs

which are less controlled and easily obtained outside
the institution.
Until recently, such institutions operated their
internal affairs without

much interference from outside public authorities.

Matters have been

slowly changing as courts and legislatures are more concerned
to secure
its inir^tes basic human and procedur-al rights.

This outside pressure

may account for the simulacrum of participation which some institutions
practice, in the form of encounter groups or in other ways.
are asked their opinions, "consulted," but at the

sairie

Here inmates

time they are

treated as reduced beings in some defined respect and control over

conditions, including self-determination to come and go as one pleases,
is beyond reach.

Goffman's point was that the most important factor in

forming the character of persons in such institutions was their reactions

and adjustments made to its structure.

In "total institutions" the in-

mates may make primary and secondary adjustments, but the conditions disallov;

prisoners and army recruits, for example, from developing images

of self-respect and the cognitive and moral insights needed to make

social decisions once they have departed from the institution to rejoin
the community.
The structure in which constituents of a political machine in the

early style of Mayor Daley of Chicago find themselves may not be

2U6

strikingly different from some practices in
a total institution.
(5) of the

Feature

paradigm is most highly emphasized and other
features are not

aikely to receive as much attention from the
machine, largely because the
populations were new

iirimigrant

groups with language difficulties.

In an

important way, however, the city controlled by a
political machine is not
the saiae as a total institution, it is not cut
off from the general soci-

ety and has regular, commercial, social, legal and
other ties with an
open society and a critical press.

With conditi.ons supporting machine

politics apparently disappearing, this form of repressive
participation

may become more negligible.
The situation v/ith which we must be concerned is the national

Presidential election.

To what extent do these elections approximate

the features of "repressive participation" in the paradigm?

The contin-

uing declining voter turnout should be noted, perhaps as a sort of
secondai-y adjustment.

The

197i|

Gallup and Roper polls regard tbds

decline as related to the disillusionment

vjith

"Watergate" politics,

but the decline has been taking shape over many years as the political

parties continued to lose party identifiers.

paradigm appear applicable:

Many of the features of the

Feature (l) is manifest in several ways.

While more individuals have the opportunity to become involved in national
politics at the caucus, primary and convention levels, the chances are
not uniform, and elite control of local party organizations has been a

dominant factor in the exclusion of all interested groups.

Elite-made

strategic decisions tend to determine nominations and platforms.

Choices

are limited between two look-alike candidates; sometimes general elections
at the state level are not even competitive in this narrow sense.

Feature

2kl
(2) is approached to the extreme.

The general parameters of the
agenda

for political debate are seldom challenged
in a visible way.

'

When they

are, as was the case during the 1968 Democratic
Convention, efforts were

made to discredit its proponents.

In the two elections where clearest

distinctions, ideologically, could be made between
the candidates, turnout approached new lows.

Cross-cutting issues and the emphasis on

personality helped to confuse the process of choice.
1972 McGovern candidacy,

I

In the case of the

suggest it was as much the unfai.iiliar social

vocabulary of the cajididate as it was any other factor that
explains his
failure to engage a broader following.

operative in deep ways.

To this extent feature (3) was

Efforts to control the press by Spiro T. Agnew

as a matter of policy, the appointment of a Director of Coirimum
cations

as part of the

VMte House

Office, the alleged use of the Internal

Revenue Service to harrass news reporters, and other intelli.gencegathering activities, all attest to the attempt to control and manipulate
81

public opinion in other ways as well.

Less important are features

(ij)

and (5) except that other settings which could provide for the development of conceptual processes do not permit and encourage political
transactions, generally.
degrees.

Feature (6) is also satisfied in varied

Common usage acknowledges political "rhetoric" in terms of

the degree to which promises are not carried out or not carried out to
the extent necessary to make it more than token (for example, Nixon's
1968 secret "plan" to end the Vietnam War upon his election).
Wliatever interest there is displayed at national elections, there

81

The story begins with Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward's account.
All the President's Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, I97I4).
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is even less exhibited at state and local elections.

This pattern of

dropoff has usually been attributed to the nationalization of
politics
during the 1932 Depression and the politics of the New Deal.

Factors

such as industrialization and urbanization contributed to the tendency.
As community power studies seem to suggest, the difficulties of coping
in face-to-face situations with elite social and political dominance may

also be a factor.

Following the 196h Office of Economic Opportunities

legislation and later the Model Cities legislation, attention was refocused on this local level for citizen involvement.

But it brought

with it conflict by actively involving outgroups while the elected
officials own constituencies were not broadly involved.

Mayor Daley's

outrage, for instance, expressed a sensed loss of control.

Nevertheless,

the general problem, as many observers and participants themselves noted,
82

was that the community action boards were cooptive.

The minority

representative more often than not played the role of an Uncle Tom
caught in an ambiguous position.

Neither a solely recommending role for

the boards nor determination of issues by the majority rule principle
gave much sense of povier and self-respect to the emerging, politicallyconscious poor.

Especially is this so in the cases

inhere

their own

representatives were appointed by the mayor, not by themselves.

The

politicians, were, in the end, not at a loss for protection their
interests.

in play.

In mild ways features (2), (3), and {$) of the pai-adigm are

The way the community action boards were put to use, in cer-

tain instances, was to buy off and divert the aggrieved, the same

g2

For example, Kenneth B. -Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant
Observable
War Against Poverty - A Study of Conim.uni.ty Action Programs and
2hS"2Uli,
Row,
1968),
and
Harper
pp.
Socl'al ChangeTTJew York and EVanston:
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principle that was at work in the "human relations school."

Unless the

minority groups saw their role as a struggle against the existing
structure and its established values, such agencies limited ways for the

fullest development of its participants.
As the Western Electric studies show in regard to nianagement of the

firm in American society, management's solution to production problems
and the problems of alienation is, usually

vdien it

can be afforded, the

solution of therapy, informing, and consultation (from some critics point
of view,

— placation).

It is management's role in its pov/er of carrying

out the intent of ovmership to set the parameters of conformity in the
firm.

This is the most basic condition limiting the autonomy of the

employees and workers.

The firm, moreover, also has ties to the society

such that its rights and prerogatives of ownership are legally sanc-

tioned and upheld.

The problem of control may be more constrained in

non-union and company-union settings, but even in the unionized setting

of advanced industrial society there are, therefore, signi.ficant constraints.

As Touraine points out:

"In liberal societies, it is appro-

priate to say that unions' objectives are mostly withj.n the company

itself since the power of economic decision-making remains private and
the intervention of the unions is on the level of organization and

institution, either directly or by means of mixed or representative
83

consultative bodies."

The union when it exists has become a pressure

group among pressure groups, having to bridge the contradictions between

B3~~

•

Touraine, p. 18^.

j
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its needs for survival within the firm and the desire
to expand its

power base from outside the firm.

Rights and procedures are a matter of

generosity of the firmj workers may feel self-important in being
consulted
and sometimes their recommendations may be followed.

But, in the main,

there seems to be no federal law that requi.res them to be listened to,
just as there has been no application of the due process clause of the

Fourteenth /imendment to the private workplace.

The important decisions

made by management- -budgeting, personnel, objectives— as well as union
85

decisions, are still out of control.

To some extent or another, de-

pending on the particular characteristics of the workplace and the union,
one or all of the features of the paradigm apply.

But consistent frus-

tration of the worker, in terms of the contradiction between being consulted and not listened to, can lead to his/her politicization.
As

v/e

are coiidng to see, just in those settings vihere Devjey suggested

the opportunities existed for individuals to become more experienced and

intelligent in the making of social decisions, the opportunities are
limited or denied altogether.

That is true of the opportunities in the

local setting as much as in the workplace; it is true as well for the

— at

educational system
private or public.

the primary, secondary, or university level

The public secondary school model, which was exemp-

lified until recently by the New York City School Department, was highly

—W~

—

The beneficial results from increasing working involvement both
to the morale of the worker and for the sake of production— is recommended
by the Report of the Special Task Force to the Societary of Health,
Education, and V/elfare, Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press, n.d. [1973]).

Stanley Aronowitz examines this structure in close detail in False
Promises - The Snaping of American V/orking Class Consciousness (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1973), chap. ii.
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centralized and in the hands of a politically-appointed school
board who
was not representative of the various constituencies in the
city or
86

cognizant in any rationalized fashion of their peculiar needs.

Those

affected by their decisions were the most ignored and furthest removed

in the important processes of budgeting, personnel, and curricula programming.

Such

vjas

true, as well, in the university structure, whether pri-

vately or publicly controlled— a strange sit\iation, for the students were
in a good position to see the contradictions between the destructivenature of the production demands of the society upon the university and
the traditional function of the university to be intellectually independent
07

and critical.
ticularly:

Student complaints exhibited the role of fcatui-e (3) par-

The attempt to shape a conforraing consensus, in effect, boards

of trustees had final power as to what speakers might have access to the
campus and could inhibit associational activities in other ways

trolling funding and the selection processes of speakers, as
its faculty appointments and granting of tenure.

— by

vrell as

con-

by

Moreover, according to

some complaints, curricula was fragmented, uncritical, and not geared to

finding

vrays

to address and resolve social problems.

Where the opportun-

ities of developing the processes of conceptualizing and developing in-

formation for forming knowledge are most important, they are severely impeded.

The significance of such efforts at suppression was not lost on

EE

The work of Marilyn Gittell is helpful here; also, Mario Fantini
and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization Acl-iieving Reform (New York: Praeger,
1973), chap. 3.
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The structure is examined in Habermas' Toward a Rational Society
Beacon Press, 1972), chaps. 1 and 2, and in Touraine, chap. 2.
(Boston:

some student elements, and so the one feature that
vould make this
setting peculiarly repressive (3), the shaping of
conceptual processes,
is not achieved.

V
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Conclusion

Marcuse's attention to the Freudian theory of repression
and his

unique effort to apply the concept of repression historically
to advanced industrial society has proved useful.

We have been enabled to

draft a contrast model to the dominant conception of participation
in

political science today.

As a critical model, the paradigm of repressive

participation establishes a set of questions that must prompt the

libc-.Tal-

pluralists to reexajnine their empirical and normative theory of participation.

They must

nov:

demonstrate what tliey have so readily assumed, if

they wish to be taken seriously.

For others, it might compel more

rigorous investigation into quaJities of participatory forms in various
settings and the social trends developing with regard to these forms,

A Karcusean theory of impressive participation, nevertheless, remains

negative in character.
this particul.ar problem

Theorists of diverse perspectives have identified

— of

negation

—with

Marcuse's philosophic approach.

The point is that the critical approach Marcuse applies does not success-

fully lead out of a conceptual impasse.

transcent itself.
suggests:

It seems not to be able to

As Jeremy J. Shapiro, a student of Marcuse, critically

"Marcuse's retention of the two-dimensional model combined

with the biological trend of Freudian theory lead him to look for forces
of negation outside the very system which he has shown to have no outside.
Tills

prompts fluctuation between pessimism about the lack of a revolution-

ary agent and optimism that sometimes leads to an almost uncritical
8d

identification with existing anti-authoritarian forces."

Similarly,

SB

Jeremy J. Shapiro, "One Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic
of Tec^mological Eixperience" in Critical Interruptions , p. 185.

2^h
A. Maclntyre and Peter Clecak also
detect the problem but without seeing

his significance and dismiss him prematurely,
I believe.

Maclntyre, for

instance, in his polemic concludes that "Marcuse
underrates most men as

they are; the false contempt for the majority into
which his theory leads

him UTiderpins policies that would in fact produce
just that passivity and
that irrationalism with which he charges contemporary
society."

89

Un-

fortunately, Maclntyre himself fails to see that his own
position lacks
a view of the human being as a language -constituted being which
Marcuse »s

work embraces.

For another example, Clecak dismisses Marcuse by charg-

ing him with being a "utopian Marxist;" his critical theory becomes
90

"primarily a mode of therapy" and "a myth of consolation."

If we were

to take careful measure of Marcuse, it would be clear that the problem
of Majxuse's work is his involuted and metaphorical style.

His style

is not essentially analytic but literary, and this feature is severely

in evidence in the last part of Eros and Civilization and also in Coimterrevolut ion an d Revolt- - perhaps in these two pieces more than elsevjhere.
It may be conjectured that this style is explained by Marcuse 's cominit-

ment to the view that language that is not interest-dominated is essentially
open-textured.

We can gain this view from, for instance, his comment

in Essay on Liberation

:

"The new sensibility and the new consciousness

whiich are to project and guide such reconstruction demand a new language

(language in the wider sense
91
which includes words, images, gestures, tones....)."

to define and communicate the new 'values'

"59"

Maclntyre, He rbert Marcuse , pp. 10^-106.
90
Clecak, p. 199.
91
Essay on L iber ation , pp. 32-33.
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The least ambiguous recommendation Marcuse makes
touard a strategy
of change was expressed in his notion of the "Great
Refusal," the negation
.

of the negati on.

The notion was first proposed in One Di mensional Man

and has been reasserted elsewhere.

It was the notion that individuals and

groups must step outside the established system and "reject the rules
of
the game that is rigged against them."

It appears the concept originally

was more negative than the one applied toward the end of the 1960«s.

In the Essay, for instance, Marcuse began to hint that students and other

liberation movements could develop intervening structures and successful
counter-institutions.

His rejection of established settings, which

the basis for change for the radical liberals,

vjas

vras

premised on the view

that established institutions would become cooptive and that there was no

way to preserve one's integrity and autonomy by continuing relatioiiships
with established structures.

reverting to

hi-s

By the earD.y 1970" s, it seemed, Marcuse was

earlier pessimism, doubting the possibility of these

movements to overcome the force of dominant structures.
It has been my claim, however, that there are some latent possibili-

ties lurking in the philosophy of Marcuse.

Marcuse supplies, in effect

the "bridge" av;ay from a society of limited participatory forms toward a

more himanized and participatory society.

simultaneously

vje

And this is a possibility while

are members of the society undergoing reconstruction.

Importantly, Marcuse works with a dynamic philosophy of mind.

His concept

of man is that of the active and creative agent, the fabricator of his
own history.

And implicit in his thought is the vision of a qualitatively

different society, a society that is rooted economically in socialism.

His ideal society could very

we'll be a

Rousseauan, participatory society.

.
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whoce conditions are those which approach economic,
social, and political
equality.

Marcuse's philosophy, therefore, lends itself to a
synthesis with
the pragmatic tradition of thought, its theory of
knowledge, and view of

man as the active agent, or age nt -patient .

There is here a basis for a

synthesis between the radical-liberal perspective of Dewey,
Bachrach, and

Kaufman and the critical perspective of Marcuse.

For, what the radical

liberal contributes is its appreciation of the growth of knowledge in
terms of active persons in experiential settings trying to discover the

principles to guide social living.

The problem thus becomes one of

developing a strategy of change and of identifying structures of change.
One group has been more affirmative in this regard than Marcuse,

been recoraraended by Bachrach and Kaufman.

aiid

has

These ere the options provided

in the settings of the community, labor unj-ons, schools and imi varsities,
and the workplace (e.g., co-determination and self -management )

What becomes clear, if

vre

apply the significance of Marcuse 's theory

of repressive society to settings for participation, is that the meaningfulness of participatory settings only develops when participation

approaches the paradigm of "communicative interaction."

In the style of

good conversation, political discourse must be based on the mutual respect
of all parti cii)ants; discussion must pertain to important issues j and

deliberation must lead to a reasonable attempt to fulfill and realize the
intent of the decision.

Language, as the primary structuring force of

human consciousness, becomes the force for further scrutiny, for it is
this factor that can limit

— indeed,

prohibit— the participatory role of

some groups in advanced industrial society.

However, even if language

2Sl

is open-textured, it does not mean that we
can do without concept-

ordering and concept clarification.

The purpose of the next and con-

cluding chapter is to suggest the r elationship of
language as a

structuring force in society to forms of participation
and non-participation.
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CHAPTERVII
PARTICIPATION AND THE LANGUAGE-STRUCTURED
SOCIETY
This project began with two explicit
purposes:

(l) To illuminate

some basic uses of the term "participation,"
and (2) to consider whether,

theoretically, a defensible case for a politics
of participation in ad-

vanced industrial society could be adduced.

By way of conclusion, I

want to summarize the main distinguishing uses
of the term under in-

vestigation and, then, draw up the arguments for an
enriched conception
of participation.

I

want to clarify my notion of a humanj.zed, moral

participation in tenns of a particular feature of advanced
capitalist
society, vrhich is the language-structured character of its
social

groupings.

It is this particular feature of society

wMch

has been

Printed at in my critique throughout, and I wnat now to bring
it out more

fort brightly.

My analysis attempted to be, broadly, contextui\l.

It was my working

assumption that a theorist's concept of participation was related to other
features characteristic of

h3.s

perspective and explanatory approach.

Below, I summarize the usage of the t erm within each of the five interprettitions examined:
1.

The Classical Conception

According to the classical conception, members of a community are
required to be self -realized, moral agents.

Emphasis was placed on the

need to determine the "public interest" through widely-engaged in processes of debate, reflection, and
from this civic obligation.

de]J. be ration.

No one might be excluded

Individuals were expected to sublimate self-

interests to the interests of the community.

The expectation was that
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only in such a way might the individual achieve
"freedom" in civic
society, for rancor, of particular wills, have
been controlled rationally.
2.

Th e Liberal-Pluralist Conception

"Participation" is one of the laany roles assigned to
individuals

in democratic society.

Its members are "free" to engage in a range of

political forms, including voting, cairipaigm.ng, and running for
office.

They also may choose not to participate in these ways (but are not
justified in choosing other ways to express their interests).

In a

pluralist society it is appropriate to consider expanding opportunities
for citizens to participate.

But prospects for expanding participation

(say, as voting) among the working class is regarded as unlikely in view

of their more private-regarding interests.

When one "participates," one

is indicating one's personal or subjective preferences on alternative

choices.

It is meaningful to claim that the choices an individual maJces

in his role as one voter among many other voters effectively constitutes

control over the political process.
3

•

The Constitutional Republican Conception

"Participation" is a hortatory word, successfully used by the

liberal-pluralist to manipulate the electorate.

One important way it

is manipulated is in the local setting where elites have the power to

set the agenda and induce compliance to programs and proposals that fail

the test of constitutional legitimacy.

Citizen politics to reform the

political parties has proved counter-productive.

Advisedly, a policy

of non-partiqipation, of refusal to participate on the grounds of
principle, is advocated,
k.

A crisis of legitimacy will impel reform,

The Had Leal-Liberal Conception

"Participation" provides the best promise for a revitalized and
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socially Just polity.

But the narrow usage which
dominates social science

researcn, and poUtxcal rhetoric,
must be rejected in favor of
the classic
conception. Essential to the advancement
of this enterprise is the view
of the individual, not as a role-player
but as an active, creative huanan

being capable of redirecting history in
important ways.

The settings for

participation must be expanded beyond the
political parties and processes
to include the workplace, trade unions,
the schools and vmiversities, and
.

the local neighborhoods.

Special effort must be given to provide
meaning-

ful opportunities for sharing in decision-maidng
processes to those who
have heretofore been excluded from conventional
political processes.

Such forms of participation must require the
deliberation, debate, and
deternrlnation of issues of significant impact on
one's life.

Despair

of success can only lead to defeat, and so an
important component of the
radical-3.iberal case is the practical maxim that success is
in part con-

stituted by beli^ef in its possibility.
^*

lhe__Radical Case of Ma rcuse

Conventional fonns of participation in advanced capitalist

society (for

exa^iiple,

voting and being consulted) are "repressive," and

this repression is unnecessary.

Social and political arrangements compel

forms of t>u.nking and behavior, through psychological defense mechanisms,

on the part of the great mass of individuals so that they are unable to

reflect critically upon the alienating and destructive character of their
li.fe.

Life is irrational, instrumentally and substantively.

The needs

of the teclinological society have become primary, not the needs for growth
and autonomy of the human being.

The condition is so dominant that it

is not likely that more than a few elements of the population will be
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able to perceive the social mlaise (e.g., blacks,
poor, feminists, and

radicalized students).
negation," a deliberate
thought and behavior.

Their strategy should be the "negation of
atteirij^^t

to break the established structure of

Under some conditions acts of protest may be

appropriate.

From the review it becomes clear that far from having a simple and
clear-cut socially-established meaning, the term "participation" is

complexly related to a theorist (s whole structure of thought.
I

would like to turn now to the basis for grounding an enriched con-

ception of participation for advanced industrial society.

The task is

controversial since the failure of the New Left's rhetoric to either
capture or hold the public Blind to the significance of a participatory
1

democracy.

Nevertheless,

I

believe the failure of the rhetoric and the

resistance of corporate and political institutions to advance opportunities can be coped with in steady and constructive ways and that the

human benefits, in terms of the reaffirmation of liberal values like free
speech and free press, vjarrant the continued effort in this direction.
It seems to me that the compelling moral justification for expanding

participation is best set out by that tradition of ideas beginning

v.dth

Rousseau, but tracing itself out in the arguments of Dewey and Kaufman,
on behalf of fundamental human rights.

Participation is a right that

follows from the fundamental human right of "respect for persons."

The

argument for equal consideration for every person defeats the claims

1

The doublebinds of radical analysis is
Ra dical P aradoxes - Dilemmas of the American
Harper and Row, 197U). This study, however,
of radical analysis j this surely seems to be
of Marcuse's ideas.

the subject of Peter Clecak,
Left:
19U5-1970 (New York:
may overstate the failures
the case with the exposition
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of the tecl:inocrat at the start.
It is easy to give verbal homage to the notion
of expanded parti-

cipation.

We can note how closely this fits in with
liberal-pluralist

rhetoric v.lthout effecting the qiaality of life significantly.

For,

social and political arrangements may go in important directions
to
modify, limit, and deny its own promises.

It seems to me that Marcuse's

analysis of the specific structiire of contemporary false consciousness
is

substantially correct, because what he points to is how actual social
practices conceal the dehujnanizing nature of capitalist-consumer society.
I

believe his insight into the superfluously, or historically specific,

repressive features of society is theoretically sigrdficant .

There may

be difficulties in rigorously investigating repression sociologically,
but it is a critical conception

wl-iich

it would be unfortunate to give up

2

just because it is intractable.

It can be suggestive in this v;ay.

VJhat

it prompts us to focus on is how the limits of hm\&n conduct can be insti tu-ticnally

proscribed in subtle, unjustified

vjays

— linguistically.

But Marcuse does not develop a theory that would guide action generally.

At least, the notion of the "Great Refusal" does not seem to satisfy this

criterion very clearly.
The radical-liberals would seek to expand more developed forms of

participation than have been generally practiced heretofore during the
twentieth century.

But their most outstanding critics suggest that a

pai-ticipatory politics, even though sustained by radical pressure,
underestirriates the resistance of the large, established economic and

2

This claim is asserted by Robert Paul Wolfe, "Marcuse's Theory of
Toleration," Polity, 6 (Summer 197U) :U7l;-U75.
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political institutions, and the only resolution
to this difficulty is a

pontics of militant socialism.
recommendation.

There are several difficulties with
this

It is by no means evident that this
strategy is any more

precise and clear-headed than the one advocated by
the radical-liveralsj
nor is it clear that the present social conditions
are appropriate to a

meaningful hearing of its claims j finally, it is not
so certain that a
socialist society necessarily realizes universal social
justice and freedom.

There is an arrogance of vision and means betrayed in
the approach

that is lacking in the pragmatic approach to inquiry.

I

believe that we

can frame an em'iched theory of participatiomMch combines the
best of
the Marcusean and radical-liberal perspectives.

The problem of social-

izing at least some segments of the economy stands as important but not
as primary, then.

One way this might be done is as follows.

The focus of om- attention

is on the nature of "action," since the word "participation" belongs to

the family of "action" concepts.

To participate means "to take or have

a part or share of or in; to possess or enjoy in coinmon with others; to
taJce part;

to have a part or share; to share

(

Oxford EngLls h Dictionary )."

Implied in the common usage of the verb, to participate, is a "shared"
community.

In what way can we say that the range of activities of members

of a commurdty is constituted by this community?

An answer to this problem resides in the conception of the human
being which a political theory assumes.

My review of the political inter-

pretations in this study has been critically linked to a conception of
the human being not as a behavioral mechanism in conformance with laws

but as an active, creative being

infonr^_by_jn^

The contention has

been that the conception of the human being
in a system of explanation
to an important extent limits the
possibilities a political theory is

able to envision.

This was Rousseau's significant insight.

A culture is

in good measure characterized by what a people
believe they are.
constraints are not primarily biologic but mental.

The

Contemporary social

science in its behavioral orientation has supplied
a limiting and dis-

torted vj.cw of political possibility in advanced
industrial society and,
it may even be suggested, seals itself off from
self-corrective possi-

bilities.

We need to correct this distorted conception that
conventional

political science has resorted to by developing alternative
interpretations
rooted in an understanding of man as an agent, an active being engaged
in various forms of practice.
If, under this conception, the hiunan being can be d efined as a being

that has intentions, then how tliose intentions arise and are formed becomes
a

most important subject for political inquiry.

This is the common groimd

chared between radical-liberals (e.g., Dewey-Kaufman) and a critical-

radical like Marcuse.

They shared the concern with the way "objective

interests" are formed in advanced industrial society.

I

think Touraine's

conclusion in his study of Post-Industr ia l Society is essentially correct
in this regard:

"What we need most urgently is not an analysis of social

behavior but of society, considered no longer as a situation but as a

3

See Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Actio n (New York: Viking Press,
1959); Alasdair Maclntyre, "B.motion, Behavior and Belief" and "Rationality
and the Explanation of Action" in Against the Self-Imapes of the Age (New
York: Schocken Books, 1971) J and Steven Lukes, I ndividualism (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1973), chap. 20.
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system of action, a network of cultural
orientations and power relationships."
Jurgen Habem^s and Claus Mueller
significantly undertake this
sociological task5 and

I

believe this work follows up the critical
in-

sights of Marcus e in fruitful ways.

5

Consciousness in advanced industrial society is
mediated and controlled by language.

Social language serves not only as the repository

of cultural traditions and as the instrument by
which individuals
establ3.sh links between themselves and others it
j
also has a socio-

political function for securing legitimacy.

Control through predicta-

bilj.ty is not obtained coercivcly in a physical
sense in those places

which have highly developed communications and inforination
apparatus,
but by the structuring of roles.

in various ways.

to class position.

And this is accomplished linguistically

The ways, it seems apparent, are related to some extent

Since language is the vehicle for sharing in the life

of a community as much as it is the vehicle for self-reflection and in-

dividuation, an individ ual's langua ge development sets the limits of his

Alain Tourai.ne, The Post-Industrial Society (New York:
House, 1971), p. 229.

Random

3'

From Habermas I found particularly helpfiil "Technology and Science
'Ideology'" in Toward A Rational Society (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1970),
Beacon Press, 1972);
pp. 81-122 J Kno wledge and Human Interests (Boston:
and "Labor and Interaction: rLemarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy o f Kind"
in Theory and Practice (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1973). Habermas seems to
have been directly influenced by Dewey and the pragmatic model of inquiry.
as

And, Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication - A Study in
Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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action.

Distorted commumcation becomes a question
of considerable

importance to the extent that it interferes with
open political communication, "since the intentional and unintentional
distortions. . .preclude
the articulation of deraands as well as an
unobstructed discussion of
6

specific issues."

I

want to sketch some possible connections
between

language-structuring in society and some forms of
participation and nonparticipation.

I

sm trying to show that it makes a difference what
con-

cepts we load the political environraent and the political
socialization

processes

i/ith.

And this sketch may, ultimately, make clearer the

relatio2iship between Bachrach and Kaufman's ideas and Marcuse's
critique,

and

will point to some further directions for social and political

I

analysis.

The idea

I

want to suggest is schematized in Table 1.

V^at the

table does is chart participatory (and non-participatory) forms, already

identified in the main text, in terms of participants' level of understanding of language.

There is established six corresponding roles of

language as the vehicle of self -understanding.

The stages are progressive

in terms of the capacity for language; they would seem to be invariable,
I

wnat to quote Mueller to the point here:

"If the semantic, vocabulary,

and syntactic levels of his language are limited, the individual is not
7

likely to develop his full potential."

The perspective of this schema

is historically-specific and critical; that is, it doubts the capacity

for present socio-political arrangements to effect the cognitive and

-z

—
Mueller, p. 16,

7

Ibid., p. 17.
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emotional development of

,„oot

posalblUties are available.

h^«n

beinos.

But

i

t

does not deny that

A. KuelDer-s analysis
sugReato, the absence

of effective legitimating rationales
is a problem to which the
political
system has no answer. .'It is precisely
this problem that undermines,"
Mueller argues, "a political system
tenuously held together by material
benefits."

B
Ibid., p. 182.

j

PARTICIPATORY STATES AND CORRESPONDING UNGUAGE
1.

2.

3.

Non-Participation
fxxcludod groups; oppressed
isolatfid and luunobili zed;
latent protestors

Kon-Participstion as Acquiescence
Vague recognition of costs of nonconforiJiity; these individuals see
themselves v.athout complex needs or
rights—as objects; accept roles as
defined; sometimes too con^fused to
make much meaning out of them
Participation as Role-Playing
Indi.viduals get some returns-material
rewards or some modicum of security;
liberal style and image may be
attractive; sees relationship to
system as a social contract; Performance Principle dominates the Pleasure
Principle
(a) Dependent Participation voting, performance of civic duties,
etc.
Has a well-developed rationa].ity for hj.ding irrationality
(b) Cooptive Participation (CAP), collective bai'gaining, human
relations programs
Elites attempt to ameliorate alienation through consultation and limited
opportuTii-ties for self-determination

U.

5.

6.

Non-Participation as Refusal
Individuals refuse to play by the rales
of the game; reject the settings of
politics as usual; problem here is
that such activity may remain uncopjiected to the political process
and so do nothing to reform or change it
Protest
Ex. strikes, parallel and counterinstitutions; Cohn-Bendit 's "march
through the institutions"

Participation as Becoming
Worker's Control; community control
corporations; characterized as developing an articulate notion of principles
needed in pubLic decision-making;
capacity to identify with position of
others; to operate with foresight; to
uphold authentic ideals; non-repressive
ci-Q.ture

Fi^JlTURES

Language functions as
expansive rhetoric and
token action

Language functions to deny
one's own features, to
repress; simple language
forms satisfy

Language functions with myths
and illusions to develop a
complex, anesthetic rationality to protect established
structure of interests (property
derived) gives cues to
penalties for non-conformity

(Sham experience may provoke
reassessment of one's role)

Language functions as cri.ticue;
language coritains referents to
limits of the possible; "language
of authenticity"

Language serves as g^aides to
action; importance of strategic
concepts

Union of thought and actionPraxis; attention is directed
tov/ard improving his, and
otners, life-condition
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1.

Non-participation is a widespread feature
of advanced indus-

trial society, and for some it is a
non-selected pattern of response to
the political environment. It is
simply the natural condition and
predica/nent of that segment of society which
remains isolated or marginal (e.g., Appalachians, migrants, ghetto
poor, urban aged).

These are

the underprivileged who do not even form a
social class because the
economi.c system does not profit from their
labor.

irrelevant, and

afi

They are virtually

Habermas points out, their demands have merely

an "appellative" character.

At this primary language level, the oppor-

tunity for sharing in a wider social community is
minimalj the language
code is "restricted."

Liberal rhetoric to participate does not even

stretch to meet this disadvantaged segment of the population.

This is

best exhibited by the nature of governmental programs under
a liberal
admini.stration targeted to this group.

As in the War on Poverty program,

these were conceived of as "training" prograias intended, at most, to

provide a irdnimal skill.

To quote Mueller again:

"The absence of

sufficient conceptual development and of certain value predispositions,

which is related to both socialization patterns and language codes, can
prevent the individual from understanding the political code of society."
2.

At the next stage, non-participation may be more nearly a form

of acquiescence based on the vague recognition of the structure's penalt j es for non- conformity.

complex needs or rights
among equals.
to them.

These individuals see themselves without

— more

particularly, as objects rather than equals

They believe they must accept the limited roles available

Their language code is, again, properly regarded as "restricted

9

Mueller, p. 17 and chap. 2.
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to apply Basil Bernstein's distinction.

But I would want to detach this

conception from the author's apparent anti-working
class bias, for some

working class groups have highly developed linguistic
structures and
some middle class groups, if we accept the repression
thesis, are, indeed *
10
impoverished in their communicative capacity.
The language content here

may be one of resignation (e.g.,

nou

can't fight city hall.").

Perhaps

individiuils joined in this class have felt victimized by the
manipulation

of vjords by the politicians and other interest groups.

Power is not per-

ceived, however, as connected directly to the manipulative factor of

specific language forms.
3.

With the opportunities for widespread public school and higher

education and the pervasiveness of the mass media, a large segment of the

population has gained a general fluency of language.

But language as a

vehicle of communication has become sophisticated at the level of logic,
not at the level of conceptualization.

Perhaps the concept of "language-

game" becomes helpful here, v/here individuals are able to apply the rules
of the language-game in appropriate ways but they are unable to step out

of the structui-e of social reality it creates to investigate it with
11
Habermas is helpful here in the distinction he
objective criteria.
dra.ws betvreen

the model of "purposive-rational activity" and "communi-

cative interaction."

The key feature of the pruposive -rational model

is the absence of norm-guided principles.

Science and its mode of justi-

fication leads to the (false) equation of all human problems to teclmical

10

Harold Rosen, La nguage and Class - A Critical Look at the Theories
of Basil Bernstein (Bristol, England: Falling Wall Press, 1972).
11

The notion of "language -game" has been helpful to me; it is
discussed in, for instance, Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1973), chap. 9.
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problems.

A lai)guage without a norm-guided principle
manipulates con-

sumers and also m^anipulates participation
forms by robbing language of
its

HolUical meaning.

In the critique of Dahl's conception of
partici-

pation, and of other behavioralists generally,

I

tried to point out the

effort to hypostatize one notion of participation
as real, based on a

scientistic argument.

As Mueller argues, "...vast segments of the pop-

ulation are integrated into the political order because
their capacity
to engage rationally and s^bolically in public
discourse is severely
12

limited by their linguistic environments."

We have noted, for instance,

how little face-to-face dialogue occurs between voter and
candidate in
recent election years.

Several particular developments might be expected from the social

process which depoliticizes and limits interactive forms of communication.
Language-games may proliferate in order to cover the diverse fancies of
"individiuilized" groups (e.g., Tippies and other kinds of subculture

groups).

This is an "inverted" individualism, for what is accomplished

is the fragmentation of the collective energies of the social comjiunity.

Promotions are rampant.

As well, the language as the vehixle of self-

reflection and individuation may become impoverished in grammatical ways
and the shared vocabulary still more constricted, repetitive, and redundant.

It seems, many cultural critics are now concerned with the

qualj.ty of the English language itself.

It may be that this is what

must occur for the purposive-rational model to predominate; in all ages
it seems, institutions have a need to transfix language,
ii.

If the suggestion to this point is correct, that forms of

12

Mueller, p. 12.
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participation are directly related to language
capacity of the participants, then it becomes important to a theory
of a participatory society
that language capacities be advanced and
distorting structures be iden-

tified.
vias

Marcuse's recommendation to overcome the problem
of repression

to remove one's self from the ongoing structures
of society, the

process of "negation of the negation."

What he did not directly express,

but what, I believe, was implied in that formulation,
was some sense of
a linguistic breakthrough or transcendence.

This can occur, for instance

when individuals begin to share their

experiences as in the case

comiTion

of the Vauxhall plant, in the account of Gorz,

13

The notion of a language-game is of that order of insight, a

linguistic breakthrough, for it suggests a reflective understanding
through language.

That it is our language, and it goes a good deal

toward shaping our world.

Attention is directed to the level of con-

ceptualization, of developing criteria by which to inspect the shared

community's rules and standards and interests.
It would be an interesting subject-matter, I think, to study the

13

Andre Gorz, "Workers' Control is More than Just That," in Hunnius,
Gars on and Case, eds., Workers' Contro l
A Reader on Labor and S ocial
Chang e (New York: Vintage, 1973), PP. 332-335. This was the setting
for the Goltthorpe survey of workers which found them individiially resigned
to, if not reconciled with, their condition.
Gorz writes:
"And as they
discussed things, they found out that they all felt alike: They felt
apathetic but frustrated^ they were apathetic because, as individuals,
in their individual isolation and loneliness, no one could do anything
But when people start talking about their loneliness,
to change things.
their frustration, their powerlessness, they cease to be isolated and
povrerless.
They start melting into a group which holds immeasurably
greater power than the individual power of all those who compose it." p. 33U.
Ih
Wittgenstein is quoted to this point: "We remain unconscious
of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language games because the
clothing of our language makes everything alike." Kenny, p. 166.
;
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conditions which would bring about this insight.

One of the points I

believe Bachrach and Kaufman were suggesting
about forms of cooptive

participation was that the disjunctions experienced
in this form of

participation might prompt some such reevaluation of
the established
cultural language.
Tl-iis

fourth stage is a critical one, then, because it begins
to

question and invalidate the cultural language-game an individual
has

been initiated into.

Individuals refuse to play by the "rules of the

game," and language has begun to serve as the vehicle of a critique
of

established authority relations.
5.

Language now viewed in an objective sense may lead to a para-

doxical situation.

It allows individuals to control others; but it

also allows them to join with others in the use of language at the level
of

coriiiTiuni.cative

interaction.

It can reinstitute communication as the

search for the realization of practical goals.

"It is governed by

binding consensual nor !ns_, which define reciprical expectations about
behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two
acting subjects.

Social norms are enforced through sanctions.

meaning is objectified in ordinary language commimication.

Their

WOiile the

validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically
true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms
is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding
15

of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations."
At thJ-s level language opens up new possibilities for participation, and
I

think these are suggested in such experiments as the "free universities"

Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" p. 92.

27h

and worker's control movements.

As Touraine points out:

"Alert educators

have replaced the idea of a worker-literature or
a worker culture with
the much

:nore

realistic and fruitful description of workers
participating

in the total culture—which may mean participating in
a movement of
16

overall social and political opposition."
The paradigm case of developed language capacity would
be non-

6.

distorted

com:nujii cation,

"commmiicative interaction."

action are related synergestically.

^

Thought and

Language is dialectical and con-

ceptualj there is an appreciation of developing socially, strategic

guides to conduct.

Individuals at this level, ideally, would have

achieved a moral sense, and these individuals' lives would be bound up
vri.th

the life of the comiTiunity.

Characteristic features of the person-

ality would seem to include the capacity to identify with the position of
others, to act with foresight, and to uphold authentic human ideals.

Hampshire provides a rich characterization at this level vMch

I feel

merits citation:
That the thought which guides action may attain to different
degrees of explicitness, and may correspond to different
degi^ees of self-consciousness, has been a constant theme of
this book. The more explicit a man is in formulating to
himself the ends of his action, and the grounds upon which
his decisions rest, the more he is aware of himself as
having made choices between specific possibilities, choices
that are always subject to revision. The more selfconscious he is in his criticism of his own intentions
and activities, the more he is aware of the limits of his
habits of classification, limits that determine the
possibilities open to him. He becomes aware also of the
limits set by conventions of communication and classification into w^iich he was born. He can begin endlessly to

1^
Touraine, p. 196.
See Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" pp. 92'%,
and Mueller, p. 20.

question and tc criticise the vocabulary and
the form
of language which he has learnt always to
use jn
considering alternative ends of action. He
cannot
any longer consistently think of his more specific
judgments of ultimate value as timeless truths,
insulated from his practical intentions, or of his
practical intentions at any time as disconnected from
his opinions about the essential powers and interests
of men. His moral and political opinions, and his
practical intentions, are two phases of a single
process of thought that always revolves in his mind
aro\md his idea of the activities that are essential
to men, of those that, are essentially destructive and
that prevent men from realizing their potentialities
as human beings. lo
Communi.cative interaction would be guided by the purpose of forming
a

non-repressive culture that aims at the harmonized relation between
emotions and reason.

Sublimation is of a non-repressive kind.

Partici-

pation is represented in the idea of "becoming," or in Dewey's notion
of the realizing self.

The life of action is cliaractcrized as a process

Participation is no longer a fractured-segmental, assigned and instru-

mental role.

It is a style of conducting one's life in a community.

Participation conceived as "becoming" can avoid the problem of moral
claims turning into empty, manipulative rhetoric.

The study of parti-

cipation can become the study of political biography:

"In the future,

ideals will not be communicated by attempts to describe them, which

inevitably distort, but by the models of an appropriate conduct in life.
This was also the point of Tolstoy's stories.

I

believe that we have

some examples of such communities of participants so that this ideal is

19

Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig V/ittgenst ein, With a Memoir
Horizon Press, 1965), p. 135.

(New York:
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not practically impossible ^ the Quaker meeting
may be suggested, and so

might the

Amsh

commuiii.ty.

Gandhi's ideal of the "satyagraha" campaign

is also appropriate.

Obviously, this is only a very general and hypothetical
sketch of

relationships between language-structuring and forms of
participation
and non-participation.

I

believe it offers some advantages.

For one

thing, this model overcomes the .limitation provided
by one recommendation

that suggests "we increase the cognitive appeal of
propaganda."

It does

not lean heavily on flamboyant rhetoric or. Utopian visions
and avoids

political parsdysis.

In other ways it may be of benefit.

It may begin

to offer some clues for developing constructive strategic guides
to a

more radical, humanized process of social change.

By focusing on

language capacity, we have focused on the root structuring principle in

contemporary society.

Social and economic equality have been seen as

essential conditions for the reform of society in Rousseau and
wi-iile

Mai-x,

not much attention has been directed to the need for linguistic

equality, the implicit insight Marcuse gained from psychoanalysis.

The

symbolically-satiated environment and the growingly impoverished natui'e
of social interaction in the United States, for example, presently ought

to be a disturbing sitiaation for persons concerned with sustaining and

extending humanistic values.

Participation would promise to provide a meaningful mode of activity
for the advancement of this purpose.

I

shall sketch here, now, my model

of a humanized participation:
1.

It involves individuals acting as moral agents, who have become

conscious of the demands meaningful, purposeful participation places on
them.
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2.

It will begin at the local setting,
close to the lives of most

individuals and where it can be expected that
individuals will begin
to relate specific local, contradictory
problems to the general condition
of society.
3.

Rationality, as dialogue and action in the service
of social

justice and human dignity, will be achieved by
virtue of the application
of a broader frame of rand to public problems
developed through expanded

public discussion via the media, socializing agents,
and through other
creative ways,
h.

This will require that our theory of participation be
connected

to some more fully articulated account of the place of
language in group

and community interaction.

There will be a need to investigate and dis-

tinguish "technical" from "promotional" languages.
5.

In compromising settings participants must have a mode of

analysis, a set of meaningful explanatory concepts, that helps to explain

the structure of relations.
6.

Finally, members of communities must have opportunities and

settings to develop and confirm these capacities, the significance of

which Marcuse missed.

I

doubt that all the opportunities to expand

humanized forms of participation have been seized.

Especially important,

as Andre Gorz and others bring it to our attention, is participation in

the workplace (e.g., worker's control structures) as an advancement to

practices of industrial democracy and collective bargaini-ng.

E. F,

Schomacher, for another, reports on the imaginative experiment of one

ovmer of a profitable business finn in England who transfered ownership

in

19'jl to his

employees.

The Scott Bader Commonwealth continues as a
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highly successful venture, expanding worker
satisfaction, as well as
20
contributing to many charitable purposes outside
the organization.

There are other possibilities to consider.

Starting at the local

level of government, there are many places for
the imaginative consti-

tution of a participatory style of politics.
boards are in urgent need of reform.

Planning boards and zoning

In metropolitan areas neighborhood

control corporations provide an excellent remedy to
urban decay and
poverty.

The experiments in community control of the schools,
with

firm recognition of the need to eliminate racism and
parochialism and
vjith a

participatory role for faciaty and students, remains an option.

22

Metropolitan areas are suffering from housing blight, and this also
is an opportunity for members of a housing community to organize its
own

management system.

This solution may even be the one that forces itself

upon residents of buildings and housing complexes where the landlord has
23

abandoned property claims.

Hospitals and other organizations lend

themselves to democratic participatory governance, though this has not

been widely tried.

20
For this interesting story, see E. F. Schumacher, Small i s
Beautiful - Economics as If People Mattered (New York: Harper T'orchbooks,
1973T7Tp. 258-266.
21
Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Goveriiment
The Local Foundations of
Political Life (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Also,
Charles Hamden-Turner, From Poverty to Dignity
A Strategy for Poor
Americans (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 197i-i).
;

:

22

Mario Fantini and I-Iarilyn Gittell, Decentralization;
Reform (New York: Praeger, 1973).

Achieving

23
V/all

"Crime and Fear Decline as Tenants Take Over Housing Development,"
Street Journal, April 18, 1973.
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At the regional level, plaiining
districts, where technical,

engineering, and real estate d ecisions
all too often predominate, have
a need for the inception of popular
participation.

suggested for environmental councils.

The same could be

At the national level the re-

establishment of a constitutional politics requires
that those shut out
from political party structures-for example,
various groups at party

presidential conventions-should persist in thejr
endeavors to advance
their just claijns to participate, and

tMs

can be legally achieved.

One might imagine public convocations on national
policies and the in-

itiating of a comprehensive, long-term plan of controlled
growth for the
country.

Perhaps a now constitutional convention is in order.

There are also movements in the process of establishing their
claims

—the

woman's movom'jnt which is pressing claims for equal dignity and

opportunity, for

exairiple.

and consumer movement

There is, as well, an active "public interest"

grovri.ng

in

tMs

country.

Launched by Ralph Nader,

it envisions the inception of widescale public citizenship, of people

who will hold governiaent and corporation publicly accountable.

Thei'e

are, as Nader recommends, the possibilities for opening up boards of
26

trustees and independent regulatory commissions to public representation.

~2T~~
Recognizing the need to decentralize planning, through the influence of Jane Jacob's study Death and Life of Great American C i ties ,
the New York City Planning Department has rejected its ear]j.er commitment
to a master plan in favor of miniplans. Paul Goldberger, "Why City is
Switching from Master Plan to Miniplans," New York Times , June 27, 19lh',
and Glenn Fowler, "Community Boards Assert Growing Influence on the
Financing of Capital Projects," New York Times , September 22, 191k*
25;

—

Bo Burlingham, "Popular Politics The Arrival of Ralph Nader,"
Working Papers , Summer 197h. And also, John W. Garner, In Common Cause

(New Yark:" Norton, 1972).
26
Eileen Shanahan, "Reformer: Urging Business Change Ralph Nader
the Consumer Advocate Calls for Federal Charter for Corporations, and
Much More, In A Plea for Business Reform," New York Times , January 2ii, 1971.

—

280

Finally, both public and private
bureaucracies might be re-conceived
in
27
terms of the demands of a "public
interest."
These are some of the
more apparent possibilities which may
offer opportunities to broaden

sectors of the population to become
engaged in political dialogue as
the first step toward the more participatory
society.

Mobilizing the participatory society will
also requi.re the directed
and conscientioiLS efforts of social scientists
and governmental leadership; the assistance of corporate leadership
would be an asset but

unlikely.

The role of governmental agencies will be
to establish and

further the opportunities for wide-spread public
participation.

Re-

invigorating the party organizations in a more populist
direction will

probably be required.

The role of responsible social scientists will be

to exanilno participatory styles and to explore the possible
avenues for

developing cognitive and affective capacities that will make
participa-

tion in various settings

a

more meaningful, self-realizing experience.

The participatory life and the participatory style of politics,
in

conclusion, presents itself as a just and firm alternative for resolving

the contradictions of an advanced industrial-capitalist society wliich

places more claims on consumption than useful production, which makes
more claims on the human mind to conform than to seek autonomy, and
wbj.ch institutionalizes poverty amidst affluence.

The problem of find-

ing specific ways to encourage a self-realizing participation remains.

27

One argument is that of Kenneth A. Megill, Th e New Democrati c
Theory (New Y'ork: The Free Press, 1970), chap. 7. He suggests: ""By
rejecting the distinction between policy malcer and policy implementer,
the new democrats have opened up the possibility for the development
of control institutions in an advanced industrial society." p. 116.
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To this point we have recognized that the
synthesis of the radical-

liberal case for participation and the radical
critique of Marcuse rests

on the recognition that social reconstruction is
not exclusively a task
of addressing material conditions.

The symbolically-satiated environ-

ment and the growingly-impoverished nature of social
interaction in the
United States pose the particular problem of discovering
and fostering

those conditions that develop the Hnguistic and conceptual
capacities of
all persons, and this is the engagement of all in the ongoing
human

dialogue we know as politics.

.
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